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This thesis is an analysis of the social, political and historical inter-relationships 
between moving image technologies, constructions of gender and sexuality, and 
theories of science and technology. Presented as a series of case-studies on film, 
video, medical imaging and computer technology in the work of five women artists, 
this thesis looks at the way in which artistic practice overturns traditional theories of 
technology as purely ‘instrumental’, theories of the subject in which identity is tied 
to the body, and the assumption that women do not access technology in a 
sophisticated way. It considers the various ways in which women artists have 
engaged with, and subverted, the explicit body in representation through deploying 
new moving image technologies at the historical moment of their widespread 
distribution across domestic, artistic, pornographic and medical spheres. It ends by 
asking what is the political potential in challenging the anthropomorphic and 
destabilizing the figurative through abstraction?  
 
Beginning with an investigation into the way in which Carolee Schneemann uses the 
material properties of film to establish a haptic encounter, in which female and feline 
bodies are caught up in a sexual economy of touch (pet/petting), this thesis then 
looks at the work of Kate Craig and the mutual expansion of pornography and home-
video technology, questioning the emergence of the ‘amateur’ in relation to theories 
of power and gender; offers a technological and philosophical modeling of medical 
imaging technology (taking endoscopy in the work of Mona Hatoum as a case 
study); and re-evaluates the use of binary in information systems beyond a limiting 
analogy with ‘Western binaries’ through the work of Nell Tenhaaf. Using the 
languages of art history together with science & technology studies, medical 
discourse and feminism, this research theorises gender, technology and medicine as 
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In February 2010, The New England Journal of Medicine published a paper 
entitled ‘Wilful modulation of brain activity in disorders of consciousness’. The 
research demonstrated that, using fMRI, individuals classified as persisting in a 
vegetative state (VS) might have neuroanatomically specific reactions to 
particular questions: by imagining playing tennis the supplementary motor area 
would appear to ‘light up’, thereby indicating a ‘yes’ response; and by 
imagining walking around their home the parahippocampal gyrus area would 
be stimulated, indicating a ‘no’ response. The conclusion of this research is that 
patients previously thought to be diagnosed with VS might actually retain some 
level of awareness, previously undetected with bedside behavioural tests, 
therefore shifting diagnosis to being in a ‘minimally conscious state’ (a new 
clinical ‘entity’ coined by the Aspen Neurobehavioural Conference Work Group 
in 2002).1 
 
If, as suggested by this experiment, different types of imaging technology 
intersect with the body in such a way that they produce new medical, political 
and aesthetic classifications of the subject, what are the subsequent new 
epistemological problems associated with those (unstable) categories, and how 
does the image negotiate this? 
 
                                                
1 Monty, Martin M. et. al., ‘Wilful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Consciousness’ 
in The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 362, No. 7, February 18, 2010. The use of the 
word ‘entity’ in this context raises significant questions about the formulation of the subject in 
discourse surrounding disorders of consciousness. 
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In this thesis I am concerned with the way in which technologies are used to 
stage the body/self (i.e. as a means of self-representation) within the context of 
an unstable body politics, and to investigate the points of overlap between a 
range of visual cultures: medical, artistic and art historical, pornographic and 
digital. By the term ‘technology’ I refer both to the sense of a mechanical, 
electronic or digital device – indeed, this thesis focuses exclusively on these 
types of image-making machines – as well as to the process or method by which 
something becomes incorporated into a particular visual language or register.  
 
The practice of drawing could be read as a technology of vision, and images of 
science as a vision of technology, but neither will be covered by this study. 
Instead, it focuses on the material and metaphorical processes that occur in a 
limited range of artworks that not only deploy technological devices in the 
practice of image-making, but do so in order to question and contest the very 
visual languages that those technologies have generated. The selection of case 
studies discussed in this thesis has therefore largely been determined not by type 
of technology (although arguably in its analysis of film and video this thesis 
confronts two mediums that are well established in the discourses of art and art 
history, and by looking at medical imaging and computer technology it clearly 
hopes to expand and extend these discourses), but rather has been guided by the 
practices themselves, in which technology has been encountered in such a way 
that reveals central questions about its very use. 
 
Some clarification about how technology is understood in this thesis is therefore 
necessary in order to give definable shape to the term ‘technology’, which is 
both idiomatic and manifold: it tells us both lots of things and yet very little. 
Counter-intuitively, an analysis of the term reveals a variable and variegated 
concept that mutates, shifts and flows (properties more commonly associated 
with the organic, usually perceived as oppositional to the technological). A 
general theory of technology is likely to be problematic, given that the term 
historically covers highly disparate concepts, from bodily prosthesis to skill or 
handcraft (techne) to mechanical devices, including: the applied sciences; 
industry and manufacturing; machinery and equipment; process and method; 
and, more peculiarly, the terminology of a subject; and the systematic treatment 
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of grammar.2 Technology is not only an electronic, mechanical or digital device, 
but also a system of representation. In the close relationship between technology 
and grammar, which this brief analysis reveals, we are reminded of Teresa de 
Lauretis’ important work into the relationship between gender and the 
technology of grammar. In her influential 1980s text, De Lauretis recognised 
that linguistic representation itself is a technology of gender, and that there is a 
linguistic link between the syntax or grammar of Romance languages and the 
term ‘gender’. ‘Genre’, she notes, is both French for ‘gender’, as well as a 
description of a category of art. Gender is a language (and a construction of 
linguistic convention) and, as such, must always already be figured in and 
through (technologies of) representation.3  
 
This study has not been born from, but is affiliated to, theoretical projects that 
sought to productively cross-contaminate (as opposed to ‘cross-fertilise’) 
feminism and scientific discourse, as discussed below. While science is by no 
means synonymous with technology, my interest in the intersections between 
the body and technology notably extends into certain areas well defined as 
science, such as medicine or information systems, both of which have been 
understood to be markedly associated with the masculine. The emergence of 
these ‘cross-contaminated’ studies began in the mid-1980s with a challenge to 
the mechanisms by which certain types of body are produced or controlled 
within the (interdependent) fields of technology, medicine and ethics: as Evelyn 
Fox Keller asked in Reflections on Gender and Science (1985), how much of 
the nature of science is bound up with the idea of masculinity, and what would 
it mean for science if it were otherwise?4 Fox Keller’s study was premised on 
the notion that both gender and science are not only socially constructed 
categories (or representations, in my terms) but that they are in fact also 
mutually implicated in one another’s co-constitution. Fox Keller’s inquiry into 
the co-constitution of gender and science is therefore critical to any 
                                                
2 These definitions are all given by the OED.  
See http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/198469 
3 See de Lauretis, Teresa Technologies of Gender: Essays on Theory, Film and Fiction, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1987. See especially the chapter ‘The 
technology of gender’ (pp. 1-30). 
4 Fox Keller, Evelyn Reflections on Gender and Science, Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London, 1985 p. 3. 
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understanding of technology, framed as it is by the masculinist discourses of 
science and the subsequent disjunction between science and femininity.  
 
The gendering of scientific discourse is posited by Fox Keller as a crucial 
component in the relationship between science and law, with far-reaching 
implications for the mantle ‘laws of nature’ (Boyle, 1665), which has 
historically been thrust upon science: ‘whereas laws of state are open to lawful 
change, there is no constitutional recourse against a law of nature.’5 For Fox 
Keller, a series of divisions has thus subsequently framed scientific discourse 
that has been central to the basic structures of modern science and society. 
These are the personal/impersonal, public/private and masculine/feminine. As 
such, the integration of these binaries into medicine, into science and into the 
very ‘laws of nature’ serves to reinforce an epistemological regime that divides 
emotional (female) and intellectual (male) labour within these fields by 
conceiving of it as ‘natural’.  
 
The assumption implicit in the term ‘laws of nature’ is that science is beyond 
the relativity of language, even beyond language itself, and thus relies on a 
particular vocabulary and syntax in order to demonstrate and secure its 
privileged position. While science is seen to directly interpret something that is 
entirely outside or independent of the mind, language is seen to interpret that 
which has already been encountered by perception. Medicine, science and 
information technology – that is, the technologies used to chart and analyse the 
laws of nature – thus become encoded in logical structures, jargon and 
diagrams. In this context, the somatic body is frequently reduced to a superficial 
representation (a code, x-ray, or chart), which is not only exclusionary 
(specialists alone have access to interpreting these modes of representation) but 
also claims that the language of science is transparent and neutral, blinding us to 
the implicit assumptions behind the claims and purposefully equating scientific 
objectivity with the masculine. Some 27 years on from Fox Keller, this same 
challenge to the apparatus of scientific discourse in the context of new imaging 
technologies – most notably medical and digital – is mounted by my work here. 
                                                
5 Ibid., p. 131. 
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In so doing, I hope to produce a critical analysis of the way in which new 
technologies might repeat problematic tropes of representation, looking to art 
practice as a potential site for inhabiting the technology in new and productive 
encounters. In this, I hope to suggest that, by de-instrumentalising the 
technology, artistic practice might constitute a space of critical analysis in and 
of itself, and a form of resistance to the traditional emphasis on technology’s 
use-value. 
 
Fox Keller’s work on re-evaluating science in the context of feminism was 
contemporaneous with two other important early works which implicitly form 
the foundation of my thinking, even if they are not explicitly drawn on in the 
thesis: Donna Haraway’s important essay ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, 
Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century’ (1985) and 
Sherry Turkle’s book The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (1984). 
Both Haraway and Fox Keller work from within the institutions of science (Fox 
Keller is a mathematical biophysicist and Haraway a developmental biologist) 
and, like Fox Keller, Haraway’s early work was concerned with addressing and 
contesting the masculine bias in science. This project then developed into 
working the concept of the ‘cyborg’ as a political strategy for socialist-
feminism.6 As a subject constituted through linkages and affinities, rather than 
identity, the cyborg could mount a significant challenge to essentialists.7 She 
writes, ‘there is nothing about being female that naturally binds women together 
into a unified category. There is not even such a state as ‘being’ female, itself a 
                                                
6 For example, see Haraway, Donna J. ‘Maps of Power, Maps of Bodies: Feminist Approaches 
to the Territory of the Life Sciences’ in Modern Language Association, Special Forum on the 
Politics of Domination, December 28, 1982; Haraway, Donna J. ‘Sex, Race, Class, Scientific 
Objects of Knowledge: A Marxist-Feminist Perspective on the Social Generation of Productive 
Nature and Some Political Implications’ Conference on Science, Technology, and Development 
Strategies, Cavtat, Yugoslavia, September 21-26, 1981; Haraway, Donna J. Commentator, 
Session on ‘Feminist Perspectives on Science and Technology’ Toronto meetings of History of 
Science Society, October 17, 1980. 
7 In this, Haraway’s work on the cyborg emerged during a time in which essentialism in 
feminism was being widely undermined, and ideas around gender and gender relations were 
being largely re-configured within the terms set out by social theory. That is to say, that gender 
became understood as socially determined rather than biological or a natural given. On this see 
Connell, R. W. Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, 1987. This anti-essentialist view was particularly strong amongst constructivist 
feminists. For an overview of this discourse see Locher, Birgit & Prügl, Elisabeth ‘Feminism 
and Constructivism: Worlds Apart or Sharing the Middle Ground?’ in International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1, March 2001 (pp. 111-129). 
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highly complex category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses 
and other social practices.’8 The cyborg has subsequently been at the heart of an 
explosion of studies concerning the body, avoiding the traps of biological 
essentialism by turning instead to its relationship to technology, and indeed this 
study is also wholly indebted to it.9 
 
Constituted in such a way, the cyborg conducts a series of re-figurations and 
contaminations across the distinctions between human and animal, organism 
and machine, and the physical and non-physical, as both a technological object 
and a discursive formation. The perceived ‘natural’ distinctions, which Haraway 
identified as being challenged by the cyborg, resonate with the dissolution of 
boundaries in the artistic practices described in this thesis: the traditional 
determinations of the ‘human’ in contrast to the ‘animal’ are brought under 
scrutiny in chapter one, divisions between the organism and the machine in 
chapters one and two and the distinction between the physical and the non-
physical forms the basis for my discussion of ‘virtual’ (or coded) embodied 
selves/avatars in chapter four.  
 
These divisions, I believe, still represent the border wars being fought today in 
representations of the subject in medical, digital and artistic practice. However, 
while this study is perpetually haunted by Haraway’s cyborg, and its 
foundational implications for political models of subjectivity premised on 
instability, there are areas in which I must make my study distinct from it, and 
re-iterate Haraway’s own understanding of the model as an ‘ironic dream’. That 
the original essay was written in 1985 should open up to question its continuing 
position at the centre of a discourse that attempts to deal with the body and 
technology. As with William Gibson’s model of ‘cyberspace’, first described in 
his fictional novel Neuromancer (1984), Haraway’s cyborg has come to be 
synonymous with forms of technology that it actually pre-dated. In particular, I 
                                                
8 Haraway, Donna ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the 
Late Twentieth Century’ in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, 
Routledge, London and New York, 1991 (pp.149-181) p. 155. 
9 For an overview of the way in which Haraway’s important article has been taken up by 
scholars in the secondary literature see Sofoulis, Zoe ‘Cyberquake: Haraway’s Manifesto’ in 
The Cybercultures Reader Second Edition, Bell, D. & Kennedy, B. eds., Routledge, London and 
New York, 2007 (pp. 365-385). 
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am referring to the widespread integration and distribution of information 
systems and the Internet in North American and European cultures. 
 
I am also concerned that an investigation of the literature that Haraway’s 
important essay engendered reveals a strong focus on the potentially liberatory 
rhetoric of hybridity and multiplicity at play in the figure of the cyborg with its 
‘monstrous’ amalgamation of affinities. Most of these studies, however, tend to 
neglect the anxiety and unease that attend upon these unstable identities. 
Accounts of the cyborg by and large fail to fully confront the historical and 
cultural denigration and domination of outsider identities, and cannot account 
for the role of the mutant or the monster in the very regimes of oppression that 
they might be hoped to destroy. By contrast, my study explicitly stakes a claim 
in the way in which new imaging technologies might be encountered in artistic 
practice outside of a traditional instrumental ontology. But in so doing I hope 
also to reveal the ways in which new forms of technological vision has itself 
structured forms of oppression: these technologies have been used in ways that 
both repeat and defeat problematic modes of representation. This will be 
achieved by committing to an analysis of the visual politics associated with 
imaging technologies in the works of Carolee Schneemann, Kate Craig, Mona 
Hatoum and Nell Tenhaaf. 
 
My account here of the ways in which technology and the body intersect in the 
formation of subjectivities is therefore shot through with moments of tension: 
how has imaging technology interacted with the body so as to repeat 
conventional accounts of the subject in visual culture, and how might it be used 
to trouble them? If the subject, as Karen Barad’s recent theory of ‘intra-action’ 
has argued, is always-already understood through and informed by technology, 
can it perform difference in order to rupture understandings of a subject-object 
opposition, or does it provocatively mark the re-entry of the subject into a 
sphere allocated as Other?10 This inherent tension in performing difference is 
brought to the fore most explicitly in the literature that deals with ‘virtual’ 
bodies. I have here qualified the term ‘virtual’ as I wish to problematise any 
                                                
10 See Barad, Karen Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
Matter and Meaning, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2007. 
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perceived opposition with the constructed space of the ‘real’. The consequence 
of this would be both to begin to dismantle the primacy of traditional models of 
the somatic body and its unity – potentially re-locating identity outside of the 
body in favour of a distributed form of embodiment, which has wide reaching 
implications for a feminist analysis – and to challenge the domination of 
postmodernist rhetoric in discourse around computer technologies – most 
notably that arising from Jean Baudrillard’s analysis of simulacra and 
simulations.11  
 
In The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (1984) Sherry Turkle 
questioned how the emergence of computer technology has affected the way 
that we think, especially the way that we think about ourselves. In opposition to 
traditional understandings of the computer as rational, logical and ‘instrumental’ 
(that is, with a use-value) Turkle instead chooses to read the computer as 
‘subjective’ (that is, as a machine that has entered into social life and 
psychological development). Turkle’s difficult characterisation of information 
technology as both ‘new and exciting’ and ‘powerful and threatening’ must be 
at the heart of subsequent debates surrounding it. In her casting of the computer 
as an evocative object and not as a purely analytical engine, Turkle focused on 
the use of computers as an expressive medium, rather than as an instrumental 
means of production and logical organisation.12 In particular, this involved 
studying computers in the realms of leisure and learning, rather than just work, 
with an emphasis on computer programming as a means to create a sort of 
second world (thus arguably prefiguring the future development of Web 2.0 as a 
space for social networking, video sharing and online role playing games).13 In 
this book, Turkle considered the ways in which computer technologies in the 
                                                
11 See Baudrillard, Jean ‘Simulacra and Simulations’ in Baudrillard: Selected Writings, Poster, 
M. ed., Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998 (pp. 166 - 184) p. 167. See also Jameson, Fredric 
Postmodernism: or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Verso, London and New York, 
1991. This challenge to the term ‘virtual’, and the distinction between the body and 
embodiment, will be more fully fleshed out in chapter four. 
12 My use of the term ‘analytical engine’ is here important since it resonates historically with the 
device designed by Ada Lovelace and Charles Babbage in the 1840s. The plans for this device, 
although it remained unbuilt, were influential in the future development of computer 
technology. For a fuller account of this event, and its implications for a feminist analysis of 
computer technology, see chapter four. 
13 Web 2.0 is a term used to describe web applications that facilitate user generated content and 
participatory information sharing. Typical examples of Web 2.0 phenomena are blogs, wikis, 
tag clouds, social networking and video sharing sites. 
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1980s were seen as mediating relationships both with other people and also, 
crucially, with ourselves. The incorporation of computer technologies into 
social life (such as in virtual reality environments, gaming scenarios, chat rooms 
and avatars) staged the point at which these technologies became integral to 
personal means of self-representation, and the way in which a thematics of 
disembodiment became associated with those very processes.   
 
Building on the foundational work of Fox Keller, Haraway and Turkle, several 
artists and scholars in the mid-1990s returned to questioning encounters 
between the body, technology and society, with a notable emphasis on emergent 
medical technologies such as genetic engineering (via Dolly the sheep and the 
Vacanti mouse), and computer technologies such as Jaron Lanier’s work on 
developing immersive virtual reality (VR) environments and online networks. 
During this period, the emergences of immune system discourse (precipitated 
by the AIDS epidemic), New Reproductive Technologies (NRTs), disability 
studies, queer theory and a highly fractured feminist project provided a fertile 
ground for foregrounding the conceptualisation of difference in technology 
studies. A range of both theory- and practice-based work started to look at the 
way in which new technologies – from biomedicine to virtual reality – seemed 
to be instigating a phenomenological account of the body in which absence 
(detachment, strangeness) was increasingly structuring experience. Arthur 
Kroker perhaps aptly termed this period ‘the flesh eating 90s’.14 This historical 
moment of tension between the virtual and the visceral is played out in the 
artistic and critical practice of this period with the use of the body in 
conjunction with increasingly new and sophisticated technologies, medical or 
otherwise: 1990 Drew Leder publishes The Absent Body; 1990 to 1993, Orlan 
conducts 9 surgery-performances called Images, New Images and the 
Reincarnation of Saint Orlan; 1992 to 1993 Stelarc works on his Virtual Arm 
Project using DataGloves; 1990 Gary Hill’s video installation Inasmuch As It Is 
Always Already Taking Place presents a fractured subject; Laurie Anderson 
uses voice modulators to transform her feminine voice into a masculine one; 
                                                
14 Kroker, Arthur and Kroker, Marilouise Hacking the Future: Stories for the Flesh-Eating 90s, 
New World Perspectives, New York, 1996. 
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1999 N. Katherine Hayles publishes How We Became Posthuman: Virtual 
Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics.15 
 
In this large and unwieldy body of works, technology is at the core of the drive 
to reconsider key phenomenological and ontological questions. From virtual 
reality systems to genomics to the move from analog to digital systems of 
representation, the body was experienced in new ways, putting pressure on 
existing models of the body, self, gender identity and sexuality. Technological 
and social interventions on the body precipitated a new critical enquiry in the 
1990s and initiated the challenge to who/what we think we are, inviting new 
interpretations of the body, even while occasionally re-playing old-fashioned 
Cartesian dualism as the body appeared to take flight from the information hub 
in a fit of technophilic fantasies of transcendence.  
 
In Leaky Bodies and Boundaries: Feminism, Postmodernism and (Bio)Ethics 
(1997), Margrit Shildrick discussed the possibility for producing a moral or 
ethical discourse beyond the conventions of the autonomous agent, when the 
boundaries of neither the body nor the subject itself are secure. What emerges, 
she asks, when rigid notions of identity and difference no longer provide the 
grounds for moral discourse? This key text in postmodern feminism addresses 
the anxiety that postmodernism cannot yield an ethics, and argues that 
‘leakiness’ or instability might actually be the ground for that very ethics. 
Feminist ethics, argues Shildrick, makes no universal claims. Central to my own 
work on an unstable body politics, Shildrick’s work informs my interpretation 
of practices that challenge the conventional subject, suggesting pathways for the 
reconceptualisation of the subject within scientific, technological and medical 
discourse. Developing from the theories of Luce Irigaray, which anticipate a 
recovery/discovery of radical sexual difference, both my work and Shildrick’s 
might attempt to reclaim not a homogenous category of ‘woman’ (or, in the 
context of this thesis, also the categories ‘man’, ‘human’ or ‘animal’) but rather 
a multiplicity of positions linked by the in-common experience of a particular 
                                                
15 For a discussion of many of these works, particularly in the context of a fracturing of the 
subject through technologies of representation, see Jones, Amelia ‘Dispersed Subjects and the 
Demise of the “Individual”: 1990s Bodies in/as Art’ in Body Art: Performing the Subject, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London, 1998 (pp. 197-240). 
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body form.16 As with Fox Keller, Shildrick’s work has exposed the fallacious 
claims to gender neutrality in which an ethics of technology has – up until now 
– couched itself. She writes, ‘Western ethics has based itself not simply on the 
exclusion of women as moral agents, but makes transcendent disembodiment a 
condition of agency.’17 In this respect, my own work seeks to destabilise some 
of the inherent assumptions contained within medico-legal discourse, revealing 
the mechanisms by which certain visual cultures (in this case most notably 
digital and medical) rely on a detachment of the self and image in order to 
subject it to analysis and reform. 
 
These problems with embodiment and subjectivity, originally perceived by 
Turkle, were reignited by N Katherine Hayles some 15 years later in How We 
Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics 
(1999). Drawing on archival material from the Macy Conferences, held in New 
York in the immediate post-war period (1946-53), Hayles looked at the 
relationship between the gendered body and socio-cultural constructions of 
informational systems from the last 50 years, noting the implications for themes 
of transcendence in VR (virtual reality) models of a disembodied subject, and 
how that might be seen to replicate the liberal subject of the enlightenment. 
Hayles notes that Norbert Weiner’s original work on feedback systems – 
formalised as the field of ‘cybernetics’, a term deriving from the Greek for 
‘steersman’ – defined information as an entity distinct from the substrates 
carrying it, subsequently producing a conceptualisation of information as a kind 
of ‘bodiless fluid’ that could flow between different substrates without any loss 
or change. Any models trying to account for the embodiedness of the 
technological subject was therefore troubled by this definition, as human 
                                                
16 On the concept of multiplicity in philosophy, see Elizabeth Grosz’s important study, Volatile 
Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, Indiana University press, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, 1994 (esp. pp. 120-122). In this study Grosz gives an overview of Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s hypothesis that the subject itself is a multiplicity. This hypothesis, Grosz argues, 
then goes on to form the basis of the work of both Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, whose 
work on the ‘machine’ describes a ‘non-totalised collection or assemblage of heterogeneous 
elements and materials. In itself, the body is not a machine; but in its active relations to other 
social practices, entities, and events, it forms machinic connections.’ (Grosz, p. 120). The 
challenge these theories present to models of a unified, stable self are perhaps the starting point 
for this thesis.  
17 Shildrick, Margrit Leaky Bodies and Boundaries: Feminism, Postmodernism and (Bio)Ethics, 
Routledge, London and New York, 1997 p. 2. 
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identity became increasingly associated with ‘thinking machines’. In other 
words, extending the legacy of the Cogito, thought was conceived as more like 
an informational pattern than an embodied enaction. 
 
Hayles’ interest in the social relation between the virtual and the visceral is 
understood fundamentally within the context of the gendered body. This is well 
demonstrated by the fact that Hayles chose to frame her book with a prologue 
recounting the paradigmatic historical study regarding informational systems: 
the 1950 paper ‘Computer Machinery and Intelligence’ by Alan Turing, a 
mathematician and computer scientist who formalised some of the early 
concepts of computation with his ‘Turing Machine’. It is Hayles’ prologue that 
subsequently forms the header to chapter four of this thesis: 
 
You are alone in the room, except for two computer terminals 
flickering in the dim light. You use the terminals to 
communicate with two entities in another room, whom you 
cannot see. Relying solely on their responses to your questions, 
you must decide which is the man, which the woman. Or, in 
another version of the famous “imitation game” proposed by 
Turing, you use the responses to decide which is the human, 
which the machine.18 
 
For Hayles, the Turing test demonstrated a complex interaction between the 
virtual and the visceral in informational systems: that formulations of the 
subject have always tried to resolve a perceived split between the enacted body 
in front of the computer terminal and the represented body constituted through 
semiotic markers in an electronic environment on the ‘other side’ of the screen. 
For Hayles, the implication for gender (and other markers of difference) in the 
realm of VR is that if you try and distinguish who might be a male subject or a 
female subject on the other side of the computer, you are attempting to resolve 
the enacted and the represented subjects into a single gender identity. That there 
might be a ‘wrong’ answer in the Turing test suggests that in fact we can no 
                                                
18 Hayles, N Katherine How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature 
and Informatics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1999 p. xi. 
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longer take for granted such an easy identification of the subject and must 
acknowledge its inevitable split as a result of informational systems. Hayles 
therefore asks: can technology ever be meaningfully separated from the human 
subject?19  
 
Directly engaging with the work of Haraway, in an attempt to formulate a new 
paradigm, Hayles argues that we are no longer cyborgs, but ‘posthuman’. The 
posthuman has marked similarities to the cyborg: ‘emergence replaces 
teleology, reflexive epistemology replaces objectivism, distributed cognition 
replaces autonomous will, embodiment replaces a body seen as a support 
system for the mind and a dynamic partnership between humans and intelligent 
machines replaces the liberal humanist subject’s manifest destiny to dominate 
and control nature.’20 The posthuman also thinks of the body as a prosthesis that 
we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other 
prostheses is the continuation of a process that began long before we were 
born.21 Human being is therefore articulated so that it can be seamlessly 
integrated with other intelligent machines. However, unlike the cyborg, the 
posthuman uses the cybernetic feedback loop or circuit. Instead of polarities 
joined by the hyphen (male-female, text-marginalia, human-machine) it uses the 
circuit to fulfil Haraway’s ‘pleasurably tight coupling’ between these 
oppositional systems. While the cyborg holds these distinctions in tension, the 
posthuman circuit implies a more transformative union, moving closer to a 
model of subjectivity premised on feedback loops and mutual co-constitution. 
The posthuman is subsequently ‘post’ because there is no a priori way to 
                                                
19 This, of course, is now explicitly the case in relation to debates around transgendering and the 
way in which technology has affected an actual, rather than purely conceptual, gender 
indeterminacy. 
20 Ibid., p. 288. 
21 In Drew Leder’s important early study, The Absent Body, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago and London, 1990, which will form the theoretical framework for much of my 
discussion in chapter three, he describes Martin Heidegger’s interest in the notion of a ‘tool’ in 
its formal and functional role as a sort of prosthesis. Heidegger writes, ‘The tool is something 
ready to hand (zuhanden), part of an equipmental structure that tends to withdraw from our 
explicit attention. We concern ourselves primarily with the work or product towards which we 
labour. The disappearance of the hand-held tool is none other than an offshoot of bodily 
disappearance closing over the incorporated instrument. e.g. Merleau-Ponty’s blind mans stick. 
My natural organs are modified and supplemented via the incorporation of such artificial 
extensions. This internal relation of bodily organ and tool is suggested by the Greek usage of 
one word, organon, to refer to both.’ Heidegger, Martin Being and Time, MacQuarrie, J. & 
Robinson, E. trans., Harper and Row, New York, 1962 (pp. 95-107), also quoted in Leder p. 33. 
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identify a self-will that can be distinguished clearly from an Other-will. This 
notion of a feedback loop or circuit serves as a useful frame for the models of 
subjectivity presented in the case studies in this thesis, and will be more fully 
examined in its original historical and cultural context in chapter two in relation 
to the emergence of video based practices in the 1970s. 
 
The work of both Turkle and Hayles in wrestling with this tension between 
virtual and visceral subjectivities informs not only the research on digital bodies 
in chapter four but, in fact, the entire study. Embodiment, in opposition to the 
body, becomes a central thematic area of concern throughout. Hayles writes, 
 
Embodiment differs from the concept of the body in that the 
body is always normative relative to some set of criteria. To 
explore how the body is constructed within renaissance medical 
discourse, for example, is to investigate the normative 
assumptions used to constitute a particular kind of social and 
discursive concept… Technologies turn embodiment into the 
body by creating a normalized construct arranged over many 
data points to give an idealized version of the body in question. 
In contrast to the body, embodiment is contextual, enmeshed 
with the specifics of time, place, physiology and culture, which 
together compose enactment.22 
 
Embodiment is thus a form of subjectivity that allows one to inhabit multiple 
embodied positions as situated subjects, so as to challenge the conventions of a 
unified subjectivity. The term embodiment, which originates in the important 
thinking of scholars such as Hayles, Elisabeth Grosz and Rosi Braidotti in the 
1990s, is a fertile strategy for thinking about subjectivity beyond the limits of 
the body without re-inscribing problematic binaries, and will frame much of my 
discussion. The analysis I apply to the case studies in this thesis is, however, not 
done with the aim of illustrating the concept of embodiment, but to demonstrate 
                                                
22 Hayles, p. 196. On the notion of embodiment, see also Grosz p. 19 and Braidotti, Rosi 
‘Cyberfeminism With a Difference’ (1996) available online at 
http://www.let.uu.nl/womens_studies/rosi/cyberfem.htm 
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the way in which this notion potentially re-frames encounters with imaging 
technologies in ways that might productively align the body/self with other 




1st December 1982: On the day I was being born, some 30 years ago, Martha 
Rosler broadcast herself on public access TV deconstructing the implicit 
messages aimed at women in Vogue magazine (Martha Rosler, Martha Rosler 
Reads from Vogue for Paper Tiger TV (1982)). Taking artistic practice out of 
the studio or gallery and re-locating it within the domestic sphere (traditionally 
associated with the feminine), Rosler used emergent media technologies to 
critically reassess their role in the formation of gender stereotypes and 
troublesome modes of representation. Situating her practice in the very 
technological and cultural milieu which she aimed to critique and redefine, 
Rosler engaged with a strategy of self-reflexivity and repetition that is at the 
core of many practices which carefully tread the highwire between the 
technophilic and the technophobic.23 This study therefore confronts the way in 
which artistic practice has appropriated and intervened in the imaging 
technologies that I have grown up with in order to challenge, critique or reframe 
the terms by which the body and technology come together in mutual co-
constitution with gender and sexuality. Lacking any clear art historical 
precedent for a project that encompasses both a critical and art historical 
analysis for a range of imaging technologies, including those such as medical 
                                                
23 For an important example of this mode of analysis in philosophical thought, see the work of 
Rosi Braidotti, and her discussion of the different French and the German traditions in relation 
to technology. She argues that in the German school, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer 
talk about the reduction of the body to an assembly of detachable parts – ‘a factory of spare 
parts’ – which denies the unity and specificity of the human being: ‘they have a negative view 
of powers of science and even worse one of technology.’ But in French school, biotechnology is 
not completely antithetical to humanity. She argues that Foucault deflates the discourse about 
the ideologically dangerous nature of technology in order to look at it as an extension of basic 
bodily functions. She writes, ‘here the French school of philosophical materialism (that of 
Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem) is important in stressing that a primitive 
anthropomorphism pervades the technical universe: all machines obviously copy and multiply 
the potencies and potentialities of the human body. The organic and the technological 
complement each other so that the nature-culture distinction is dropped in favour of the political 
reflection on the concrete materiality of the subject as an embodied organism or as a biocultural 
event.’ Braidotti, Rosi Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary 
Feminist Theory, Columbia University Press, New York, 1994 p. 63. 
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and digital imaging (which are rarely brought under the sway of the category 
‘art’), my project has instead been informed by the fruitful linkages between 
feminism and science. In my study of the intersections between the body and 
technology, the theoretical works discussed above have therefore helped shape 
and expand my field of enquiry. From these debates I have formulated an area 
of study based on philosophical, anthropological and cultural advances in the 
field of science and technology studies, rather than on traditional forms of art 
historical scholarship.  
 
Significantly, some of the imaging technologies described in this study, most 
notably endoscopy, have received virtually no critical attention in almost any 
discipline, including science and technology studies. Since being used by the 
artist Mona Hatoum in the installation Corps Étranger (1994), this technology 
has now been opened up to both artistic and art historical analysis in a way that 
could potentially enter into a critical dialogue with medical discourse. As much 
as the sciences, and especially medical sciences, are finding a new position of 
prominence amongst art historians, I hope that this exchange might come to be 
bidirectional, and as such propose an analysis of both the visual politics and 
poetic vocabularies of a range of imaging technologies. 
 
However, Hatoum, and the innovative use of endoscopy, is not the central focus 
of this study. Rather, situated deep within the body of the text, she instead 
appears as a figure from which various thematic, philosophical and 
technological linkages reach forward and backward, outward and inward across 
a number of women’s art practices that both challenge the historical perception 
that women cannot access technology in a sophisticated way, and question and 
contest forms of female invisibility in the discourses of technology. In chapter 
one, I look at the film and photographic practices of Carolee Schneemann in 
which she stages erotic encounters with her various cats. In particular focusing 
on the work Infinity Kisses (1981-88), I consider how Schneemann uses 
technology to foreground the relationship between the female and feline body, 
so as to argue that earlier works, such as the important 16mm film Fuses (1964-
67), have also had animal sexualities at their thematic core even though this has 
largely been neglected by art history. Crucially, Schneemann uses the film 
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screen in this work as a highly tactile space of encounter that sets up a 
resonance with the term pet(ting). By shooting and situating this work in a 
highly (hetero)sexualized, domestic sphere, Schneemann not only creates a 
radical tension with non-human sexualities, but also looks at the role of 
technology in generating encounters which are often marginalized.  
 
Continuing my investigation of the domestic as a site of (re)production in new 
imaging and editing technologies, chapter two focuses on the video works of 
Lynda Benglis and Kate Craig in the 1970s at a time when home video 
technology (VHS) was entering the mainstream. Although I am wary of 
reinscribing the domestic onto women’s artistic production, the theme remains 
notable and worthy of investigation in this chapter as there were emergent 
issues during this period around the accessibility of new media technologies for 
women artists on the grounds of cost and access to training, and the subsequent 
production of intimate depictions of the female body and sexuality that the 
technology enabled because of its portability and low cost. Moving both the 
realms of production and distribution into the domestic sphere meant that VHS 
also had an important role to play in the rapid expansion of the pornographic 
industry. Focusing on Craig’s work Delicate Issue (1979), chapter two attempts 
to confront the historical and social mechanisms not only by which technology 
enabled the proliferation of pornography, but also by which pornography 
enabled the proliferation of technology as increasing numbers of consumers 
purchased VHS systems for the purpose of watching and/or making these films 
at home. In this, the chapter also considers the relationship between VHS and 
the ‘home movie’, and its particular ties to feminine and domestic forms of 
‘labour’ and production with videos of childbirth, birthdays and home sex tapes 
(as opposed to commercialized ‘pornography’). 
 
In Delicate Issue, Craig uses the novel autofocus feature on the video camera to 
generate close-up imagery of her body that, like Fuses, is sexually explicit in its 
content. Unlike Fuses, however, this film was shot by the artist’s (male) partner, 
who is credited in the introductory sequence (again, like Fuses), but from under 
the direction of Craig, as she watched herself in the process of being watched, 
through the aid of a TV monitor, which enabled one of the most notable features 
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of VHS: instant playback. This brought to the fore the immediacy of one’s 
becoming-representation. As such, the work is concerned with issues of self-
imaging but uses the technology to problematise any easy identification with 
exactly who is the bearer of the gaze. In much the same way, Mona Hatoum’s 
installation work Corps Étranger, shows a body that has made itself available to 
the gaze of (an)Other, in this case the gaze of the medical establishment as 
figured through the eye of the endoscope and the eye of the doctor, even while it 
watches itself being watched, directing the production of the images from its 
state of performed vulnerability.  
 
As with Craig’s video, Corps Étranger uses the device of the close-up by 
presenting the female body as an object of scrutiny and analysis. While Delicate 
Issue largely focused on the exterior surfaces of the body (cf. Schneemann’s 
work on the tactile skin of the film screen) Hatoum’s endoscopic investigation 
shifts the object of attention to the interior lumen and cavities of the body. The 
work of questioning the function of the close-up and its ties to pornography, 
begun in Delicate Issue, is therefore continued in Corps Étranger as Hatoum 
plays on the points of overlap between pornographic and medical visual 
cultures, and the fantasy of infinite penetration associated with epistemological 
illumination.  
 
Importantly, by submitting an otherwise healthy body to clinical investigation, 
Hatoum inscribes herself into a visual regime that is, primarily, attuned to 
pathology. In this, Corps Étranger questions modes of visibility and invisibility 
and their relationship to pathology, asking what can the clinical eye see, and to 
what it is blind? This work therefore returns us to one of the central 
problematics of this thesis: the detachment of the self from its body/image. As I 
will demonstrate, Hatoum’s installation is set up so as to generate a sense of 
confusion and misinterpretation when confronted with the image, as we simply 
cannot know what we are looking at; a sense of strangeness that is re-iterated in 
the very title of the work itself. The function of the work is therefore to make us 
consider the way in which a thematics of misunderstanding fundamentally 
overlays our own relationship with our bodies, drawing us back into the original 
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problem of how to use contemporary technology to successfully re-present the 
body/self.  
 
It is precisely this problem that is taken up by the diverse practice of Nell 
Tenhaaf in chapter four, in which she finally eschews ‘the body’ in favour of 
‘embodiment’ in her complex technological ‘sculpture’ Lo-Fi (2005-2010). 
Having worked with a range of film, video, medical imaging and computer 
technologies over the last three decades, Tenhaaf foregrounds the issue of 
representing the body/self in this work by bringing together a range of human 
and non-human subjects (in this case Artificial Life), clustered together as 
groups of LEDs. In their discrete ON/OFF setting, the LEDs thus reference 
binary code and serve as an extended metaphor on the medium itself. For the 
purposes of my argument, this allows for a productive encounter between the 
historical means by which binary has become associated with a detachment of 
the body from the self and a re-reading of digital culture that inscribes themes of 
potentiality and multiplicity. As such, the thrust of this final chapter is to re-
conceive of binary as a state of superimposition in which the self cannot be so 
easily detached from the body, upending technophilic fantasies of transcendence 
without simply re-inscribing the feminine back onto the body. 
 
While some of these themes have been addressed from within the context of 
other disciplines, most notably in gender studies, they are yet to be addressed in 
an art historical context and subjected to an analysis that considers the way in 
which these imaging technologies have strong roots in diverse fields, and how 
artistic practice might find a new vocabulary of representation for them. In this, 
I am thinking largely of those studies that – nonetheless very successfully – 
critique the way in which imaging technologies are used in mainstream cultural 
practice. To date, there has been extremely limited analysis of the visual politics 
at stake in medical and digital imaging, particularly in relation to gendered 
vision, and very few studies consider art as a site of a critical engagement with 
technological practices. Most existing studies have undertaken a broadly 
cultural analysis of medical imaging, and are perhaps fairly representative of the 
narrow literature available in that they frame the discussion within the recurrent 
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theme of a ‘fantastic voyage’ through the body.24 While these touch on the 
relationship between gender and medical imaging, specifically by looking at the 
ways in which ultrasound technology is bound up in visual economies 
associated with a penetrating medical/male gaze, it neglects the way in which 
other, non-gender-specific forms of imaging technology, such as endoscopy, 
might also be complicit in this practice. In these studies, the definition of 
medical imaging also frequently gives way to medical images, including 
illustration, anatomical drawing and/or representations of illness. Furthermore, 
most existing studies in this field are also largely focused on the interaction 
between medical imaging and mainstream visual cultures (for example TV 
surgery, educational CD ROMS, ‘images of science’ type exhibitions, and the 
Visible Human Project). In terms of digital cultures, a focus on the mainstream 
rather than artistic practice is well represented by The Cybercultures Reader, 
edited by David Bell and Barbara Kennedy, which is now in its second edition 
(2007); and the Electronic Mediations series at the University of Minnesota 
Press edited by Mark Poster, Katherine Hayles and Samuel Weber.  
 
By contrast, this project foregrounds the technology and submits the processes 
and mechanisms to an analysis that is visual and political. It will also focus on 
the use of medical and digital imaging technologies as a means of representing 
the body in critical art practice, acknowledging that the techniques and 
technologies of image making are themselves integral to the construction of 
subjectivity. Thus this project will look at practices that question and contest the 
epistemological claim of certain forms of vision to the site of the production of 
knowledge, erotics and power.  
 
Within the context of art historical scholarship, my study is most indebted to the 
work of Amelia Jones, who has not only written at length on several of the 
artists discussed here (Schneemann, Hatoum and Benglis), but who also shares 
an interest in the use of moving image technologies in artistic practice as a 
                                                
24 For example see Kevles, Betyann Holtzmann Naked to the Bone: Medical Imaging in the 
Twentieth Century, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1998; van Dijck, José The 
Transparent Body: A Cultural Analysis of Medical Imaging, University of Washington Press, 
Seattle, 2005; and The Visible Woman: Imaging Technologies, Gender, and Science, Treichler, 
P., Cartwright, L. & Penley, C. eds., New York University Press, New York and London, 1998. 
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mode of self-representation, as evidenced by her recent book Self/Image: 
Technology, Representation and the Contemporary Subject (2006). Developing 
out of the debates originally presented in Body Art: Performing the Subject 
(1998), Jones expands the category of performance to include those artists who 
use imaging technologies as a means of staging the self. As I will demonstrate 
in chapter two, in relation to video technology, this type of encounter between 
performance and imaging technology has a long and fertile history. With 
Self/Image, Jones reinvigorates the discourse around self re-presentation, 
looking at digital imaging, video installation and robotics, and away from more 
traditional models of portraiture. Using the work of Swiss artist Pipilotti Rist as 
the paradigmatic example of the way in which an intersubjective encounter 
might be affected in such works, Amelia Jones calls for the current distinctions 
between what is real and represented to be dismantled, in much the same way as 
I hope to problematise the terms ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ here in this thesis. 
 
Beginning with Hippolyte Bayard’s Self Portrait as a Drowned Man (1840), 
Self/Image traces both the desire and the fragility of images that offer up the 
body as a cohesive and knowable entity. In the first chapter, ‘The body and/in 
representation’, Jones negotiates the relationship between image and self, 
stating that ‘the body/self itself is representational.’25 According to Jones, the 
image has always been strategically employed to announce the presence of an 
artistic subject, yet with the appearance of new technologies of representation, 
the assumption that a stable subject exists behind the work is disturbed. Jones 
aligns herself with queer subjectivities, and draws on the work of Claude Cahun 
to reveal that she too wishes to tear apart the modernist belief that there is a 
fixed and singular subject contained within the image, preferring instead to 
acknowledge the myriad bodies that engage in the production of these images 
and their meaning. Jones also demonstrates how the early video works of 
Benglis and Paul McCarthy may be re-thought in terms of what Jones describes 
as a ‘televisual flesh’, thus conceptually aligning it with my reading of film and 
photography as fundamentally embodied, as per the work of Schneemann in 
chapter one. Self/Image thus describes a trajectory of video installation and 
                                                
25 Jones, Amelia Self/Image: Technology, Representation and the Contemporary Subject, 
Routledge, London and New York, 2006 p. xiv. 
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photography that attempts to understand the photographic lexis as a screen in 
which the flesh of the artist may become co-mingled with the skin of the 
representational field.  
 
Using the language of feminist discourses from Donna Haraway to Julia 
Kristeva to Mary Douglas, Jones appropriates terms like ‘leaky’ and ‘pollution’ 
to re-cast them with great effect towards a new model of spectatorship. By 
negating ocular-centric models of perception, Jones convincingly argues for a 
reinvestment of the body into any understanding of artistic practice, proposing 
that viewing a work necessarily entails an intersubjective encounter. Drawing 
on the work of N. Katherine Hayles, Jones claims that the body is becoming 
increasingly indistinguishable from the technology that represents it: ‘the body, 
always, is contingent on acts of representation.’26  
 
While the cultural and political positioning of the practices and the 
methodological aims of Self/Image are conceptually consistent with this thesis, 
the key point of divergence is in Jones’ conceptualisation of technology, which 
is not foregrounded in her study. Moving beyond Jones’ thesis, I will undertake 
an in-depth analysis of the various technologies employed by the practices 
discussed – film, video, endoscopy, computer imaging – so as to demonstrate 
the way in which the different formats impose different material limits on works 
that subsequently give rise to varying forms of representation and challenges for 
imaging the body. Furthermore, the claim that this study makes for these 
different technologies also hopes to reach beyond the discipline of art history so 
as to be productive in other contexts. For example, as I have already suggested, 
it is significant that art history might be the place in which a medical imaging 
technology, such as endoscopy, is submitted to a critical analysis. Likewise, my 
understanding of Tenhaaf’s reconceptualisation of binary forms of 
representation in Lo-Fi bears on broader theorisations of computer technology 
in a way that art history usually does not accommodate.  
 
                                                
26 Jones 2006, p. 245. To this I would also add the important work of Braidotti in her book 
Nomadic Subjects, in which she proposes that there is no clear distinction between the natural 
(the body) and the cultural (technology), because the body mediates technology. 
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Although there might be formal links between this thesis and publications that 
try to reposition scientific practice within art history, such as the emergence of 
what have been termed ‘SciArt’ practices, there are notable conceptual and 
theoretical ways in which it is distinct.27 Although these practices often use new 
technological advances in genetic engineering and computer technology that 
would seem to make sense to include in the context of this thesis, many of these 
studies and the theoretical output surrounding them appear to repeat deeply 
problematic representational polarities of techno-philia and/or -phobia. In this, 
particularly, I am thinking of the work of SymbioticA and the practice-based 
research group TC&A at the University of Western Australia and Eduardo Kac, 
which has dominated the practical and theoretical output in this field for the last 
two decades; the neuro-art history/neuro-aesthetics of John Onians; the work of 
Orlan and Stelarc (both of whom have worked with TC&A); and publications 
such as Leonardo, edited by artists and academics who have previously held 
visiting fellowships to work with TC&A.28 These discursive practices, which 
are closely bound together, on the whole no longer seem to be generating 
significant inroads into concepts of science and society, even while the 
technologies they use are often novel.29 I therefore intend that this study would 
distinguish itself from the purely aesthetic analysis of scientific or medical 
images, which uses the universalizing language of scientific authority to uphold 
and secure traditional enquiry into what are now highly contested concepts such 
as ‘beauty’. By contrast, this project will look at practices that question and 
                                                
27 For examples of this see Wilson, Stephen Art and Science Now: How Scientific Research and 
Technological Innovation are Becoming Key to 21st-Century Aesthetics, Thames and Hudson, 
London 2010; Reichle, Ingeborg Art in the Age of Technoscience: Genetic Engineering, 
Robotics, and Artificial Life in Contemporary Art, Springer, Wien, 2009; and Kac, Eduardo 
Telepresence & Bio Art: Networking Humans, Rabbits, & Robots, University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor, 2005. 
28 See variously: http://www.tca.uwa.edu.au/; Catts, Oron ‘The Art of the Semi-Living’ in Live: 
Art and Performance, Heathfield, A. ed., Routledge, New York, 2004; Catts, Oron and Zurr, 
Ionat ‘Growing Semi-Living Sculptures: The Tissue Culture & Art Project’ in Leonardo, Vol. 
35 No. 4, 2002 (pp. 365–370); Kac, Eduardo ‘GFP Bunny’ in Eduardo Kac: Telepresence, 
Biotelematics, Transgenic Art, Kostic, A. & Dobrila, P. T. eds., Association for Culture and 
Education, KIBLA Multimedia Center, Maribor, Slovenia, 2002 (pp. 100–130); Onians, John 
Neuroarthistory: From Aristotle and Pliny to Baxandall and Zeki, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, Conn. and London, 2007; Orlan and TC&A, Harlequin Coat (2010); and Stelarc and 
TC&A Extra Ear ¼ Scale (2004).  
29 A notable exception to this would be the art historian Frances Stracey’s article in the scientific 
journal Nature, in which she adopted a form of meta-critique so as to actually question the use 
of these technologies and techniques in artistic practice. See Stracey, Frances ‘Bio-art: the ethics 
behind the aesthetics’ in Nature Reviews Molecular Cell Biology, 20 May 2009, 
doi:10.1038/nrm2699. 
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contest the epistemological claim of scientific and technological forms of vision 
to the site of the production of knowledge, erotics and power. 
 
Importantly, therefore, it is not only in the discussion of new medical and digital 
imaging where this study hopes to make a unique contribution. By critically 
investing in a productive tripartite encounter between the study of gender, 
technology and artistic practice, this thesis is able to use a contemporary 
methodological framework in order to revisit important early feminist practices, 
such as Schneemann’s Fuses, Lynda Benglis’ Now (1973) and Kate Craig’s 
video works produced at the Western Front artist collective in Vancouver. Thus, 
for example, by engaging with the recent explosion in animal studies that has 
largely arisen from contemporary debates about the use of animals in scientific 
practice, it has perhaps been made historically and culturally possible for me to 
now actually begin to see the cat in Schneemann’s early work and consider its 
role as a highly erotically and politically charged figure.  
 
I would stress, however, that this thesis does not aim to generate totalising 
theories of technology, and instead looks at areas of tension between practice 
and theory as a potentially fruitful encounter. Indeed, several of the key 
theorists who frame this study, including Jacques Derrida and Luce Irigaray, are 
concerned with conceptual points of rupture and disconnection between a study 
and its object (cf. language, gender and touch). Therefore, while wary of the 
potential for my claims to fall into a sort of technological determinism, it 
nonetheless remains notable that this study has emerged at a particular historical 
moment. New advances in various imaging technologies, and the increasingly 
rapid integration of technology into the domestic sphere in European and North 
American cultures, have perhaps enabled this thesis to address some notable 
blind spots not only in theories of the subject and issues around gender and 
sexuality, but also in art history. As such, this study finds itself perhaps unable 
to fully reconcile the problem of ‘the body’, even while it takes itself to be 
deeply ‘embodied’, textually and culturally. That is to say, borrowing from the 
fruitful work of Braidotti, this thesis is itself a situated subject: wholly 
contingent on the factors of its own material and cultural production. 
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PETTING AND PERSONHOOD: RE-FRAMING INTERSPECIES CONTACTS IN 












1890: M.E. Van Meter, a physician in Red Bluff, Colorado, requires skin to 
treat the severe burn of a 14 year old boy. He takes skin from the boy’s father 
and brother and then removes skin from two young puppies of the Mexican 
hairless breed and applies them to the boy, achieving a ‘superior result’.1  
 
I am intrigued by this anecdote. What sort of biological, ontological, 
epistemological and ethical questions would have to have been answered to 
enable xenotransplantation technologies (where organs from one species are 
grafted onto another) to be used in this way? What is it about the skinning of 
hairless puppies – hairless as a result of generations of artificial selective 
breeding – and the subsequent re-skinning of the hairless adolescent boy that 
might make us feel uneasy? What are the implications of the linguistic decisions 
that have been made, in order that the animals were referred to as ‘puppies’ 
rather than ‘juvenile xoloitzcuintli’, tying them to the symbolic economy of the 
pet and the domestic (historically constructed as subjective and feminine) rather 
than to science (historically constructed as objective and masculine2)? What 
would the piece of skin have looked like? What would it have felt like? With 
                                                
1 Lederer, Susan ‘Animal Parts/Human Bodies: Organic Transplantation in early 20th Century 
America’ in The Animal/Human Boundary: Historical Perspectives, Creager, A. & Jordan, W.C 
eds., University of Rochester Press, New York, 2002 (pp. 305-329) p. 313. 
2 For a discussion of the gendering of science and technology see Fox Keller, Evelyn Reflections 
on Gender and Science, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985. 
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‘fingery-eyes’ we can perhaps imagine ourselves touching – and being touched 
by – this unfamiliar, unpleasant piece of skin.3 The Mexican hairless is a very 
strange looking dog indeed. 
 
Hairlessness, skin, puppies: these words point toward an uncomfortable place; a 
place of uneasy encounter between the human and the animal. That technology 
has been used to stage a physiologically and conceptually problematic 
relationship between different kinds of bodies gives rise to a complex 
renegotiation of the tacit assumptions that have structured Western thought 
systems for at least the last 450 years, and the category ‘human’ that it upholds. 
In this example of xenotransplantation, what sort of status does the ‘puppy’ – 
the domesticated animal, the pet – have when it is skinned and used in 
biomedical research? More problematic, perhaps, what sort of status does the 
‘human’ have after its body no longer recognizes the animal antigens as foreign, 
and decides not to send enzymes to digest the skin, instead producing collagen 
and allowing its own capillaries to grow in to the skin of the animal, feeding it, 
nurturing it and growing it?  
 
Xenotransplantation technologies, such as the historical case study described 
above or the common pig-to-human heart valve transplant, perhaps tend toward 
producing an instrumental relation between the human and the animal, in which 
the animal body is held in objective utility in relation to the human. As such, the 
technology itself compounds and reinforces the categories ‘human’ and 
‘animal’, as they remain suspended in a system that holds one in the service of 
the other. Thus the nature of the linkages and affinities that technology 
generates might shift and slide, according to the material conditions of 
production. What, then, of the techniques and technologies of vision, and how it 
structures encounters between these different bodies? What role might touch 
still have to play in this? If, in theories of representation, the visual field has 
historically tended to construct the viewing subject as singular, centralized, 
                                                
3 I have borrowed this term from Donna Haraway, who in turn has borrowed from Eva 
Hayward’s term for the optic-haptic join of camera with marine creatures. See Hayward, Eva 
‘Fingery Eyes: What I Learned from Balanophyillia Elegans’ in The Encyclopedia of Human-
Animal Relationships, Bekoff, M. ed., Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, Connecticut, 
2007.  
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male and, certainly, human, how then might technology also be recast as a 
means of representing, and even producing, a dispersed subjectivity that 
accommodates multiple bodies?4 How might film and photography no longer be 
associated with reasserting an ocular- and anthropocentric visual field? 
 
For the last five decades, Carolee Schneemann’s work has explored the 
possibility of reconfiguring technologies of representation in this way. Her 
challenge to regimes of objective perspectivalism that imagines looking from a 
distance, objectify and record are perhaps well known. She writes, ‘if my 
paintings, photographs, films and enacted works have been judged obscene, the 
question arises: is this because I use the body in its actuality – without 
contrivance, fetishization, displacement? Is this because my works are usually 
self-shot, without an external, controlling eye?’5 Although much of the work, 
and the discourse around it, are commonly associated with ‘live’ or ‘body’ art 
practices – which could be positioned counter to the technological – much of it 
is, in fact, bound up in technological and technical processes of production and 
reception, that traditionally does require an ‘external eye’. What has been 
explored to a lesser extent, therefore, is the way in which Schneemann actually 
overturns this logic and uses film and photography to foreground a series of 
complex encounters between different bodies (male, female, animal, human) 
and between those bodies and technology. Frequently filtered through the 
filmstrip, as well as through secondary levels of printing, reproduction and 
projection, the body/image becomes twice mediated by technology in much of 
her work. The resulting complex visual structure of these film and photographic 
works then begin to trouble the category ‘human’ by disrupting the viewing 
processes that appeal to models of a unified subject at the centre of perception, 
                                                
4 For an overview of such debates see Crary, Jonathan Techniques of the Observer, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 1990; Jay, Martin ‘Dialectic of 
Enlightenment’ in Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French 
Thought, University of California Press, Berkeley and L.A., 1993; Mulvey, Laura ‘Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ in Screen 16.3, Autumn 1975 (pp. 6-18); Doane, Mary Anne 
‘Film and the Masquerade: Theorising the Female Spectator’, Screen 23.3-4, 1982 (pp. 74-88); 
Pollock, Griselda Vision and Difference: Femininity, Feminism, and Histories of Art, Routledge, 
London and New York,1988.  
5 Schneemann, Carolee ‘The Obscene Body/Politic’ in Art Journal: Censorship II Special 
Edition, Vol. 50, No. 4, Winter 1991, (pp. 28-35), p.33. 
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dispersing the subject and aligning it figuratively and conceptually with bodies 
classified as ‘animal’. 
 
Since the late 1950s Schneemann has featured her cats Kitch, Cluny and Vesper 
in much of her work, significantly in the context of sexual activity. Either they 
seem to look at Schneemann during intercourse with another partner (see Fuses 
1967, Plumb Line 1971, Kitch’s Last Meal 1978), or they kiss and lick her and 
actually become her partner (Infinity Kisses 1981–88, Vesper’s Stampede to My 
Holy Mouth 1991) (figs 1.1-1.5). Critically, Schneemann invokes the sexuality 
of these feline bodies not in opposition to, but in parallel with her own. For 
example, in writing about her childhood experiences, growing up in the 
countryside, she has noted, 
 
[My parents and I] would all lie in bed on Sunday mornings, 
they would teach me to read the comics… I remember the deep 
intimacy, sensuousness and delight. I built my own erotic 
fantasy life with various invisible animal and human lovers 
inhabiting my sheets, bed… The animals were sexual creatures 
and I identified that part of my nature with them.6 
 
The sexual and creative relationship between Schneemann and her cats is an 
area awaiting fuller development. Certainly, looking at her work, personal notes 
and correspondence, cats seem to turn up everywhere (figs 1.6-1.9), and yet, the 
critical literature has, by and large, neglected the role of the cat in many of her 
works.7 Furthermore, with the exception of the work of Rebecca Schneider, it 
makes no attempt to engage with the complex erotic encounters that are 
explicitly staged, and only makes passing reference to the cats, if at all. Thus 
                                                
6 Schneemann, Carolee quoted in Gadon, Elinor W. The Once and Future Goddess, Harper and 
Row, San Francisco, 1989 pp. 295-296.  
7 The following key texts in the literature on Schneemann’s film works also all neglect the 
figure of the cat, or only make passing reference: James, David E. Allegories of Cinema: 
American Film in the Sixties, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989; Jones, Amelia Body 
Art: Performing the Subject, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London, 1998; 
Jones, Amelia Self/Image: Technology, Representation and the Contemporary Subject, 
Routledge, London and New York, 2006; Macdonald, Scott ‘Carolee Schneemann’s 
Autobiographical Trilogy’ in Film Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 1, Autumn 1980 pp. 27-32; 
Macdonald, Scott A Critical Cinema: Interviews with Independent Filmmakers, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, LA, London, 1988. 
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they seem to inhabit some sort of blind spot, as for example when Schneemann 
raises the issue of kissing her cat for the photographic installation Infinity 
Kisses, during an interview. The interviewer, Aviva Rahmani, simply ignores 
Schneemann’s suggestion of an interspecies relationship and instead states: ‘by 
using a cat, you’re making it “non-pornography”, taking the erotic issue out of 
heterosexual mating into eroticism for its own sake’. To which Schneemann 
flatly responds: ‘my work seems to occupy a zone corresponding to the art 
world’s blind spot.’8 Even as late as 2002, therefore, the question of the cat 
cannot yet be critically addressed in an erotic context. This is perhaps especially 
surprising given the recent explosion of Animal Studies across a range of 
academic disciplines.9 While this chapter hopes to address this important 
lacuna, it also posits that this lack of engagement is demonstrative of a broader 
cultural aversion to critically engaging with particular sexual phenomena. 
 
Although it is perhaps surprising that Schneemann’s cats are still somewhat of a 
blind-spot in readings of her work, this could be because they only appear (with 
the inflexion of both ‘coming into existence’ and the way something ‘looks’) 
marginal, on the sidelines, off or ob-scene, and as such are difficult little 
creatures to contend with, formally, conceptually and historically. That they 
generally appear only on the margins of a frame, a film or a painting, makes 
them obscene in the very sense of the word, tied as it is to visibility.10 As 
Jacques Derrida might say, the cats only make a sort of furtive appearance, a 
pas de loup (as stealthy as a wolf) into the works. That is to say that they are, ‘a 
discreet intrusion or even an unobtrusive effraction, without show, all but secret, 
clandestine, an entrance that does all it can to go unnoticed and especially not to 
                                                
8 Schneemann, Carolee ‘On censorship: interview with Aviva Rahmani’ in Imaging Her Erotics, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 2002, (pp. 210-215), pp. 214-15.  
9 Notably, this has also become a fruitful field of enquiry for feminism and gender studies. See 
Feminist Theory, Vol. 12, No. 2, August 2011, Special Issue: Nonhuman Feminisms. 
10 ‘Obscenity’, as Peter Michelson argues, is the ‘bringing onstage of what is customarily kept 
offstage’. (see Speaking the Unspeakable: A Poetics of Obscenity, State University of New 
York Press, Albany 1993, p.xi); or, as Linda Nead defines it, the representation of matter ‘which 
is beyond the accepted codes of public visibility’ (Nead, Lynda The Female Nude: Art, 
Obscenity and Sexuality, Routledge, London & New York, 1992, p. 90); or from the OED 
definition, ‘Offensively or grossly indecent, lewd; (Law) (of a publication) tending to deprave 
and corrupt those who are likely to read, see, or hear the contents.’ See 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/129823 
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be stopped, intercepted, or interrupted.’11 Like the wolf, the cats seem to pose 
‘thorny frontier questions’12 about the perceived distinction between the human 
and the animal body, which has historically been structured around the twin 
Aristotelian models of zoe and bios (the ‘qualified life’ and the ‘bare life’).13 As 
I hope to demonstrate in this chapter, the cats become a point of contact in 
Schneemann’s work between these classificatory systems, and foreground the 
role of technology in that process. What is both novel and provocative in 
Schneemann’s use of the animal body, however, is that the encounters between 
bodies are specifically erotic. As such, Schneemann reveals how certain bodies 
– particularly the feline and the female body – might operate within a symbolic 
economy of sexual affection, stroking and touch.14 An Olympia for celluloid, 
perhaps. 
 
For example, in Personae (J.T. & 3 Kitch’s) (1958), Fur Wheel (1962) (figs 
1.10-1.11) and Fur Landscape (1963), three early works by Schneemann, there 
is a preoccupation with the physical contact between human and animal bodies, 
evoking both the tactile and the erotic, which can also be seen in her later film 
and photographic works.15 In Fur Landscape, Schneemann covered the support 
with house paint and fur in order to produce a surface that demands a tactile 
encounter over and above a purely visual one: it literally invites petting. 
Likewise, Personae (J.T. & 3 Kitch’s) depicts a naked man lying on a bed, with 
the negative spaces around his body revealing a number of feline bodies in the 
paint, deeply entwined with his. Since they largely occupy only the negative 
                                                
11 Derrida, Jacques The Beast and The Sovereign: Volume I, Lisse, M., Mallet, M-L. & 
Michaud, G. eds., Bennington, G. trans., University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 
2009 p. 2. 
12 Ibid., p. 4; In relation to the wolf as a problematic animal character, see also Giorgio 
Agamben’s discussion in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Heller-Roazen, D. 
trans., Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1998. Derrida is clearly in dialogue with 
Agamben when he writes The Beast and The Sovereign.     
13 The Aristotelian distinction between zoe and bios (see Metaphysics, Politics) forms the basis 
for Agamben’s discussion of the homo sacer. This distinction is challenged by Derrida in The 
Beast and The Sovereign, as he questions Agamben’s conceit that the wolf directly corresponds 
to zoe (in opposition to bios).  
14 The myriad of associations with the touch as presented by Jacques Derrida forms the basis for 
my thesis here. See Derrida, On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, Christine Irizarry trans., Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, California, 2005. 
15 See Stiles, Kristine ‘The Painter as an Instrument of Real Time’, in Imaging Her Erotics (pp. 
3-17) for a discussion about Schneemann’s work in paint and how it produces a tactile 
experience. 
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spaces of the painting, the cats here literally perform a discreet, almost 
imperceptible intrusion. 
 
What is interesting about these early object-based works is the way in which 
they set up a resonance between the terms ‘pet’ and ‘petting’ that comes to be a 
thread throughout much of Schneemann’s work, especially the important early 
film Fuses (1964-1967). This resonance might have been even more profoundly 
felt in the 1960s, with the popularization of terms such as ‘heavy petting’. In a 
project entitled Naked Action Lecture (June 27th, 1968, ICA) Schneemann 
dressed and undressed whilst lecturing to students on perception and spatial 
organisation. She writes: 
 
At the conclusion of the slides I went on to the stage and asked 
for volunteers from the audience to join me in demonstrating a 
principle of collage; we would all undress, cover each other with 
paste and leap off the stage into the mound of shredded papers… 
after performing the collage a blackout. We left the stage for the 
showers upstairs. Fuses began.16 
 
By preceding a screening of Fuses (figs 1.12-1.15) with an example of ‘body 
collage’, as in Naked Action Lecture, Schneemann invited the film to be viewed 
within an embodied, tactile, visual field in which the skin of the body functions 
as an interface both with the environment and with other bodies. In Fuses, this 
interface also incorporates the body of her pet cat, Kitch, in order to generate 
new embodied forms of desire, premised on touch and erotic inter-species 
encounter. Picking up on Amelia Jones’ wonderful description of this work as a 
‘hetero-erotic flesh-poem’17, this chapter hopes not just to challenge the ‘hetero’ 
label that is so frequently applied to this film, but actually to nuance it and 
suggest that the concept of hetero could here be more usefully understood as 
being grounded in difference: both the difference of gender, and the difference 
of species.  
                                                
16 Schneemann, Carolee More Than Meat Joy: Performance Work and Selected Writings, 
McPherson, B. R. ed., Mcpherson & Co., New York, 1997, p. 180. 
17 Jones 2006, p.146. 
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Shot on 16mm, this film is a densely woven mesh of surface marks, scratches, 
paint and images, inviting a kind of vision that spreads out over the surface 
instead of penetrating into depth or narrative.18 Upon this surface, this screen, 
the film shows Schneemann and James Tenney having sex. There is a cat, 
Kitch, who watches them. A soundtrack of ocean waves crashing and a cat 
meowing accompanies the film. As has already been well-documented 
elsewhere, the techniques used for filming were highly experimental: the 
footage was shot in slow, fast and regular motion using a variety of camera 
positions – hand-held, suspended from a ceiling, balanced on a table – and a 
range of exposure levels depending on the time of day or year at which the 
footage was shot. The film stock was then manipulated so that one sees multiple 
print generations of the same image and highly edited passages with splice 
marks, flares and perforations made visible. In addition to this, Schneemann 
repeatedly worked into the film stock by drawing, painting or animating directly 
onto it, hanging the footage outdoors and baking imagery on. In fact, the 
original stock of Fuses was so heavily collaged, so thick, that it could not be 
printed.19 In this way, as with Fur Landscape, the materiality of the film itself 
becomes staged on the surface of the screen, as its limits are exposed by 
Schneemann’s extensive exploration of the physical properties of the 16mm 
camera, via both production and destruction.20  
 
In Fuses, the film screen constantly asserts its materiality, since the fantasy 
space of narrative is often negated as the eye roves over its enticing surface. As 
Schneemann has scratched and marked it, the projected image actually 
becomes, as Amelia Jones writes, ‘a kind of skin that has been tenderly stroked 
                                                
18 Schneemann writes that ‘viewers are distracted by the simultaneity of perceptual layers Fuses 
offers.’ Schneemann 2002, p. 21. For a discussion of how Schneemann’s early paintings also 
rejected illusion, see Stiles, p. 4.  
19 Schneemann, Carolee ‘Interview With Kate Haug’ in Imaging Her Erotics, (pp. 2-45), p. 43. 
20 ‘The durability of 16mm (as opposed to 8mm) made it an obvious choice for the highly tactile 
experience of Fuses.’ (Macdonald, 1980, p.30). The editing process itself also contributed to the 
grainy, textured surface. As Schneemann states in the interview with Kate Haug, ‘my film is 
always dirty because of the way I edited, with the cats moving around and the windows wide 
open.’ Schneemann, 2002, p. 33. What I find interesting about this quote is the way in which the 
cats seem to be caught within the double meaning of the word ‘dirty’. We are not quite sure 
whether the cats are dirty, or whether they have made the film dirty, or indeed what precisely is 
being implied with the term ‘dirty’.  
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or passionately punctured.’21 Fuses has therefore been widely conceived as an 
important moment in film-making, in which the spectator is encouraged to re-
focus on the screen as a tactile skin, drawing the eye away from an 
illusionistically rendered diagesis played out within the filmic lexis. As Scott 
Macdonald has suggested, this both activates notions of touch in the work, and 
proposes a model of spectatorship toward an embodied encounter with the 
screen-image, 
 
In Fuses the camera is not a detached observer with its own set 
of rules. It’s a participant in the experience, functioning both as 
a stimulus and a receiver of stimuli. The fact that the imagery 
recorded by the camera was physically handled and explored by 
Schneemann for years makes the finished film an extension of 
the tactile experiences it records... Fuses is a natural accretion 
which, like the husk of a cicada or a chambered nautilus, is an 
index to the life processes which created it.22   
 
Fuses represents an accumulation of images and ideas, collected over the years, 
and on to which is imprinted the traces of a quotidian domesticity. For both 
Macdonald and Jones, the film solicits an image that is somehow alive, as the 
screen-image pulsates and writhes with rippling contours, and the surface 
accommodates an indexical relationship to the world, premised upon touch 
(con-tact).23 ‘Functioning both as a stimulus and a receiver of stimuli’, the film 
exhibits the tactile reflexivity of skin: that it may be both touching and 
touched.24 Using the formal device of continuous variation on the surface of the 
                                                
21 Jones, 2006, p. 146. 
22 Macdonald, 1980, p. 28. 
23 For a formulation of the film screen as skin in Fuses see also James, 1989. 
24 For a discussion of the tactile reflexivity of skin see Anzieu, Didier The Skin Ego, Turner, C. 
trans.,, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1989, especially p. 61; Freud, Sigmund 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926) W.W. Norton and Co, London, 1990; Merleau-Ponty, 
Maurice ‘Eye and Mind’ (1960) in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and 
Painting, Smith, M. trans., Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1993; Merleau-Ponty, The 
Visible and the Invisible, Lingis, A. trans., Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968; and 
Nancy, Jean-Luc Etre Singulier Pluriel, Galilée, Paris 1996, the book which formed the basis 
for Derrida’s discussion of touch in On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, 2005. Nancy writes in Etre 
Singulier Pluriel, ‘touching is the very experience of origin as plural singularity. Self-touching, 
touching oneself, (self)touch one another.’ Quoted in Derrida, 2005, p. 115; for a feminist 
critique of some of these models of tactile reflexivity see Irigaray, Luce ‘Section IV’ in An 
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screen, Fuses exhibits the unstable visual, psychological or spatial referent that 
has characterised the philosophical notion of the haptic, in which the film screen 
becomes a sort of synthesis (‘fusing’) of both optic and tactile sensory 
information.25 As such, the skin of the film is integral to the production of 
encounters between bodies on either side of it: both in the space of reception 
and in the space of representation. The screen is a point of physical contact, 
then, a point at which the flesh of the bodies in the film presses up against the 
screen, causing it to extend out in to our space and implicating us in the erotic 
encounter. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty has written, ‘vision is a palpation with 
the look.’26 Rather than reinscribe the logic of a disembodied eye, a motif 
through which film has traditionally been understood as both purely visual and 
at the perceived centre of a unifying and objectifying gaze, Schneemann instead 
uses the materiality of film to scramble narratives and disperse representations, 
and invest in the corporeality of the celluloid itself. In this, Fuses was very 
much part of a broader context in which artists at this time were asserting the 
corporeality of film, most notably through dance. Particularly, Trisha Brown’s 
works Planes (1968) and Homemade (1966), both incorporated film – and the 
act of filmmaking – into the performances in a way that rejected any sense that 
the spaces of production or reception were the domain of a disembodied eye. 
Neither the act of looking at, or making, film could any longer be separated 
from the body itself.  
 
Tales and tails 
 
In Fuses, the points of contact between the fields of reception and 
representation are constructed as erotic by virtue of the ties of both skin and 
                                                                                                                                      
Ethics of Sexual Difference, Burke, C. & Gill, G. C. trans., The Athlone Press, London 1993 
especially pp. 186-87.  
25 For a discussion of the haptic see Deleuze, Gilles Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, 
1981; Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix ‘1440: The Smooth and the Striated’ in Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus, Massumi, B. trans., Continuum, London and New 
York, 1987 (pp. 523-551). Their work on the haptic comes from Riegl, Alois Problems of Style: 
Foundations for a History of Ornament (1893), and Riegl, Late Roman Art Industry (1901). For 
a discussion of the way in which the haptic has been used in film theory in relation to 
marginalized or counter-cultural practices see Marks, Laura The Skin of the Film: Intercultural 
Cinema, Embodiment and the Senses, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2000. 
26 ‘Vision is a palpation with the look.’ Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 134. The reciprocity between 
the touched and the touching forms the basis for Merleau-Ponty’s model of the field of vision, 
in that there is a similar reciprocity between seer and seen. 
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flesh to the tactile. Both the formal and the structural properties of the work – 
what it shows, as well as how it shows – construct Fuses as erotic and, crucially, 
both the content and the structure achieve this by activating the notion of touch. 
The content and the structure or formal properties of the work are thus deeply 
and systematically entangled. They are knitted together in to a web, in which 
numerous points of connection – knots and nodes – support the construction. At 
the centre of the web is the cat, which brings together the tactile and the visual 
through the notions of both petting and fur, which are each tied to sexual 
affection and the erotic.  
 
During a brief passage, the filmic lexis is centred on the bodies of Schneemann 
and Tenney. Over the surface of the film scratches and breaks interrupt our 
viewing processes. The scene then switches to Kitch, nestled on someone’s lap, 
while a hand gently caresses him from above. A streak of purple paint smears 
itself across the film screen and the fur melts into breaks and scratches. This 
time, as the breaks fade, the scene has switched again to hands, intimately 
touching Schneemann, probing wet, fleshy recesses. The camera zooms in to 
blackness and the purple smear again signals the rupture between spliced 
footage while simultaneously smoothing over the break, producing the illusion 
of one body becoming another, as the image of Kitch then re-appears on our 
screen. He is still being tenderly stroked, almost absentmindedly. Schneemann 
has become Kitch. The breaks and smears of the surface of the screen produce 
this equivalence, as we see both Kitch and Schneemann being touched, each 
body sharing an analogous position in relation to the external, disembodied 
hand. The erotic contact, which is being staged by the image of the hand 
stroking Kitch, is underwritten by the explicit sexual – and more specifically 
genital – contact shown in the intercut scenes.  
 
While this passage clearly refers to the eroticism inherent in the contact between 
fur and skin, underscored by the analogy between Kitch and Schneemann, it 
might also serve as an allusion to a symbolic economy in which women’s 
bodies are equated with animal bodies, especially feline ones. While a similar 
history exists between men and cats, it usually concerns benign male figures: 
for example, there is a partnership of cats and mayors seen in both Finneganns 
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Wake and The Tale of Dick Whittington. By contrast, there are numerous 
historical and literary female and/or feline figures that are specifically 
constructed as malicious. For example, there is the association of cats with 
lubriciousness, evil and/or the feminine in numerous fairy-, folk- and 
‘wondertales.’27 In these, the cat is generally seen as an object of malevolence 
associated with the dark, a magic creature in its own right and, crucially, 
female. Covering a range of historical and literary sources, this includes the 
grimalkin28 and the cait sith29 from English and Scottish folk tales; the Cat Saint 
from the Basque region (a cat-witch who would punish women who disobey her 
rule of no domestic work on St. Agatha’s day)30; and, in two of Grimm’s fairy 
tales, The Cat and Mouse in Partnership and The Youth who went Forth to 
Learn what Fear Was the cat features as a malignant entity.31 From out of these 
fairy tales and folk stories, as recent developments in the literature have noted, 
we then see the emergence of fantasies about the witch and her familiar.32 
                                                
27 The Russian structuralist Vladimir Prop preferred to use the term ‘wondertale’, from the 
German ‘wundermarchen’, as a means to embrace both fairy tales and folk tales. 
28 Hadlock, Wendell S. and Stimson, Anna K. ‘Traditional Cat Names’, in The Journal of 
American Folklore, Vol. 59, No. 234, Oct. – Dec., 1946, (pp. 529-530). A grimalkin is an old or 
evil-looking female cat. The term stems from ‘grey’ (the colour) plus ‘malkin’, an obsolete term 
for a cat, derived from the hypocoristic (a pet name) form of the female name Maud. The 
term/name may first come from Beware the Cat (published 1570) by William Baldwin, who 
relates the story of Grimalkin's death. According to its editors, the story, and thus the name, 
originates with Baldwin. It is also spelled Grimmalkin or Grimolochin. Grimalkin was the name 
of the cat of Nostradamus, and later the witches' cat Gray-Malkin in Macbeth by William 
Shakespeare. In Tom Jones, Henry Fielding relates a story from a 17th-century collection of 
fables in which Grimalkin is a cat whose owner falls passionately in love with her. He prays to 
Venus, who changes the cat into a woman. Lying in bed, however, she spots a mouse and leaps 
up after it, ‘Puss, even when she's a Madam, will be a mouser still.’ In Wuthering Heights, Mr. 
Lockwood shares a set of two benches in the back kitchen of Healthcliff's manor with a 
Grimalkin described as a ‘brindled, grey cat, which crept from the ashes, and saluted me with a 
querulous mew.’ 
29 See Briggs, Katherine The Fairies in Tradition and Literature, Routledge Classics, London 
and New York, 2002, pp. 85-87. 
30 Alford, Violet ‘The Cat Saint’, Folklore, Vol. 52, No. 3, Sep., 1941, pp. 161-183. 
31 Grimm, Complete Fairy Tales, Routledge Classics, London and New York, 2002. The 
magical power of the cat is perhaps demonstrated by the unusual practice of bricking up cats in 
new builds as a foundation sacrifice, particularly during the regeneration works in London 
following 1666. For a fascinating exploration of this phenomenon see Howard, Margaret M. 
‘Dried Cats’, in Man, Vol. 51, Nov. 1951 (pp. 149-151).  
32 For a discussion of the emergence of the witch’s familiar out of existing folk lore see Sax, 
Boria ‘The Magic of Animals: English Witch Trials in the Perspective of Folklore’, in 
Anthrozoos, Vol. 22, issue 4, Dec., 2009 (pp. 317-332); and Wilby, Emma ‘The Witch's 
Familiar and the Fairy in Early Modern England and Scotland’, Folklore, Vol. 111, No. 2, Oct., 
2000 (pp. 283-305). In these sources the historical construction of the witch’s familiar as an 
elite demonological concept imposed upon popular culture ‘from above’ is challenged. 
According to this hypothesis, prosecutorial suggestion during witchcraft trials, witchcraft 
pamphlets, pulpit teachings and so on served to gradually impress the idea of the witch's 
familiar into the popular imagination, where it then became a vehicle for the sensationalist and 
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Finally, more recently, there are the dangerous cat-women represented in the 
surrealist photograph Cat and I (Wanda Wulz, 1932), DC Comics’ Catwoman 
and the film Cat People (Jacques Tourneur, 1942; Paul Schrader, 1982). 
 
Fuses, like many of Schneemann’s works, thus appears to perform in dual 
political arenas. On the one hand it stages an encounter that has been 
characterized as a challenge to Enlightenment models of vision as disembodied 
and so ‘“cleansed” of the vicissitudes of desire.’33 But, on the other, it concerns 
a symbolic economy in which women are either reduced to animals (bird, pussy, 
beaver, cow, chick) or carved up like animals (leg-man, breast-man); the film 
specifically invokes this troublesome logic of modernist dualisms with its visual 
puns on ‘stroking pussy’.34 Similarly, another passage of the film shows an 
extended scene of cows in a snowstorm in which the film dissolves into white: 
an emptying out, a break, in the dense imagery. Schneemann writes that she had 
‘gone out into the snowstorm naked, putting on a coat. It happened to have been 
some old scraggly fur coat, so I was thinking about fur and animal and flesh.’35 
 
                                                                                                                                      
paranoid fantasies of the witch and her neighbours. This concept is challenged in these articles 
by considering the links between the familiar and the fairy (i.e. in popular culture). For a 
discussion of the witch and her familiar, see Kingsbury, J.B. ‘The Last Witch of England’, in 
Folklore, Vol. 61, No. 3, Sep., 1950 (pp. 134-145); and Micklewright, F. H. Amphlett ‘A Note 
on the Witch-Familiar in Seventeenth-Century England’, in Folklore, Vol. 58, No. 2, Jun., 1947 
(pp. 285-287); The English Statute of Witchcraft of 1604 made it a felony to ‘consult, covenant 
with, entertain, employ, feed or reward any evil and wicked spirit to or for any intent or 
purpose.’ K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 
1971, p. 443; Lastly, any overview would be incomplete without reference to the fantastic 
online resource of The University of Virginia pertaining to the Salem Witchcraft Trials: 
http://etext.virginia.edu/salem/witchcraft/texts/transcripts.html. 
33 Jones, 2006, p. 20. Writers like Jones and MacDonald cast Fuses as a provocative challenge 
to western scopic regimes. By precluding the narrative element in the visual field, operating 
outside of hetero-normative discourse and by mobilising modes of production rooted in female 
agency (whereby the woman is shot by-herself and for-herself) Fuses is famously read as 
defeating the vice-like grip of the camera/eye and the subsequent conflation of woman/fetish 
that has been so expertly described by Laura Mulvey in ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema’.  
34 Schneemann has written of Fuses, ‘I have all these little sexual jokes in it – Tenney’s balls 
resting on a chair bordered with Christmas tree balls. Then I montaged a burning bush joke – 
there’s a close up of my bush. I loved discovering those associations. Nobody saw those for 
years. I’d be the only person in the audience chuckling away. Like pussy/pussy – his hand on 
the cat and cut to his hand stroke my pussy.’ Schneemann, 2002, p. 42. 
35 Schneemann, 2002, p. 33. Interestingly, Schneemann has lived in New York’s fur district 
since arriving in the city in 1962, in an apartment that used to house the old Papadopolous 
furrier sweatshop. This item of trivia is part of a web of connections between Schneemann and 
fur, which are worked through in several of her early pieces, including Four Fur Cutting Boards 
(1963) and Fur Wheel (1962). Of note is that these works were produced contemporaneously 
with her arrival in the area. 
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The film therefore seems to expose the historical relationships not only between 
the female and the feline but also between (women’s) skin and fur and, indeed, 
these have historically come together in numerous sexualised narratives and 
contacts – ‘tales and tails.’36 In this it brings together a series of linguistic 
(female, feline) and biological concepts (skin, fur). For example, fur has been 
understood as the most privileged, the most exquisite type of second skin for 
women to wear and, along with flesh, has traditionally acted as a signifier for 
the female body in and of itself. From Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s 
dominatrix Wanda, to Meret Oppenheim’s fur-lined tea-cup, to June Sauer’s 
fashion photographs of women in fur,37 to Brigitte Bardot (sex-kitten and 
animal rights activist), to the Canadian phenomenon of Les Filles du Roi,38 we 
encounter a plethora of points of con-tact; of cultural, political and historical 
intersections between women’s skin and fur. 
 
In her book Fur Nation: From The Beaver to Brigitte Bardot (2001), Chantal 
Nadeau traced some of these points of convergence (touches) between women’s 
skin and fur, within the context of the construction of a Canadian national 
identity. In the history of fur pelts, skins and skinning, argues Nadeau, women 
are traditionally skinned and then re-dressed in fur.39 Such a study is especially 
important for Canadian identity since the economy was founded on the fur trade 
                                                
36 Although, rather than ‘expose’ we might use the term ‘expeause’. This neologism is a 
compression of the words ‘peau’ and ‘expose’ as used by Derrida, 2005 in his discussion of skin 
and touch. 
37 ‘[June Sauer captures] the delicate papery texture of skin and the sensuality of fur in the 
frame. I understand fully the web of mediations that converge to construct women in furs: the 
spectacular materiality and incandescent public and ‘private’ qualities of the fur ladies. [In her 
photos] I can caress skin and fur all at once.’ Nadeau, Chantal Fur Nation: From the Beaver to 
Brigitte Bardot, Routledge, London and New York, 2001 p. 69.  
38 Les Filles du Roi was a French cultural phenomenon during the foundation of the new colony 
of Canada. These were girls who were considered unsuitable for marriage in the mother country 
and so were sent by royal proclamation to Canada for marriage, in other words for the 
procreation of the white race. Canada’s economic structure was completely dependent on the fur 
trade and Les Filles du Roi played a key role in the consolidation of French dominance in the 
new world. As a result of the marriage, the French engages who worked in the fur trade in 
Canada were forced to swear allegiance to the King for the duration of their contract with the 
fur companies. The girls were given in exchange for the continued success of the beaver fur 
trade.  
39 Also see Emberley, Julia Venus and Furs: The Cultural Politics of Fur, I. B. Taurus & Co. 
Ltd, London, 1998. Specifically, Nadeau is concerned with women’s place in both the symbolic 
and the material production of fur and so she positions herself in opposition to Emberley 
because she risks reproducing the traditional exclusion of women from material production. It is 
also of note that there are simultaneous histories of men and fur, in the context of sexuality, 
usually pertaining to the hairiness or hairlessness of their own bodies. In particular I am thinking 
of the ‘bears’ of gay communities.  
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and the fact that the national emblem, the ‘beaver’, contains an array of 
allusions to gendered bodies.40 Importantly for Nadeau and for my study here, 
there is eroticism inherent in the very appearance of fur, which is brought to life 
with the highly charged relationship between fur and the (culturally endorsed) 
depilated skin of a woman. She writes, ‘when I look at fur I cannot help but see 
the feeling of the fur at the tips of my fingers, I cannot help but feeling the skin 
that is wearing the fur.’41 The very look of fur is thus intimately connected with 
its tactility, as it invites a haptic encounter.  
 
Like sight, the haptic operates in the processes of psychological orientation to 
the world and encounters between subjects. While the haptic does pertain to 
touch and tactile sensations, it actually implies an interdependency between the 
sensations of touch and sight, and as such is offered as a counter-point to the 
hegemonic dominion of visual over non-visual culture, and cultures.42 Indeed, it 
is precisely through the complex interaction of visual and tactile sensations 
activated in Fuses that the symbolic economy of the pet and petting comes into 
play, revealing the many ways in which the haptic – as opposed to the purely 
visual or tactile – operates in the production of desire. By considering the pet 
(n.)/to pet (v.) within the context of the haptic, we might more fully understand 
the processes of petting and stroking as incorporating communication and 
human-animal con-tacts.  
 
The animal body or, perhaps more accurately in this context, animal fur, both 
touches on metaphors of the female body and touches on the notion of touch 
itself: the tactility of fur reveals what is inherently erotic in the notion of touch. 
Beyond the hetero-normative model of subjectivity and eroticism that is 
generally seen as defining the work, I would therefore like to argue for a re-
imagining of the politics of desire at play in Fuses. Indeed, Schneemann has 
                                                
40 Beavers have a peculiar relationship to the explicit gendered body, not only by means of its 
obvious associations with female genitalia, but also because male beavers have a 
paramesonephric duct, or uterus.  
41 Nadeau, p. 8. 
42 E.g. see Marks, whose model of ‘intercultural cinema’ (marginalised practices) is radically 
opposed to modernist notions of disembodied vision. For Marks, haptic vision incorporates 
aspects of embodiment in order to assert that vision fundamentally remains a point of contact 
between bodies, and that there is a bodily experience involved in the apprehension of the screen 
image. 
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stated that ‘Fuses was partly inspired by the shameless appreciation of our cat 
Kitch.’43 It is these points of contact, or touches, between animal fur, the female 
body, the film screen, tactility and eroticism, that might provide a new critical 
space for considering Schneemann’s work and, indeed, open up a whole range 
of practices to a material analysis of the techniques and technologies used in 
their making. Thus, Fuses demonstrates the interweaving of thematic and 




The relationship between the tactile and the visual which, as I have shown, is 
activated by fur and the notion of the pet in Schneemann’s Fuses, has been 
historically staged in opposition to the post-Enlightenment tendency towards the 
rationality of perspectival vision, which sees from a distance, understands and 
objectifies. Merleau-Ponty’s work on the reciprocity of touch, and his 
formulation of that reciprocity as the ground for also understanding vision, 
forms the basis for Luce Irigaray’s critique in An Ethics of Sexual Difference 
(1984). For Irigaray, one of the problems with Merleau-Ponty’s work on touch 
is that it still remains primarily invested in the look. She writes, ‘must my 
aesthesiological body be completed by vision?...[Merleau-Ponty] privileges 
vision, takes back a great deal of the phenomenology of the tactile, and gives it 
the privilege of closing up the body.’44 Irigaray’s conceptualisation of touch is 
subsequently premised not upon the points of contact between the visual and the 
tactile, but rather the points of rupture. The look, for Irigaray, has the tendency 
to ‘freeze’ the touch, to disturb ‘the intelligence of my touching…paralyzing the 
flow, turning it to ice…I cannot situate the visible and the tangible in a 
chiasmus.’45  Unlike the work of Merleau-Ponty, Alois Riegl, Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, both Irigaray and Derrida suggest that rather than simply 
completing one another, the point at which the tactile and the visual meet is at a 
point of disconnection, a point of non-contact, which stages the Aristotelian 
                                                
43 Carolee Schneemann, personal email correspondence, March 4, 2009 
44 Irigaray, pp. 174-76. Merleau-Ponty’s model here appears similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work on the haptic in which the eye seems to complete le vecu, or the lived experience: ‘The 
haptic does not establish an opposition between two sense organs but rather invites the 
assumption that the eye itself may fulfil this non-optical function.’ Deleuze and Guattari, p. 543.  
45 Irigaray, p. 162. 
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aporia of the touch: the idea that we can never quite touch touch.46 The prism of 
touch is actually, therefore, diffracted through a range of tactile experiences that 
include both the positive and the negative, the caress and the blow. Derrida lists, 
 
Skimming, grazing, pressing, pushing in, squeezing, smoothing, 
scratching, rubbing, stroking, palpating, groping, kneading, 
massaging, embracing, hugging, striking, pinching, biting, 
sucking, wetting, holding, letting go, licking, jerking, looking, 
listening, smelling, tasting, avoiding, kissing, cradling, 
swinging, carrying, weighing.47  
 
This state of disconnection between the look and the touch is described by 
Irigaray as a ‘mucous’. A strange membrane that, she argues, Merleau-Ponty 
does not fully address in his work in this field. She writes, 
 
The look cannot take up the tangible. Thus I never see that in 
which I touch or am touched. What is at play in the caress does 
not see itself. The in-between, the middle, the medium of the 
caress does not see itself…nor will I ever see the mucous, that 
most intimate interior of my flesh, neither the touch of the 
outside of the skin of my fingers nor the perception of the inside 
of these same fingers…these mucous membranes evade my 
mastery, just as my face does, yet differently. The joined hands 
perhaps represent this memory of the intimacy of the mucous.48 
 
The mucous therefore represents a space of not-touching, even while it seems to 
appeal to the tactile through its metaphorical associations with stickiness, 
viscosity, joining, sealing and fusing. For Irigaray, it is therefore a space that is 
inherently associated with the relationship between the interior and the exterior 
as well as the self and the Other, or perhaps rather two Others. Irigaray writes, 
                                                
46 Aristotle, On the Soul. Aristotle’s formulation of the aporia of touch informs Derrida’s On 
Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, in which touch is fundamentally problematic because it always 
entails a non-touching. Touch is diaphanous and always mediated, distanced, divided. 
47 Derrida, 2005, p. 70. 
48 See Irigaray, pp. 161-170 for a critique of Merleau-Ponty’s work on touch. 
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‘prior to and following any positioning of the subject, this touch binds and 
unbinds two others in a flesh that is still and always untouched by 
mastery…covering it, uncovering it again and again, like an amorous 
impregnation that seeks out and affirms otherness while protecting it… in that 
place, nothing attests to the subject.’49 Schneemann notes that Fuses invokes a 
loss of self that perhaps speaks to this idea of ‘two others’, in which neither 
body inhabits the position of the subject in relation to the other: 
 
[In the section of the film when everything turns white] I wanted 
everything to suddenly drain into this open, indecipherable 
whiteness – like that orgasmic space where you are out beyond 
wherever you are. You don’t know where you are. You don’t 
know if it his body or your body.50 
 
This space of otherness, rather than simply the Other, is the film screen, a site of 
corporeal transfer across its boundaries. In a very brief sequence, Schneemann 
is just glimpsed brushing her hair. Streaks of red paint and animated circles 
obscure the scene. On to the surface of the film, scratches also appear, 
zigzagging across, formally mimicking Schneemann’s wavy hair. It is almost as 
if stray hairs had been lifted on to the screen itself, somehow caught by the 
sticky surface of the film. This stickiness is like a net, trawling both the space of 
representation and the embodied space of reception in order to trap traces of 
bodies as they press up against the film screen, destroying the conceptual 
distance between the viewer and the image.51 In this way, the screen operates as 
an interface that facilitates a tactile encounter, causing the distinction between 
the viewing subject and the object of representation to be eroded.  As bodies 
press themselves up against the film screen, often unrecognisable, any stable or 
unified sets of referents are destroyed, as orientations are never constant but are 
                                                
49 Irigaray, p. 186. 
50 Schneemann, 2002, p. 33.  
51 For Deleuze and Guattari, the close-up fulfils an integral function in haptic vision since it 
positions itself in opposition to perspectival rationality: ‘It seems to us that the Smooth is both 
the object of a close vision par excellence and the element of a haptic space… one never sees 
from a distance in a space of this kind, nor does one see it from a distance…’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, pp. 544-46). 
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in continual flux. Any linkages are therefore only constituted according to 
dynamic tactile relationships.  
 
In her November 1979 interview with Scott Macdonald, Schneemann discussed 
the working methods involved in making Fuses. What is striking is the 
resistance to describing herself, the filmmaker, as an unequivocal I/eye. For 
Schneemann, the process of making Fuses involved a deeply collaborative 
relationship not only with the other participants in the film (the cats and the 
men, always ‘we’52) but also with the film stock and the technology used to 
produce it. Seeping through the filmic lexis, out of reel- and into real-space, the 
film implicates both the spectator and Schneemann in an encounter with other 
bodies (human and animal) and with technology. Continually touched, handled 
and re-worked by Schneemann, the film stock bears an indexical relation to the 
processes of production and editing it has undergone, which she has described 
as a sort of bodily praxis.53 She writes, ‘once I had made the identification of 
aperture and exposure, I had to develop a sense of the camera and me as a 
meshed system’,54 and again ‘I had to make cameras and light meters and 
tripods all part of my body.’55 In this way, Schneemann appears to defeat a 
traditional, instrumental, ontology of the film camera, relinquishing the position 
of the authorial I, and instead allow the organic and the inorganic to interact and 
take over in the process of production.56 As Schneemann edited hundreds of feet 
of the film stock manually, in a conflation of sight and touch, she has described 
how her body became entwined with it, moving back and forth, back and forth 
reworking the film. In this way, editing becomes a non-linear practice that 
breaks down the authorial ‘I’ in favour of a more nuanced reciprocal mode of 
production: ‘I go into a trance. How else can you edit it? It’s a “musical trance”, 
                                                
52 ‘The sounds that Kitch made were a web all around me. She liked to work with resonant, 
hollow spaces where, we realised after a while, she could bounce sound.’ (Macdonald, 1988, p. 
147). Also see Schneemann, 2002, p. 26 for a discussion of the equality of bodies in the filming 
process.  
53 Macdonald, 1980, p. 28. 
54 Macdonald, 1988, p. 138. 
55 Ibid., p. 139. 
56 In terms of an instrumental ontology I am thinking of the Heideggerian model of gestell. For a 
rejoinder see Heidegger, Martin ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in Basic Writings: 
Martin Heidegger, Krell, D. F. ed., Harper Collins, San Francisco, 1994 (pp. 283-318). 
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and I’m reeling film back and forth. In some cellular way I feel that I’m being 
reeled back and forth. In that sense it’s more like dance.’57  
 
This interest in how the body generates rhythm and movement in filmmaking 
further situates Schneemann’s work amongst the practices of dancers such as 
Trisha Brown or Yvonne Rainer, as discussed earlier.58 Like Schneemann, 
Irigaray also considered the way in which movement might be intimately bound 
up with touch in the processes of phenomenological experience. Movement was 
a central area of concern in her critique of Merleau-Ponty’s constant privileging 
of vision in tactile encounters: ‘It happens that movement is a more adequate 
way of building myself an aesthesiological body. And that, moving through the 
world, across the universe, or dancing, I construct more of a dwelling for myself 
than through vision.’59 The embodiedness of Schneemann in the process of 
making the film is linked to the embodied field of reception – the spectator – 
through the device of the screen, a porous membrane. As such, the screen in 
Fuses becomes the point of contact, through which different bodies might come 
so close to one another as to almost touch, so that there is a merging between 
three distinct fields: the space of the artist, the screen and the space of the 
viewer.60  
 
A deeply entangled conflation of bodies therefore becomes established in Fuses, 
whereby eyes, lenses, bodies and screens come to stand in for one another. 
However, Fuses is not only concerned with the visual field of the spectator or 
the artist, but also notably that of the cat, Kitch. As Schneemann has written, 
‘Kitch watches with complete unrestrained interest. The cat becomes the filmic 
eye, a metapresence inviting the viewers.’61 The camera cuts from Tenney and 
                                                
57 Macdonald, 1988, p. 145. 
58 For various discussions on the relationship between Schneemann’s work and dance, see 
Haller, Robert ‘Amy Greenfield and Carolee Schneemann: An Introduction’ and ‘Through the 
Body: A dialogue between Amy Greenfield and Carolee Schneemann’ both in Field of Vision, 
No. 4, Fall 1978 (pp. 2-4 and pp. 5-8). 
59 Irigaray, p. 175. 
60 For a discussion of how this is activated in Schneemann’s early paintings see Stiles, p. 4. 
61 Schneemann, 2002, p. 42. ‘We are perceived through the eyes of our cat. By visualising the 
cats point of view I was able to present our coupled images in the contexts of the rectangles and 
the seasons surrounding us.’ Schneemann, 2002, p. 45. This position is echoed by Kristine Stiles 
who suggests that the cat is ‘a visual intercessor, marking the contingency between the inner and 
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Schneemann making love, to Kitch watching (suggesting that he, like us, is 
watching the lovers). Kitch watches Schneemann and Tenney making love; 
sometimes he is her lover. Schneemann watches Tenney; we watch 
Schneemann. As the gazes shift, so too might our narcissistic identification with 
any one of the subject positions. We are Schneemann; we desire Schneemann. 
We are watching Kitch; we are Kitch, watching Schneemann. As such, Kitch 
becomes the point of contact between the screen and the bodies involved in the 
production and apprehension of the screen-image. In Fuses, the audience seems 
to be positioned within the role of cat: the cat’s gaze and ours frequently 
intersect and align. In fact, the cat appears to provide the only stable viewing 
position: our eye, the filmic eye and the cat’s eye at times seem to converge and 
resolve the field of representation.  
 
Furthermore, looking to the work of Derrida, the very gaze of the animal might 
be seen to trouble the taxonomic split between human and animal bodies as one 
comes to stand for the other. In ‘The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow)’ (2002) Derrida considers the gaze of his pet cat as a way of imagining 
how to philosophically invest the animal body with agency, without assuming a 
position of authority from which to do so.62 Positioned against Descartes, Kant, 
Heidegger, Lacan and Levinas – whose work on animals treats them as a 
theorem, as something seen and not seeing – Derrida suggests that the human 
experience of feeling shame when we are caught naked in the gaze of an animal 
does not necessarily reveal that they are autonomous subjects, but rather that the 
subjectivity of all species of (human)animal are intertwined in the process of 
identity formation: 
 
When I say “Je suis,”… I move from “the ends of man,” that is 
the confines of man, to “the crossing of borders” between man 
                                                                                                                                      
outer eyes and where the boundaries of vision relate to the thinking, feeling body that is and is 
seeing itself be.’ Stiles, p. 10.  
62 On the question of agency in nonhuman animals see Haraway, Donna Primate Visions: 
Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science, Routledge, New York and London, 
1989, and Barbara Smuts Sex and Friendship in Baboons, Aldine Publishing Co., New York, 
1985. Both of these works draw our attention to the ways in which denials of animal agency rest 
on arguments that falsely define humans as free autonomous actors, and actually preclude the 
subjectivity required for agency. 
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and animal. Crossing borders or the ends of man I come or 
surrender to the animal-to the animal in itself, to the animal in 
me and the animal at unease with itself, to the man about which 
Nietzsche said (I no longer remember where) something to the 
effect that it was an as yet undetermined animal, an animal 
lacking in itself.63 
 
In this important text, Derrida has described the way in which the animal gaze 
starts to reflect that of the human back on to itself (a ‘reflected stare, the mirror 
of a shame ashamed of itself’64) in order to problematise the relationship 
between self and Other. However, Derrida’s model is markedly different to the 
traditional one in which the animal is understood as providing the viewpoint of 
an absolute Other under which the human-self comes to establish him/her-self 
in a negative, and highly anthropocentric, process of identity formation.65 
Instead, in a move away from this form of anthropocentricism that only confers 
subjectivity upon the animal body, perhaps we might take Derrida to be arguing 
for neither animals nor humans to be subjects in their own right.  
 
In the gaze of the cat, Derrida does not simply find a subjectivity that is like, or 
unlike, his own, reflected back. Instead, what is reflected back is an idea of the 
‘human’ and of the ‘animal’, an idea that is perhaps founded on ephemeral 
terms. As Derrida has written, the cat reflects back ‘the border crossing from 
which man dares to announce himself to himself, thereby calling himself by the 
name that he believes he gives himself.’66 What Derrida is suggesting here, and 
which I take to be the subject position of both the cats and the humans in Fuses 
is, I believe, a model of subjectivity more akin to Irigaray’s understanding of 
others rather than the Other. Instead of a theory of difference (two others) it 
would be a multiplicity of others, as all the bodies are drawn into a 
confrontation and conflation with the (non)human-animal other. Crucially, as 
with Derrida bumping into his cat while naked, this multiplicity is underwritten 
                                                
63 Derrida, Jacques ‘The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, Wills, D. trans., 
Critical Inquiry, Vol.28, No.2, Winter 2002, (pp. 369-418), p. 372. 
64 Ibid., p. 373. 
65 Ibid., p. 380. 
66 Ibid., p. 381. 
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by an encounter that is sexualised, if not erotic. In Fuses, the way in which 
Kitch watches the scenes of sexual activity might parallel our own desire to 
watch. But it might also point toward an unease with the proximity of the 
animal body in the arena of a private (and more specifically domestic) sexuality. 
Kitch’s eye is therefore both literally and metaphorically a cats eye – something 
that both sees and makes visible. It represents both our desire to see, like the cat, 
and makes evident an unease about that very animal sexuality.  
 
The cat has now entered a pas de loup, stealthy as a wolf, into the viewing 
structures of the film. We have ignored the cat, up until now, because we 
literally have not seen Kitch: a blind spot in a film that largely rejects retinal 
forms of vision. The cat’s eye and our eye overlay, Kitch’s point of view is our 
point of contact between bodies. Yet the eye – the point of contact – necessarily 
does not see itself (as Irigaray has written, ‘thus I never see that in which I 
touch or am touched. What is at play in the caress does not see itself. The in-
between, the middle, the medium of the caress does not see itself…’67). 
Continuing the work begun by Merleau-Ponty into the relationship between the 
tactile and the visual, Derrida asks, ‘can eyes manage to touch, to press together 
like lips? If two gazes look into each other’s eyes, can one then say that they are 
touching? Are they coming into contact, the one with the other?’68  
 
The erotic encounter presented by Fuses therefore stages the points of tension 
between the tactile and the visual, as described in Irigaray and Derrida’s 
theories of touch. Fuses is thus both a joining or fusing, but also a rupture, a 
starting point of something new (a lit fuse, a blown fuse). It is a point of con-
tact between bodies, which is simultaneously a point of non-contact, an inability 
to touch. As Derrida asks, ‘what is contact if it always intervenes between x and 
x?’69 For Derrida and Irigaray, touch is always simultaneously ‘letting ago’ and 
‘avoiding’. It is a non-touching, a cannot touch, a must-not touch, noli me 
tangere. It is always divided, distanced and transplanted; mediated by technical 
prosthetics like the pen, the computer keyboard or the film screen, always 
                                                
67 Irigaray, p. 161. 
68 Derrida, 2005, p. 2.  
69 Ibid., p. 2. 
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staging its own disconnection. In Fuses, this limit point, the point of con-tact 
(and non-contact), is the cat.70 While much of the literature on this work posits 
Fuses as an embodied skin that facilitates erotic encounter, which I would not 
seek to overturn, I would argue in addition that it is precisely the point of 
rupture, structured around the aporia of the touch, which also foregrounds the 
problematic tension between the figure of the female and the animal body in 
Fuses.  
 
The idea of petting therefore underwrites both the formal and the conceptual 
properties of Fuses. The tactile encounter, or the petting, of both the film 
surface and the animal, implicates us in an encounter that destabilizes the 
traditional dichotomies of the seeing/seen and subject/object, and stages the 
mutual histories of the female and the feline and the troubled logic of taxonomic 
classification through the aporia of the touch. As with the case of 
xenotransplantation cited earlier in this chapter, both the human and the animal 
body are brought together in Schneemann’s work through technology and, 
crucially, this encounter is inherently a tactile one, based on the real or 
imagined stroking or petting of fur. It is precisely because these cats are 
Schneemann’s pets (that is, an animal that is touched, that is petted) that they 
come to represent the point at which the notion of the human and the animal rub 
up against one another. This is because the pet is the category both by which 
animals are anthropomorphised (‘part of the family’) and humans are 
animalised (‘petted, cared for, etc.’). Indeed, following the foundational studies 
of Mary Midgley in the field of human-animal relationships, I take the notion of 
the pet as the paradigmatic central axis for many other cross-species 
encounters.71  
 
                                                
70 Derrida also constructs the notion of touch as a limit concept, to be crossed, and not crossed, 
touched and not touched: ‘like the pointy tip of an antennae, a scout at the forefront, an acute 
place, still very close to a point and upon a limit…for Nancy it is always a matter of touching 
what is well nigh at the limit not to be touched – namely, the limit itself, and the point’s 
extreme, pointed tip.’ Derrida, 2005, p. 42; ‘how to touch upon the untouchable? We can only 
touch on a surface, which is to say the skin or thin peel of a limit (to touch the limit)’ Derrida, 
2005, p. 6. 
71 For an interesting discussion of this idea see Midgeley, Mary Animals and Why They Matter 
A Journey Around the Species Barrier, University of Georgia Press, 1983 and Midgeley, Mary 




Originating in the 1450s, the cade lamb was the archetypal pet of English and 
Scottish traditions that, by definition, had been raised by hand in the home. The 
notion of the pet to which I refer in this study is thus both a historically and 
culturally specific phenomenon, tied to hand-rearing and agricultural 
communities. While varying degrees of domestication of animals have been 
perceived across numerous traditions, I am here concerned with an obsessive 
type of pet-keeping that emerges from the construction of the domestic sphere, 
premised on (Western) Christian traditions of simultaneous kinship with, and 
dominion over, animals.72 In this tradition, the pet is perceived as human-like 
enough to be welcomed into the home, yet constantly maintains a relation to the 
historical construction of the animal-Other.73  
 
These opposing models of ways to interact with animals come into conflict 
through the figure of the pet since, within this context of kinship, the idea of a 
beloved family pet turning on us is especially troubling and sinister: we might 
expect bites and scratches from a wild animal, but not a tame one. The 
sociologists Arnold Arluke and Clinton Sanders designate such incidents as 
‘frame breaks’. That is, moments in which the pet might behave in a way which 
reminds us that they are, in fact, animals and not members of the family. It is 
during these moments of psychological rupture that the pet is theoretically 
revealed as only really a representation of ourselves, constructed through 
narcissistic over-identification with, or against, the animal body. Since the 
incorporation of the cade lamb into the household, the family pet has, 
historically, not only been widely anthropomorphized74 but has also become a 
                                                
72 For a discussion on ideas of kinship in relation to women, see Mitchell, Juliet ‘Patriarchy, 
kinship and women as exchange objects’ in Psychoanalysis and Feminism: A Radical 
Reassessment of Freudian Psychoanalysis, Penguin, London, 2000 (pp. 370-376). 
73 The following text gives an interesting an insightful appraisal of the production of domestic 
and docile bodies (both animal and human) in post-industrial societies, Kreisel, Deanna K. 
‘Wolf Children and Automata: Bestiality and Boredom at Home and Abroad’ in 
Representations No. 96, Autumn 2006 (pp. 21-47). On the way in which animal rights 
discourses feed into this sort of pastoral relationship with animals which is related to right-to-
life arguments, see Haraway, Donna When Species Meet, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 2008. 
74 See Beck, Alan & Katcher, Aaron Between Pets and People: The Importance of Animal 
Companionship, Purdue University Press 1996; Horn, Jack C. and Meer, Jeff ‘The Pleasure of 
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sort of narcissistic totem or lens through which we might actually come to 
regard ourselves.75 The idea of the ‘frame break’ thus clearly resonates with 
imaging technologies, and as such is useful for thinking about Fuses as a site 
where conflicting attitudes about the animal might come together. 
 
For these reasons, the pet has variously been described as both ‘uncanny’ and 
‘taboo’. For example, under the first denotation of Heimlich – homelike, 
familiar, intimate, friendly – in the Sanders’ Dictionary of the German 
Language (Freud’s source dictionary) the meaning is as follows: ‘of animals: 
tame, companionable to man. As opposed to wild e.g. “animals which are 
neither wild nor Heimlich” etc.’76 Built into the very definition of the uncanny 
is therefore the primary – yet repressed – transgression of the boundary between 
animal and human. Furthermore, according to the early work of the 
anthropologist Edmund Leach, the pet is also a border creature, straddling a 
peculiar ontology, which should be theorised as improper and taboo. In his 
paper ‘Animal Categories and Verbal Abuse’ (1964) Leach proposed a 
sequence of animal categories that discriminated areas of social space in terms 
of their distance from the human. The sequence ran as follows: self, pet, 
livestock, game, and wild animal. A central theme of Leach’s paper was taboo, 
which he defined as ‘that which serves to separate the self from the world’.77 
Under this rubric, the pet comes to function as an anomalous creature because, 
according to Leach, the binary distinction human/animal is mediated by the 
                                                                                                                                      
Their Company: PT Survey Report on Pets’ in Psychology Today, Vol. 18, No. 8, August 1984 
(pp. 52-59); White, Betty Pet Love: How Pets Take Care of Us, Pinnacle Books, 1983; Shell, 
Marc ‘The Family Pet’ in Representations, No. 15, Summer 1986 (pp. 121-153). 
75 Shell, p. 124. For a discussion of the pet as a narcissistic object see also Heiman, Marcel ‘The 
Relationship Between Man and Dog’ in Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Vol. 25, 1956; ‘We polish an 
animal mirror to look for ourselves.’ (Haraway, Donna Simians, Cyborgs and Women, 
Routledge, New York, 1991 p. 21); ‘those individuated oedipal animals with their own petty 
history…who invite us to regress, and draw us into a narcissistic contemplation…’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari, p. 265). This view is also echoed by John Berger in ‘Why Look at Animals’ in About 
Looking, Pantheon Books, New York 1980 (pp. 3-28), who writes, ‘the practice of keeping 
animals regardless of their usefulness, the keeping, exactly, of pets…is a modern innovation, 
and, on the social scale on which it exists today, is unique. It is part of that universal but 
personal withdrawal into the private small family unit…which is such a disgusting feature of 
consumer societies.’ Pets are ‘creatures of their owner’s way of life’ and Berger says of ‘the 
way the average owner regards his pet’ that: ‘the pet completes him, offering responses to 
aspects of his character which would otherwise remain unconfirmed.’ Also quoted in Steve 
Baker, The Postmodern Animal, Reaction Books, London, 2000, p. 167.  
76 Kreisel, p. 26. 
77 Quoted in Baker, pp. 166-67.  
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creation of ambiguous (and therefore taboo) intermediary categories. The pet, 
for Leach, was precisely one such category, which he designated with the 
compound term ‘man-animal’.78  
 
Importantly for my work is the sense in which the notion of the pet is able to 
bring together several threads. It is the point at which the tactile, the erotic and 
the animal all come together, and thus might also be the site from which these 
categories are seriously questioned. In ‘The obscene body/politic’ (1991), 
Schneemann asks precisely these questions of the pet by claiming her 
photographic work Infinity Kisses (1981-1988) ‘raises the issue of appropriate 
eroticism and interspecies communication’.79  
 
Infinity Kisses is a large installation that features dozens of standard 4”x6” 
photographs of Schneemann kissing Cluny, the cat that followed Kitch after his 
death at a staggering 19 years of age. For five years, Schneemann positioned a 
camera next to her bed and took pictures of the moment when she was woken in 
the morning by Cluny.80 In these photographs, Schneemann is depicted kissing 
Cluny. But it is not a kiss with tight, puckered lips. Instead, the kiss is explicit: a 
French kiss with open mouths and probing tongues. The top half of the 
installation is characterised by bleached out skin and blue tones, and sharper 
definition. The bottom half appears more blurry, more sticky even, as the 
chromatic range warms. These images seem to evade the mastery of our logical 
eye: we cannot visually resolve them into a narrative, but a flash of white or a 
swelling of pink indicates to whom the body belongs. Aside from the top two 
rows, each image has a reverse double that has been positioned immediately 
above it, producing snaking s-shapes of light, or the white of Cluny’s fur 
running down the installation. These lines lead us from one image to the next, 
never allowing us to read any one of the photographs in isolation, but always in 
dialogue with its double. Also included toward the top right- and left-hand 
corners of the installation, and as a group separated to the right, are prints of 
                                                
78 Schneemann writes that ‘during his life Cluny was obsessed with bringing me gifts of 
feathers. This cat communicated devotion, a providence – a transcendent shift emblematic of his 
movement between animal and human realms.’ Schneemann, 2002, p. 274.  
79 Schneemann, 1991 p.35. 
80 For a description of the making of Infinity Kisses see Schneemann, Carolee ‘Notes’ in 
Imaging Her Erotics, p. 264. 
 61 
Egyptian hieroglyphs and a frieze representing a fragment of the story ‘The 
Breath of Life’. The hieroglyphs describe a ritual in which a young child is 
given a lion cub to raise. According to Schneemann, if they can grow up 
together exchanging mouth-to-mouth, nose-to-nose contact, then that child will 
become a visionary for its culture.81 
 
Beyond what we might call ‘puppy-love’ – that is, non-sexual and therefore 
innocent and unthreatening affection82 – Schneemann’s erotic investment in her 
cat in this work has been perceived as unnatural and troubling: it is explicit; 
obscene.83 Of note, perhaps is that these are precisely the terms deployed in 
relation to Fuses, for example in the 1989 Moscow censorship debate. Although 
in Fuses Kitch really does appear ‘obscene’ in the sense that the term ties it to 
visibility (that which is off-stage) it was not cited as the cause of the obscenity. 
By contrast, in Infinity Kisses, Cluny has been situated in a sexual context in 
plain sight. The fact that the term obscene has been used in relation to this work 
is not just an effect produced by the content, but also by the pictorial 
conventions of repetition, doubling and close-up. These formal devices confront 
us with an unending sequence of troublesome images – of oral contact that 
mobilises notions of contamination and taboo – even while it also distances us 
from fully accessing the work with its appeal to a schizophrenic roaming of the 
eye across the large surface. However, the repetition must also serve as a 
reminder of the everyday nature of this activity, both for Schneemann and 
Cluny, and it ought to be understood in terms that are perhaps quotidian and 
banal. The overall sense, then, is that we can never quite grasp the work (both in 
                                                
81 Description by Schneemann from the panel discussion ‘Women and art: empowering 
narratives’, November 14, 1995, held as part of the conference Beyond Beijing: Acting on 
Commitments to the World's Women (A World Bank Program on Gender), November 6-17 
1995. Transcript No. BB-04 accessible online at: http://tinyurl.com/mrmg9f. 
82 For a discussion of the term ‘puppy love’ see Shell, p.124. 
83 In the non-academic literature and press reviews Schneemann’s work has largely been 
surrounded by histories of censorship and repression. For example see the discussion between 
Schneemann and Hans Ulrich Olbrist in ‘Carolee Schneemann: when vision moves freely’ in 
Spiked Magazine, 2007 (pp. 40-49) especially p. 42; In 2009 The Brooklyn Rail noted that 
Schneemann’s work with her cats has been described as ‘narcissistic, sex-ploitative, 
exhibitionistic…the actions are Dionysian displays of herself, and sexually reckless candor’; In 
a review from the New York Times, dated March 26, 2009, Schneemann’s work is described as 
‘a problem. Too personal, too visceral, too something’; Infinity Kisses is also described as 
causing a ‘furore’ in Serra, M. M. & Ramey, Kathryn ‘Eye/Body: The Cinematic Paintings of 
Carolee Schneemann’ in Women’s Experimental Cinema: Critical Frameworks, Blaetz, R. ed., 
Duke University Press, 2007 (pp. 103-127). 
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the sense of ‘getting it’ and ‘touching it’). Infinity Kisses evades traditional 
viewing structures just as it troubles easy identifications with the body of the 
artist as a result of the claim she lays to a ‘deviant’ or ‘unnatural’ sexuality.  
 
It is of note that the term ‘bestiality’ has been rejected throughout this 
discussion, in favour of ‘petting’ and ‘sexual contact’. This has been done both 
in order to observe the physical, material relationship that is activated by touch 
(con-tact), and to acknowledge the problematic logic that underwrites certain 
terminology. From the outset of his posthumously published series of lectures 
collected in The Beast and The Sovereign (2009), Derrida staged the problem 
with the terminology through the tension between la bête (feminine) and le 
souverain (masculine). La and le: ‘the beast’, writes Derrida, ‘is not exactly the 
animal.’84 Yet it is certainly through the notion of the ‘beast’ that we have come 
to understand how the category ‘animal’ has been historically differentiated 
from the human. The beast is both site and cipher for the cultural and historical 
functioning of the animal outside of models of the (masculine) subject. 
 
More than any other practice – apart, perhaps, from incest – bestiality tends to 
invoke the use of terms such as ‘unnatural’, ‘obscene’ and ‘taboo’, whilst 
simultaneously failing to unravel and explore all the historical and political 
contingencies that these terms might entail and rely upon for their meaning. 
While the term ‘pet’ has become a rich site for critical excavation in the study of 
human-animal relationships, the term ‘bestiality’ is still frequently occluded. 
Surprisingly, or not, there is a distinct lack of critical considerations of bestiality 
not just across art historical research, but also anthropological, political, 
historical and other critical studies. The term, however, is encountered in both 
sexology and law, two disciplines whose mutual history is long and intricate. 
Leading figures in the fields of the study of human sexuality – such as Hani 
Miletski, Vern Bullough and Alfred Kinsey – have argued that, to a degree, such 
reluctance to discuss the practice of human-animal sexual contacts is borne from 
a confusion within the existing literature regarding the plethora of available 
terms: ‘sodomy’, ‘zoorasty’, ‘zoosexuality’, as well as ‘bestiality’ and 
                                                
84 Derrida, 2009, p. 1.  
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‘zoophilia’ are often used.85 In ‘Bestiality and zoophilia: an exploratory study’ 
(2000) Hani Miletski argues that a study of the literature suggests that the 
different ways in which authors perceive sexual relations with animals has 
driven multiple and unstable interpretations of the practice: ‘definitions of 
various behaviours and attitudes are often conflicting, leaving the reader 
confused.’86 Such confusion, as I shall demonstrate, is premised upon the 
unstable and indistinct foundation of the language found in theological and legal 
tracts pertaining to certain sexual contacts.  
 
Schneemann herself has openly refuted the terms ‘bestiality’ and ‘obscenity’, 
particularly in relation to responses regarding the use of cat imagery. Her 
rejection of these terms, however, is less aligned with the confusion of 
terminology perceived in the field of sexology, and more as a result of the 
historical construction of these terms as both pejorative, and female. What these 
terms constitute, for Schneemann, is ‘erotic dislocation and cultural 
deception’.87 Schneemann’s rejection of such terms is underscored by 
commonsense or dictionary definitions of these words. Webster’s Ninth 
Collegiate Dictionary defines bestiality as ‘sexual relations between a human 
being and a lower animal.’ Such a definition explicitly cultivates a hierarchy of 
species being, producing the term within a framework that conceives of animals 
as intrinsically inferior to humans. This idea is similarly re-staged in the Oxford 
English Dictionary, but also with highly ambiguous references to a sexual act as 
well as to those characteristics that we conceive of as animalistic, or beastly, in 
man:  
 
1. The nature or qualities of a beast; want of intelligence, 
irrationality, stupidity, brutality. 
2. Indulgence in the instincts of a beast; brutal lust; a disgusting 
vice, a beastly practice. 
                                                
85 Alfred Kinsey attempted to bypass the plethora of available terms by opting for the neutral 
phrase ‘animal contacts’. See Bullough, Vern Human Sexuality: An Encyclopaedia, Garland 
Publishing Inc., New York and London, 1994 pp. 60-65.  
86 Miletski, Hani ‘Bestiality and Zoophilia: an Exploratory Study’ in Scandinavian Journal of 
Sexology, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2000, (pp 149-150), p.1. 
87 Carolee Schneemann, 2002, p. 215.  
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3. Unnatural connexion with a beast.88 
 
By defining bestiality as that which is animalistic in man, rather than simply as 
sexual contacts between a human and an animal, the OED entry seems to move 
back and forth between the construction of the human and the animal, producing 
a point of slippage at which one might begin to collapse in to the other. The 
OED definition therefore reveals the etymological ties of the term to the 
historical construction of the animal body as inferior to that of the human body, 
and the conflation of certain human bodies with that of the animal.89  
 
Both definitions throw up numerous difficulties and exhibit naturalising fallacies 
regarding the use of language and the cultural economy that we inhabit; 
sanctioning and expounding socially instituted hierarchies of bodies. While 
Webster’s defines its term with reference to perceived relative values of different 
species (human: high, animal: low), the OED entry shirks away from describing 
the act, reinforcing the notion of bestiality as taboo, unnatural and therefore 
unspeakable. Nowhere does it explicitly state that these practices are tied to 
eroticism, sexuality, desire and/or its relationship to a complex and unstable 
legal framework (although this is surprising given that the UK has some of the 
most comprehensive and detailed legislation concerning what constitutes 
‘bestiality’90). Instead, it expounds a cultural tradition that perceives animals as 
the objects of knowledge, and humans as the subjects of knowledge.91 The result 
                                                
88 ‘bestiality’ definition in The Oxford English Dictionary 2nd Edition 1989 Oxford University 
Press. 
 OED Online URL: http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50021006 
89 In the history of Philosophy, both the opposing models of Human Exceptionalism (HE) and 
continuity across species have had strong supporters. Those who espouse HE believe that 
humans are unique in having language and sophisticated thought, and that there is a large gulf 
between these human capacities and whatever thought or language systems other animals might 
have. Core examples of HE which have informed the western philosophical tradition are Nicolas 
Malebranche, Oeuvres Completes de Malebranche (1837); Rene Descartes, Philosophical 
Writings Vol. III: The Correspondence, trans., John Cottingham, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997; Descartes, The Treatise on Man; Gottfried Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the 
Goodness of God, The Liberty of Man and the Origin of Evil (1710.)  
90 See chapter 42, Sexual Offences Act 2003, Office of Public Sector Information, Section 69. 
Stable URL: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/ukpga_20030042_en_1 
91 Delaney, David ‘Making Nature/Marking Humans: Law as a Site of (Cultural) Production’ in 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 91, No. 3, September 2001, (pp. 487-
503), p. 494 
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is that the animal is thus positioned as synonymous with irrationality and 
stupidity and, conversely, the human with intelligence and rationality.  
 
In Derrida’s later work on the animal (or, more precisely, the beast) he describes 
a zone of interaction, ‘curiosity’, in which the beast and the madman are 
conceptually brought together. Curiosity, he argues, formalizes the field of 
analogy between the development of zoological gardens and insane asylums in 
the Nineteenth Century. He notes that cura – meaning both domestic and 
hospital-based treatment – gives us the term curiosity, which necessarily entails 
a hunger for knowledge as well as an impulse to treat or cure. These institutions 
become, he argues:  
 
Curiosities for the eager, compulsive curiosity of, lets say, those 
who are outside and approach them only to within a certain 
distance to observe or inspect them in a sovereign manner from 
outside after having locked them up… What makes the 
zoological gardens comparable with psychiatric hospitals, in the 
19th century is the enclosure that is common to them, the new 
territorial limits…it’s certainly the concept of care, concern, 
solicitude, cura, that we are talking about here, and the question 
of knowing whether it is possible to surround with care, as we 
say, without surrounding with reappropriating limits. Inventing 
limits, installing limits, that’s the art we are speaking of here. 
And it is an art of both caring and locking up.92 
 
What we arrive at, therefore, is a term, ‘the beast’, ‘la bête’, meaning both 
imbeciles and animals, which incorporates different bodies within its domain. 
Bodies which may be biologically human, but which come under the sway of 
the category animal. As such, these terms function specifically as limit concepts 
for Derrida, thresholds which we desire to both transgress and secure, to touch 
                                                
92 Derrida’s work in this field is based on H.F. Ellenberger’s 1960 article ‘The Zoological 
Garden and the Mental Asylum’. For Derrida, the ‘art’ of liberating by locking up is 
exemplified by the Tierpark Hagenbeck zoo in Hamburg, designed by Carl Hagenbeck and the 
Swiss architect Urs Eggenschwyler. Founded in 1863, it is of note for being the first zoo to use 
open enclosures. It did not have railings (visible limits) but rather deep ditches or moats, which 
gave the appearance of freedom of movement. Derrida, 2009, pp. 296-99. 
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and not to touch.93 By rejecting the term ‘bestiality’, or using it only to 
acknowledge its historical significance in designating certain bodies as animal, 
we might instead prefer to utilize the phrase ‘human-animal sexual contacts’ 
(con-tact, with tact, with touch).  
 
As mentioned above, the evolution of these terms is intricately bound up in 
complex legal and linguistic structures. It is these histories that have helped to 
perpetuate the pejorative resonance of certain terms, which are hard to shake off. 
As with most cultural groups, those communities whose moral order adheres to 
the Abrahamic religions – and specifically, for our purposes, the Judeo-Christian 
traditions – describe clear and distinct prohibitions against sexual activity with 
animals. The most frequently cited are to be found in Leviticus:  
  
You shall not lie with a man as with a woman: that is an 
abomination. You shall not have sexual intercourse with any 
beast to make yourself unclean with it, nor shall a woman 
submit herself to intercourse with a beast: that is a violation of 
nature. You shall not make yourself unclean in any of these 
ways, in these ways the heathen made themselves unclean. [Lev. 
18:22-24]94 
 
Most communities have a framework of ‘natural’ categories pertaining to human 
experience. Examples of such categories may include: living and dead; mortal 
and divine; air, sea and land; and male and female. What is peculiar to texts such 
as Leviticus, and thus to Judeo-Christianity, is that these natural categories also 
                                                
93 Derrida also sees touch as a limit concept, to be crossed, and not crossed, touched and not 
touched: ‘Like the pointy tip of an antennae, a scout at the forefront, an acute place, still very 
close to a point and upon a limit…for Nancy it is always a matter of touching what is well nigh 
at the limit not to be touched – namely, the limit itself, and the point’s extreme, pointed tip.’ 
Derrida, 2005 p.42.  
94 See further important citations for ‘bestiality’ in the Hebrew Bible which can be found in the 
following laws: ‘Whoever lies with a Beast shall be put to death’ [Exodus 22:19]; ‘Do not have 
carnal relations with any beast and defile yourself thereby; and let no woman lend herself to a 
beast to mate with it; it is perversion.’ [Leviticus 18:23]; ‘If a man has carnal relations with a 
beast, he shall be put to death; and you shall kill the beast.’ [Leviticus 20:15]; ‘If a woman 
approaches any beast to mate with it, you shall kill the woman and the beast; they shall be put to 
death – their bloodguilt is upon them.’ [Leviticus 20:16]; ‘Accursed is one who lies with any 
animal. And the entire people shall say “amen.”’ [Deuteronomy 27:21]; ‘These are they that are 
to be stoned: he that has a connection with a beast, and the woman that suffers connection with 
a beast.’ [Sanhedrin 7:4]. 
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operate as moral and subsequently legal categories: Leviticus puts ‘unclean’ 
contact into the same bracket as breaches of the moral code.95 This conflation of 
naturalising discourse with the law is demonstrated by the fact that these 
prohibitions are reflected in much contemporary Western legislation. By looking 
at extracts from judicial proceedings against cases of human-animal sexual 
contacts, we can see the persistence of certain moral categories throughout those 
Western epistemological systems informed by Judeo-Christianity: 
 
Murray v State 143 NE 2d 290 [1957]: ‘…the abominable and 
detestable crime against nature…’ 
 
Young v State 141 NE 309 [1924] 310: ‘…the corruption of 
morals, the disgrace of human nature by unnatural satisfaction, 
of which reason and decency forbids a more detailed 
description…’ 
 
Connell v State 19 NE 2d 267 [1939] 267: ‘…sodomy is a crime 
the meaning of which is too well known…its nature is too 
disgusting to be further defined…’96 
 
The terms of the charges above are constructed in precisely the language of a 
natural/unnatural dichotomy, offering a compelling critical filter with which to 
consider human-animal sexual contacts within a legal framework. While these 
are notably historical examples, the US statutes continue to remain largely 
vague and inconsistent. The word ‘nature’ or ‘natural’ provides the legal system 
with an obfuscating term that constructs a moral framework founded on 
unstable and indistinct definitions. While it is of pivotal importance in the 
construction of legislation, ‘nature’ actually rests on indistinct, highly mutable 
                                                
95 Douglas, Mary Leviticus as Literature, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p.149; 
Christie Davies ‘Sexual Taboos and Social Boundaries’ in The American Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. 87, No. 5, March 1982 (pp. 1032-1063), p. 1035. 
96 All reproduced in Delaney, p. 494. 
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terminology.97 As David Delaney argues in ‘Making nature/marking humans’ 
(2001), 
 
In the context of bestiality, ‘nature’ does not signify the cow 
(State v Poole 122 p.2d415 [1942]), the dog (State v Tarrant 80 
NE 2d 509 [1948]) the chicken (Murray v State 143 NE 2d 290 
[1957]) or the eel (U.S. v Guglielmi 819 F.2d 451 [1988]) that is 
participating in the event. Rather, ‘nature’ signifies the moral 
order through which some sexual practices are designated as 
natural and others as unnatural.98 
 
The consequences is that the scope of what the statutes therefore prohibit is 
unclear and has led to the successful prosecution of cases of heterosexual oral 
sex and gay and lesbian sex, largely because there is an undifferentiated 
category of ‘crimes against nature’.99 This naturalizing fallacy is underwritten in 
                                                
97 Critically, these highly contingent notions of nature are formed precisely in relation to the 
concept of a human. Writing from within the context of law studies, David Delaney argues that 
it is precisely the point at which one draws the distinction between nature and human that 
physical acts of penetration are justified, and bodies or spaces are allowed to be opened up for 
investigation. Delaney, p. 490. 
98 Delaney, p. 494. 
99 Michel Foucault notes that hermaphrodites were seen as ‘contrary to nature’ and were 
therefore designated ‘criminal’. Michel Foucault, The Will To Knowledge: The History of 
Sexuality Volume I, trans., Robert Hurley, Penguin Books, 1998, p. 38. Currently, the term 
crime against nature is still used in the statutes of the following American states: 
- Idaho (I.C. § 18-6605)  
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title18/T18CH66SECT18-6605.htm 
- Louisiana (R.S. 14:89)  
http://www.legis.state.la.us/lss/lss.asp?doc=78695 
- Massachusetts (MGL Ch. 272, § 34, struck down by Mass. court in 1977)  
http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/mgl/272-34.htm 
- Michigan (MCL § 750.158)  
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(d4pwp355gcftjeavb3jbja2l))/mileg.aspx?page=GetObject&obj
ectname=mcl-750-158 
- Mississippi (Miss. Code § 97-29-59) 
- North Carolina (G.S. § 14-177)  
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_14/GS_14-
177.html 
- Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. § 21-886, struck down as to straights by Okla. court in 1986) 
- Virginia (Va. Code § 18.2-361)  
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+18.2-361 
For example, a man found to have committed a ‘zoosexual rape’ of a sheep in Michigan 2006 
was not charged with animal cruelty, but with ‘crimes against nature’. It is notable that a first 
offence of animal cruelty, which includes any ‘unnecessary neglect, torture, or pain’, carries 
only up to a 93 day sentence (MI 750.50 section 2(f) and section 4), whereas a zoosexual act 
prosecuted as a crime against nature is capable of a 20 year sentence.  
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Leviticus, whereby homosexuality and bestiality become conflated under the 
single term ‘sodomy’.100 Thus, Schneemann’s morning kisses with Cluny 
operate within this epistemological framework as ‘unnatural’ in that they 
trouble nature and the natural categories that provide the foundations for our 
moral understanding of sexuality.101  
 
In The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Vol. 1 (1978) Michel 
Foucault importantly addressed this naturalization/normalization of certain 
practices and the silence associated with histories of sexuality. For Foucault, 
what he characterized as a  ‘triple edict of taboo, non-existence and silence’ is 
inseparably bound up with, and mutually reinforcing to, a strategy of self-
conscious discussion about certain sexual practices.102 In other words, the 
emergence of a historical silence about sex is contemporaneous with a 
discursive explosion about it, but predominantly from within sites of power, so 
as to regulate it and further bring it under control. This is what Foucault has 
called the ‘repressive hypothesis’: silence and censure around sex is always 
accompanied by discourse in those institutions/disciplines that might be 
politically or economically invested in the study of certain sexualities.103  This 
is not, he argues, in order to produce a general theory of sexuality, but rather to 
quantify, classify and ultimately legislate against them. This may be in the 
interests of cleansing and purging society, either on religious grounds (Foucault 
                                                
100 For a discussion of sodomy, chiefly in the context of a masochistic sexuality and tied to self-
debasement, see Bersani, Leo Homos. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1995; and Bersani, 
‘Is the rectum a grave?’ in AIDS: Cultural Analysis, Cultural Activism, Crimp, D. ed., MIT 
Press, Cambridge, 1988 pp. 197–222.  
101 For a discussion of the terms ‘sodomy’ and ‘unnatural’ see Foucault, ‘The perverse 
implantation’ in The Will to Knowledge pp. 36-50.  
102 Foucault, p5.  While Foucault’s formulation of identity as an effect, and his exploration of 
the relation between power and the production of sexually differentiated bodies has been 
informative for feminist theory (particularly Butler, Judith Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity, Routledge, New York 1990; Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the 
Discursive Limits of “Sex”, Routledge, New York 1993; Bordo, Susan ‘Anorexia Nervosa: 
psychopathology as the crystallization of culture’ in Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on 
Resistance, ed., I. Diamond & L. Quinby, Northeastern University Press, Boston 1988; Grosz, 
Elizabeth Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington 1994) it has also been challenged for its lack of attention to gender issues and its 
production of a docile body which is unable to access discourse/power (see Fraser, Nancy 
Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory, Polity Press, 
Cambridge 1989; Grimshaw, Jean ‘Practices of Freedom’ in Up Against Foucault, 
Ramazanoglu, C. ed., Routledge, London and New York 1993; and Hartsock, Nancy ‘Foucault 
on Power: a Theory for Women?’ in Feminism/Postmodernism, Nicholson, L. ed., Routledge, 
London and New York 1990, all for an exploration of Foucault in feminist discourse). 
103 For a discussion of the ‘repressive hypothesis’ see Foucault, pp. 10-12 and pp. 17-35. 
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cites the evolution of the catholic pastoral and the sacrament of penance after 
the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century) or on political or economic 
grounds (the incitement to talk about sex in the eighteenth century was tied to 
conjugal integrity in the service of capitalist modes of production).  
 
This seems to remain the position of the literature on human-animal sexual 
contacts.104 Any discussion of sexualities is tied specifically to the production of 
discourse within functional domains (the political, the economic, the legal).105 
The silence, or reluctance to name, thus subsequently becomes less the object of 
interest than the different ways of not saying things, and who is and who is not 
authorized to speak and allowed access to discourse.106 Therefore, we might ask 
to what ends does the field of law maintain insecure definitions of bestiality, 
and what is at stake in the continued investment in the logic of naturalizing 
discourse? The problems that Miletski perceived with the field – of unstable and 
inconsistent notions of acceptable human-animal interactions – are thus 
mobilised in Schneemann’s work as she calls into question the mechanisms by 
which certain modes of behaviour are normalised, and subsequently the 
historical trajectory by which bodies become marked as animal (as a result of 




Building on Mary Douglas’ Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of 
Pollution and Taboo (1966), several scholars have argued that the force of the 
Leviticus taboos, and subsequently the legal code founded upon them, lies less 
in their content than in their structure, and that the prohibitions against human-
animal sexual contacts are indicative of a desire to maintain natural categories. 
What is important is whether like and unlike are kept apart.107 The critical 
                                                
104 Foucault himself makes only passing reference to bestiality, instead using the word ‘sodomy’ 
regularly, leading to some ambiguity as to whether he is referring only to homosexual sexual 
activity or to all practices that traditionally come under that term, including human-animal 
sexual contacts. 
105 Foucault, p. 25. 
106 Foucault, p. 27. 
107 For a discussion of the structure of Hebraic laws see Davies, p. 1034; and Douglas, Mary 
Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, Penguin, London 1970, 
pp. 54-72; Douglas Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology, Routledge, London 1975, pp. 
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promise of Schneemann’s bestial practices in Infinity Kisses, therefore, is the 
potential for rupturing natural categories, troubling borders and producing 
contamination across species boundaries and, crucially, that technology has a 
catalysing role in that rupturing process in its insistent repetition. In the 
following sections from Leviticus, as Douglas has noted, notions of 
contamination and pollution are activated by the repeated appeals to separation 
and distinction: 
 
I am the lord your god: I have made a clear distinction between 
clean beasts and unclean beasts and between unclean and clean 
birds. You shall not make yourselves vile through beast or bird 
or anything that creeps on the ground for I have made a clear 
separation between them and you declaring them unclean. You 
shall be holy to me because I the lord am holy. I have made a 
clear separation between you and the heathen that you may 
belong to me. [Lev. 20:24-27] 
 
You shall keep my statutes. You shall not let your cattle breed 
with a different kind; you shall not sow your field with two 
kinds of seed; nor shall there come upon you a garment of cloth 
made of two kinds of stuff. [Lev 19:19] 
 
And you shall not lie with any beast and defile yourself with it, 
neither shall any woman give herself to a beast to lie with it: it is 
perversion. [Lev. 18:23]  
 
Critically, she notes that the word ‘perversion’ is a significant mistranslation of 
the rare Hebrew word tebhel, which originally has as its meaning ‘mixing’ or 
‘confusing’. The association between these terms leads Douglas to read the 
structure of the laws as serving an analogous function to their content: like and 
unlike must be kept apart. The central project of Purity and Danger is therefore 
to ask: ‘why should bodily margins be thought to be specially invested with 
                                                                                                                                      
207-9 and pp. 306-10; and Porter, J. R. The Cambridge Bible Commentary On The New English 
Bible – Leviticus, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 82-83. 
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power and danger?’108 Certainly, there is something to do with the oral contact 
and the mixing of different saliva in Infinity Kisses that is particularly troubling. 
When we view the work, we may feel revulsion at the sight of Schneemann’s 
tongue probing inside the cat’s mouth and vice versa. In the interview ‘On 
Censorship’ with Rahmani, cited earlier, Schneemann herself notes that it is 
precisely because in many of the photographs you can see tongues touching (and 
tasting) people found the work ‘obscene’.109 ‘Some of the reactions of people 
would be that it is okay to kiss your cat, but tongue-to-tongue exchange is really 
beyond the pale.’110 As with Douglas, Schneemann relies not just on the literal 
content but also on the structure of her works – the doubling, the repetition and 
the close up – to paradoxically become ‘obscene’. The oral contact seems 
distasteful: hands and paws touching is acceptable, tongues touching is not.  
 
Perhaps what is perceived as obscene is the exchange of bodily fluids (a 
wetness) that is associated with the notions of contamination understood by 
Douglas, and later Julia Kristeva, in her work on the abject. The transgression of 
the oral boundary by the animal seems to produce an anxiety around the 
historical association of the animal/Other with dirt and uncleanliness. The 
challenge that Schneemann poses is both against the symbolic order as well as 
against societal notions of hygiene. For Douglas, the intersection of both these 
concepts is in the category of dirt: 
 
If we can abstract pathogenicity and hygiene from our notion of 
dirt, we are left with the old definition of dirt as matter out of 
place. This is a very suggestive approach. It implies two 
conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that 
order. Dirt then, is never a unique, isolated event. Where there is 
dirt there is a system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic 
ordering and classification of matter.111  
                                                
108 Douglas, 1970, p. 149. 
109 Schneemann, 2002, p. 214. 
110 Schneemann, 1995; In an article from the New York Times, dated February 3, 2002, Amy 
Newman describes Infinity Kisses as both ‘taboo-teasing’ and ‘oddly endearing’ suggesting an 
ambivalence about the oral contact. This ambivalence, as I shall demonstrate, underscores the 
human-animal relationships produced in many of her works. 
111 Douglas, 1970, p. 45. 
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The distinction between self and Other, for Douglas, is founded on the category 
of dirt: what is dirty shows us what is out of place, what is Other, what is not-
self. The human body, or self, or I, is perceived as ‘clean’ and as a ‘subject’ in 
contrast to the animal body, or Other, being perceived as an ‘object’ and 
‘unclean’. Infinity Kisses plays on this historical and cultural association of the 
animal body with dirt, being unhygienic and, following from Leviticus, unclean. 
It is liminal matter, or ‘marginal stuff’112, which is able to activate our 
understanding of the body’s margins as fragile and, in the case of Infinity 
Kisses, it is the oral exchange of bodily fluids that is troublesome because 
bodily waste is culturally perceived as dirty.113  
 
Drawing on Douglas’ work, Julia Kristeva writes in Powers of Horror: An 
Essay on Abjection (1982) that ‘filth is not a quality in itself, but applies only to 
what relates to a boundary, and more particularly, represents the object 
jettisoned out of that boundary, its other side, a margin.’114 The category dirt, 
therefore, is a relative value, whose construction points to a particular system or 
order. In the context of our discussion, what is dirty is what is improper in the 
realm of human-animal contacts: dirt draws attention to the designation of 
particular bodies as human and others as animal, according to whether they 
engage in clean/natural practices or dirty/unnatural ones. Liminal matter, or dirt, 
therefore precipitates a troubling of subjecthood in the work of Kristeva as it 
functions both as the abject and/or that which is abjected. Neither subject nor 
object, the abject troubles an easy identification between the self and 
subjectivity. Through the abject, or rather through the process of abjection, the 
Other is fundamentally always incorporated into the structures of identity 
                                                
112 ‘All margins are dangerous. If they are pulled this way or that the shape of fundamental 
experience is altered. We should expect the orifices of the body to symbolise its especially 
vulnerable points. Matter issuing from them is marginal stuff of the most obvious kind. Spittle, 
blood, milk, urine, faeces or tears by simply issuing forth have traversed the boundary of the 
body. So also have bodily parings, skin, nail, hair clippings and sweat. The mistake is to treat 
bodily margins in isolation from all other margins.’ Ibid., p. 150. 
113 The anal and the faecal are objects which have historically been seen both as dirty – that 
which is not-self – and as caught up in the processes of self-identification – the way we treat 
these objects tells tales on who we really are. Dominique Laporte’s History of Shit, MIT press, 
Cambridge, 2000, is particularly relevant here for a discussion of the ‘faecal’. See also 
Hocquenghem, Guy Homosexual Desire, Duke University Press, Durham, 1993, for a 
discussion of the ‘anal’. 
114 Kristeva, Julia in Powers of Horror, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982 p. 69.  
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formation (the self) as the abject is paradoxically both threatening with its 
ability to challenge our well-regulated boundaries, and self-affirming as it 
enables us to construct a notion of what we are based on what we are not.115 
While the abject is that which I must expel in order to become an I, it never 
exists fully as an Other in relation to the self or subject, but instead persists in 
maintaining an uneasy, circular, relation: 
 
These body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life 
withstands, hardly and with my condition as a living being. My 
body extricates itself, as being alive, from that border. Such 
wastes drop so that I might live, until, from loss to loss, nothing 
remains in me and my entire body falls beyond the limit – 
cadere, cadaver.116 [my emphasis] 
 
The work of both Kristeva and Douglas is thus deeply invested in the 
formulation of bodily margins and uses concepts of dirt, contamination and 
expulsion to suggest a fragility which provokes anxiety related to the 
destabilisation of cultural binaries ‘beyond the limit’: self/other, 
interior/exterior. Kristeva’s notion of the abject, as staged by the relation to both 
the self and the Other, provides a compelling theoretical framework to work 
through the ideas associated with the animal and dirt and to highlight points of 
contact between the two.  
 
Published in 1966, Purity and Danger actually preceded Schneemann’s Infinity 
Kisses by some 15 years, although it is exactly historically contemporaneous 
with Fuses. Perhaps we can say, then, that this work marks the advent of a 
particular historical moment in the formulation of taboo, a moment which also 
ties in Leach’s 1964 paper on the way the pet, or the ‘man-animal’, was seen as 
taboo. Specifically, taboo was understood both by Schneemann and Douglas in 
the context of a body politics, tied to themes of contamination, pollution and 
transgression of the body.117  
                                                
115 See ‘Approaching abjection’ in Ibid., pp. 1-31. 
116 Ibid., p. 3.  
117 I am thinking here in opposition to earlier debates on ‘taboo’: for example Sigmund Freud’s 
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The historical formulation of taboo in the context of bodily boundaries, and how 
it relates to societal ones, was unique at this time and provided the foundations 
for Kristeva’s important essay on abjection.118 Douglas argued that bodily 
margins are perceived as dangerous and powerful because they operate 
symbolically, with an analogous function to boundaries in society at large: ‘the 
body is a model which can stand for any bounded system. Its boundaries can 
represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious.’119 When the 
body’s boundaries are under threat and subject to penetration by, or expulsion 
of, whatever might present a challenge to the self/Other dichotomy, we perceive 
a parallel disintegration in the categorical distinctions that have come to define 
our society. Transgressions of the bodily boundary are analogous to 
transgressions of the boundary of the self, showing that ‘any structure of ideas is 
vulnerable at the margins’.120 Schneemann’s Infinity Kisses thus performs the 
fragility of the distinction between self and Other, thereby producing a model of 
the body as unstable and mutable, by employing oral contamination as a 
conceptual strategy that threatens the boundaries of the self. The notion of the 
margin, of the liminal, of the boundary and of the edge has continued to foster 
momentum throughout critical theory’s recent history: Douglas’ emphasis on 
the symbolic importance of the boundary is keenly at play in notions of in-
betweeness and of instability, and is a thread that runs throughout this thesis in 
relation to the body and subjectivity. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Totem and Taboo (1913), was about forbidden behaviours and the sanctification of certain 
objects; the numerous anthropological/colonial investigations of taboo, particularly in 
Polynesian cultures. Toy, Crawford H. ‘Taboo and Morality’, Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, Vol. 20, 1899 (pp. 151-156) covers a range of historical formulations of taboo; and the 
plethora of available literature on formulations of incest as taboo in the western tradition, for 
example see Bagley, Christopher ‘Incest Behaviour and Incest Taboo’ in Social Problems, Vol. 
16, No. 4, Spring, 1969 (pp. 505-519) for an overview. This text covers theory on the incest 
taboo, but interestingly does not mention the work of Mary Douglas.  
118 For a discussion of how bodily boundaries relate to societal ones in the work of Kristeva see 
‘From filth to defilement’ in Powers of Horror (pp. 56-89), especially pp. 66-70. Kristeva 
recognises that it is this correspondence between bodily and societal boundaries that is what is 
interesting in the work of Douglas, but argues that a correspondence isn’t enough, because it 
does not answer questions about cause and effect: ‘a social (symbolic) system corresponds to a 
specific structuration of the speaking subject in the symbolic order…[but] is the social 
determined by the subjective, or is it the other way around?’ Kristeva, p. 67. 
119 Douglas, 1970, p. 142.  
120 Ibid., p. 150. 
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In Schneemann’s work, the animal body thus self-reflexively enacts itself as 
having been historically perceived as both dirty and abject, tacitly raising these 
associations and assumptions whenever we view a work such as Infinity Kisses. 
The use of oral contact mobilises notions of pollution and contamination in 
order to reveal the mechanisms by which the animal body has been culturally 
perceived as Other to that of the human, but also as abject (n/either subject n/or 
object). Infinity Kisses consequently presents a challenge to this system 
(‘…where there is dirt there is a system…’) by precipitating a breakdown in 
distinctions between the human and the animal. In other words, the animal body 
functions as abject since it is not fully Other to the human body, and instead is 
held in co-suspension with it: what the human body is relies on what the animal 
body is not. Arguing from Douglas’ work on Leviticus and Kristeva’s work on 
the abject, I contend that what is troubling (or abject) about Schneemann’s 
Infinity Kisses is that, by virtue of being dirty, it proposes a challenge to the 
system of taxonomic classification, whereby easy distinctions between bodies 
are not able to be made: it presses upon a boundary. This boundary is also 
challenged by the way in which repetition in this work plays in to the 
domesticity or sheer banality of this erotic encounter. Rather than something out 
of the ordinary, the quotidian nature of these events forces us to question the 
roles that we place on animal and human others (hetero-sexual). 
 
The work of both Christie Davies and David Delaney provide compelling 
critical interpretations of human-animal sexual contacts in this regard. 
Specifically, they argue that erotic contact does trouble species identity, since 
they provoke an anxiety related to blurring the line between human and animal, 
and with it the perceived distinctiveness of humans. Both Davies and Delaney 
draw on the conflation of homosexuality and bestiality in Leviticus in order to 
contend that the differences between these two practices become less important 
than what they might have in common. They argue that according to ideological 
constructions of the natural, male sexual behaviour is understood as orientated 
exclusively to female humans. The act of intercourse with an animal therefore 
produces an encounter in which the animal performs in the wrong role i.e. as a 
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human of one or other gender.121 Such a troubling of species identifications is 
further compounded by the knowledge that humans might act in a way that is 
perceived to be animal: 
 
The gist of it is that animals engage in mindless lust; we are 
supposed to practice something on an altogether higher plane. 
But we cannot pretend we are doing something very different 
from what animals do when we are doing it with an animal: the 
whole edifice then collapses.122 
 
Behavioural characteristics, in addition to biological ones, are therefore seen to 
produce bodies within particular ontological categories and support taxonomic 
classification: the historical identification of the animal body with the 
monstrous, with irrationality and with lust is widely acknowledged.123 The 
human body that engages in such practices is therefore subsequently deemed 
animal (by virtue of being dirty), in spite of its biological species. In her 
‘beastly’, or ‘dirty’ behaviour, Schneemann therefore performs her body as 
‘animal’ in its desires and drives. Scenes of her giving or receiving oral sex in 
Fuses is aligned with her French-kissing her cat in Infinity Kisses in terms of 
these drives. By explicitly staging the body as erotic – and crucially in her work 
this is often understood as being culturally inappropriate eroticism i.e. too 
much, superfluous, feminine, aberrant, unclean – Schneemann therefore tends to 
play in to stereotypes of deviant sexuality in order to challenge and undo our 
complicity with them and ask where the boundary between human-self and 
animal-Other might lie, if indeed there is one. She performs her body as marked 
by her own sexuality and desires (she has desires and they are base) thus 
constructing her body as deviant in opposition to the historical fetishization of 
woman as desire in a heterosexual paradigm (she is his desire). In this, the artist 
self-identifies her own body as animal in its deviance or Otherness.  
 
                                                
121 See Delaney, p. 494; and Davies, p. 1036. 
122 Morris, Peter ‘Blurred Boundaries’ in Inquiry, No. 40, 1997, (pp. 259-290), p. 272. 
123 For an overview of this discourse, see Mullin, Molly H. ‘Mirrors and Windows: Socio-
Cultural Studies of Human-Animal Relationships’ in Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 28, 
1998 (pp. 201-224). 
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Infinity Kisses thus reveals a moment in which unstable cultural and judicial 
classifications of appropriate human-animal contacts come to the fore and the 
photographs trouble an easy identification either with or against the body of the 
artist. There is a leaky distinction, or a porosity, in these works that provoke an 
anxiety about the challenge to historical constructions of the 
person/human/subject/self/I.124 Schneemann both becomes-animal and 
anthropomorphises the cats in her works, so that technologies of representation 
operate as a catalyst for this contamination, this leaky distinction between 
different bodies, which come into contact precisely through formal, historical 
and cultural breaks and ruptures. Schneemann’s work uses the notions of touch, 
of petting, and of the pet to begin to stage complex, difficult encounters that ask 
serious questions of these ontological and sexual categories.125 In particular, 
these works pose a challenge to naturalizing conventions that have upheld and 
perpetuated these categories through social, religious and legal practices. 
 
Infinity Kisses therefore stages a sort of thematic and material continuity with 
her earlier projects, such as Fuses, in which the notion of con-tact with the 
feline body foregrounds the construction of sexuality and subjectivity through 
both the structure and the content of the work. Schneemann’s projects here 
confront new sexualities and subjectivities that operate not just within 
heterosexual discourse (as argued by Amelia Jones, Scott MacDonald, David E. 
James and Johannes Birringer in their discussion of the work) or queer 
discourse (Jonathon Katz) but also that pertaining to the non-human, through its 
investment in the materiality of film, the processes of production and the animal 
body. As with Fuses, this project uses technology to construct an everyday, 
domestic encounter between two bodies (it is filmed inside a ‘home’, a real, 
embodied space, tied to the banal and the quotidian). Through its ties to the 
quotidian, Schneemann opposes the terms ‘bestiality’, ‘obscenity’ and 
                                                
124 ‘Much of what we call cultural studies situates itself squarely, if only implicitly, on what 
looks…more and more like a fundamental repression that underlies most ethical and political 
discourse: repressing the question of nonhuman subjectivity, taking it for granted that the 
subject is always already human.’ Wolfe, Cary Animal Rites: American Culture, The Discourse 
of Species and Posthumanist Theory, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2003, 
p. 1. 
125 Touch has a central function, for Derrida, in the operation of the self: ‘Our world self touches 
itself; it flexes, inflects, and reflects itself; it auto affects and hetero affects itself in this way; it 
folds itself, onto itself and yielding to itself.’ Derrida, 2005, p. 53. 
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‘perversion’, and does not claim transgression. Instead, the quotidian becomes 
her transgression.126 The domestic is emphasized in Infinity Kisses not just 
through the act of repetition but also through the photographic format: the 
standard 6x4” prints convey to us a sense of the ‘Kodak moment’, the record of 
everyday events taken spontaneously, sent off to the chemist for processing and 
then diligently hand sorted as we select our favourites and discard those that are 
out of focus, overexposed or unflattering. This type of photograph is handled in 
a way that digital and professional prints simply are not. 
 
By explicitly activating the notion of touch – and its associations with both 
stroking and striking – Schneemann inscribes the liberatory rhetoric of crossings 
and multiplicity into the work, while simultaneously staging an unease. As 
Rebecca Schneider argues – one of the only scholars to discuss Schneemann’s 
use of bestiality – the work ‘tangles the explicitly marked body in representation 
with the historical trajectory of socially instituted hierarchies of humanity.’127 If, 
historically, animals have been seen, not seeing, and, politically, have been 
objects of knowledge while humans are subjects of knowledge,128 what are the 
implications for models of subjectivity premised precisely on this unsteady 
border between subject and object, particularly in light of emergent 
technologies of production and reproduction? Thus, in the context of this thesis, 
Schneemann’s film and photographic work is here re-positioned as an early 
intervention into the discourses of the body and technology by assuming neither 
that the organic can be readily opposed to the technological, nor that ‘the body’ 
only ever refers to a human subject. 
 
                                                
126 Schneider, Rebecca The Explicit Body in Performance, Routledge, London and New York, 
1997, p. 49. 
127 Ibid., p. 49. 
128 Delaney, p. 494.  
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1996: 10 patients with phantom limbs take part in a study to test the effects of 
visual input on phantom sensations, using a ‘mirror box’ to visually resurrect 
the phantom. A mirror is placed vertically on a table so that the mirror 
reflection of the patient’s remaining hand is ‘superimposed’ on the felt position 
of the phantom. Over half the patients felt movement in the phantom when 
viewing the reflected image of the hand, and many were cured of the negative 
sensations associated with phantom limbs such as pain or paralysis. The 
experimenters report that, ‘there must be a great deal of back and forth 
interaction between vision and touch, so that the strictly modular, hierarchical 
model of the brain that is currently in vogue needs to be replaced with a more 
dynamic, interactive model, in which “re-entrant” signaling plays the main 
role.’1 
 
Perhaps this report primarily concludes that there is a synaesthetic connection 
between sight and sensation, echoing the fingery-eyes that are activated in 
Carolee Schneemann’s film work Fuses (1964-67). Or perhaps it implies that 
the adult human brain is surprisingly plastic: new pathways that bridge the two 
cerebral hemispheres can emerge in less than three weeks as the brain is re-
trained to experience the phantom limb differently. But maybe it also infers that 
                                                
1 Ramachandran, V. S. & Rogers-Ramachandran, D. ‘Synaesthesia in Phantom Limbs Induced 
with Mirrors’ in Proceedings: Biological Sciences, Vol. 263, No. 1369, Apr. 22 1996 (pp. 377-
386).  
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technologies of vision can re-align the body and its self/image, unpicking the 
psychological and physiological differences by tricking the brain into noticing 
only the similarities. In other words, how does the body respond to its own live 
self/image and what is the role of difference and sameness in constituting that 
response?  
 
In the space of the mirror box, the body is collapsed onto its own image as 
feedback systems are established between limb, reflection and brain. In other 
words, the ‘re-entrant signaling’ suggested by Ramachandran and Rogers-
Ramachandran. The problem of the relationship between body/self and 
image/self, according to the results of this experiment, would seem to be at once 
perceptual and physiological. But this occludes the philosophical, the 
psychological and the poetic considerations of how one orientates oneself in 
relation to the image, and the way in which the image mediates one’s 
relationship with a body, a zone of transformation through which the body 
passes in the processes of identity construction.  
 
Perhaps the mirror, as a technology for looking at the body, seems particularly 
resonant in the context of identity construction since it sets up a live system in 
which information is perpetually shuffled back and forth between body and 
image. Like the mirror, the video camera also presents a self/image that is live, 
since it has the capacity for instant playback when it is connected to a television 
monitor. In other words, since it does not require the processes of developing 
and printing that film does, video can show a recorded image live alongside the 
source of that same image.2 The development of the Portapak video camera in 
1968 thus perhaps opened up a critical space in the history of the moving image, 
in which technology could now provoke a challenge to the epistemological 
emphasis on sight and the ‘live event’, playing into this rhetoric even while 
conceptually undermining it.  
 
                                                
2 See Kaizen, William ‘Live on Tape: Video, Liveness and the Immediate’ in Art and the 
Moving Image: a Critical Reader, Leighton, T. ed., Tate Publishing, London, 2008 (pp. 258-
272). See also Carroll, Noel ‘The Specificity of Media in the Arts’ in Film and Theory, Stam & 
Miller eds., Blackwell, Malden M.A. and Oxford England, 2000 (pp. 39-53) especially p. 43. 
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The emergent use of video in artistic practice during the late 1960s and 1970s 
restaged the relationship between live acts and the recorded image, as video 
streams were integrated into performances and opened up for critical reflection 
the differences between the live body and its ‘live’ image. Video seemed neither 
to be used simply as a documentary device for recording an event, nor as a 
purely object-based practice, for example as per Schneemann’s use of the 16mm 
camera in a work such as Fuses.3 Instead, video seemed to sit somewhere in-
between the object and performance, integrating the early history of video 
practice into histories of the ‘live event’.  
 
In her article ‘Performance, video and the rhetoric of presence’ (2000), Anne 
Wagner situates the emergence of video art in the context of contemporary 
performance practice. Looking at Acconci’s Following Piece (1969) and Laurie 
Anderson’s Object/Objection/Objectivity (1973), Wagner considers the way in 
which performance practices from the late 1960s into the 1970s dealt with the 
nature of the exchange of vision between artist and audience. The performances, 
she argues, acknowledged that ‘vision itself is a faculty to be tracked and 
erased, documented and suppressed, stymied and deferred.’4 Such works were 
preoccupied with reflecting a gaze back onto the audience, but a gaze that was 
often associated with violence and aggression. 
 
The problems of vision that Wagner identified in the performances of this time 
subsequently come to be played out in contemporary video practice as artists 
used the live playback capabilities of the technology to interrupt systems of 
looking between audience and performer. Optical technologies such as the 
mirror and/or the video camera were used in performance of the 1970s in order 
                                                
3 Although I will be primarily looking at video works that deal with the representation of the 
body, often intersecting with performance techniques, there were of course many practices that 
used tape to produce the art video as an object in its own right. Here, the tape would be 
manipulated using image synthesizers and the principle of feedback between camera and 
monitor to produce abstract imagery. The most noted examples of this type of object-based 
practice are the works by Nam June Paik, Woody and Steina Vasulka, or Peter Donebauer. For a 
discussion of these works see Meigh-Andrews, Chris A History of Video Art: The Development 
of Form and Function, Berg, Oxford and New York, 2006, especially chapter 7 ‘Beyond the 
Lens: Abstract Video Imagery and Image Processing’ (pp. 111-148). See also the 1973 WGBH 
Boston Public Television Program Video: The New Wave, available to watch online at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLgVGYmOg5o.  
4 Wagner, Anne ‘Performance, Video and the Rhetoric of Presence’ in October, Vol. 91, Winter 
2000 (pp. 59-80) p. 63. 
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to ‘foreground an audience’s understanding that it is what is being seen.’5 This 
was often achieved by reflecting the gaze of the audience back onto itself. 
Artists including Joan Jonas and Dan Graham used mirrors and video in their 
performance practice in order to question the ways in which the visual exchange 
between the performer and the audience might be mediated through various 
types of screen. This questioning of the relationship of gazes between the 
audience and the performer fitted into a genealogy of art practices that extended 
from Minimalism into video art. While Benjamin Buchloh had previously 
claimed that Minimalist objects, like video, had opened up the 
phenomenological space of spectatorship, Wagner draws on the formal 
similarity between the use of mirrors in 1970s performance and works such as 
Robert Morris’ Untitled (Mirror Cubes) (1965) to link these practices and 
demonstrate that video art was not separate from performance but an intrinsic 
part of it.6 In both instances, optical devices were used ‘to perform an endless 
volley of reflections – or crossfire of gazes.’7 
 
This cross-fire of gazes, which we have already seen played out between male, 
female and animal bodies in the work of Schneemann, is strikingly revisited 
some 6 years later in Lynda Benglis’ work Enclosure (1973) (figs. 2.1 and 2.2). 
A portable video camera (held by Benglis) roams a studio, moving between 
filming a man stroking a cat and two TV monitors. One of the monitors displays 
close-ups of the man and the cat, the other a hockey game being played ‘live’ on 
TV. While the space remains domestic, it is no longer sexualized.  There is none 
of the stickiness of the 16mm film screen, and the cat no longer draws us in to a 
complex negotiation of animal subjectivity and sexuality: it obstinately remains 
a cat. The man occasionally watches the hockey game. The female body in the 
scene is out of sight, as the eye of the camera is now clearly her eye – the 
artist’s eye – roaming the room. The jerky movements reference the emergent 
visual tradition of home video, and the static interference upturns the logic of 
the marks and scratches on the surface of the 16mm film in Fuses. In Enclosure, 
                                                
5 Ibid., p. 70. 
6 Buchloh, Benjamin ‘From Gadget Video to Agit Video: Some Notes on Four Recent Video 
Works’ in Art Journal, special issue Video: The Reflexive Medium Vol. 45, No. 3, Autumn 1985 
(pp. 217-227). 
7 Wagner, p. 73. 
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the screens appear flat, banal. The monitors inside the studio room make us 
aware of the implied third monitor: the one on which the viewer is watching 
Benglis’ video.  
 
A moiré interference pattern occasionally flashes across these monitors as 
Benglis’ camera re-records them. This type of disruption to the image is caused 
when a grid overlays another grid, or two waves meet, but are ever so slightly 
imperfectly aligned, causing a diffraction pattern which spreads out across the 
screen in waves, a feature instantly recognizable to anyone who has ever tried to 
take a photograph of a television or computer screen. In the case of a video of a 
video, it is the grid of the aperture grill of a CRT screen failing to align exactly 
with the image of another screen that causes this interference. As light waves 
from the two grids crossover and interfere with one another, the points at which 
they meet produce what is known as a ‘beat’, and generate a new wave pattern 
that interrupts and displaces the modernist grid: the moiré (figs. 2.3 and 2.4).  
 
It is these new rippling electronic surfaces that displace the material tactility of 
the 16mm film screen, now drained of all bodily suggestion. The gazes that 
fired between human and animal subjects now fire between camera and 
monitor, caught in a perpetual loop. The subjects are merely caught within the 
‘endless volley of reflections’ as the camera and the screens produce a 
seemingly closed (en-closed) system that, by implication, is meant to also 
include Benglis and, subsequently, us. The space created here is like the 
enclosure of the mirror box, since not only are the bodies in the space caught 
under layer upon layer of re-presentation, but the gaze which looks inside the 
box (the audience), apparently as if from the outside, is also incorporated into 
the system: trapped in the enclosure between camera and monitor. 
 
Since 1976, this enclosed space of the video loop, which volleys the subject 
back and forth between camera and monitor, has been theorized as a narcissistic 
space of projection. In her foundational article ‘Video: the aesthetics of 
narcissism’, published that year, Rosalind Krauss attempted to identify the 
defining characteristics of video: producing a totalizing theory of the new 
medium, which has been at the heart of most subsequent art historical analysis. 
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The characteristics that she discovered – of being ‘live’, and of allowing the 
performer to watch him/herself as if in a mirror – was perceived by Krauss as 
being fundamentally psychological rather than physical in nature, since the 
medium itself is structured around a narcissistic doubling of the self, in which 
the self is either that of the body of the artist (as in the case of works on tape) or 
the body of the spectator (as with video installations).8  
 
By defining the medium of video as psychological Krauss, perhaps unwittingly, 
played into a discourse that considered communications technology (or the flow 
of information) as fundamentally disembodied. Likening the medium of video 
to the ‘mediums’ of parapsychology, she argued that the human body becomes 
both a sender and receiver of communications that arise from an invisible 
source. In so doing, her model of information or data transfer inserted the 
emergent discourse around video into a genealogy of thought that considered 
the flow of information (which historically includes human thought processes) 
as removed from the material substrate through which they flow. This is a 
genealogy that extends from Cartesian dualism, through enlightenment 
idealism, and into contemporary techno-fantasies of artificial intelligence, 
which will be developed further in the final chapter.  
 
However, through the analogy of the spiritual medium, Krauss identified the 
key feature that, as we have seen, distinguishes video from other moving image 
technologies such as film: that the presentation of the image may be 
simultaneous to the event, or coextensive with the live body of the artist. Not 
needing to undergo chemical or mechanical processing before display, the 
videotape allows for instant playback, enabling a simultaneous doubling of the 
body of the performer or split between self and image. For Krauss, the artists 
used the playback function of the home video camera in order to perform with 
or to their self/image, producing a narcissistic doubling back of the subject upon 
itself. She writes: 
 
                                                
8 Krauss, Rosalind ‘Video: the Aesthetics of Narcissism’ in October, Vol. 1, Spring 1976 (pp. 
50-64). 
 86 
The body is therefore centered between two machines that are 
the opening and closing of a parenthesis. The first of these is the 
camera; the second is the monitor, which re-projects the 
performer’s image with the immediacy of a mirror.9 
 
While the notion of a subject caught within a system of representation is crucial, 
Krauss’ understanding that the process of transformation that the image of the 
subject has undergone as ‘mirror-like’ is highly problematic. In the first 
instance, her model appears to be based on Nancy Holt’s description of 
experiencing feedback interference with speech patterns in the work Boomerang 
(1974) (figs 2.5 and 2.6), in which she says she feels like she is caught in a 
‘mirror reflection…so that I am surrounded by me and my mind surrounds 
me…there is no escape.’ Krauss likens this prison-like situation to being caught 
between two mirrors, from which there is no escape spatially or temporally. 
Caught between two mirrors the subject, she argues, experiences a collapse of 
both time and space: ‘this is the prison of the collapsed present.’10 The subject is 
disconnected from its own past, the distinctions between subject and object have 
flattened into one and the physical and conceptual spaces between the two have 
been squeezed out: ‘the medium of video art is the psychological condition of 
the self split and doubled by the mirror reflection of synchronous feedback.’11 
 
However, the mirror analogy also begins to unravel when we consider the 
relationship between video and performance, or the ‘live event’, noting that, 
while related, they are not synonymous. As William Kaizen suggests, ‘there is a 
paradox in the references to video as immediate: why would a system for 
recording be described as if it were unmediated?’12 The notion of the ‘live 
event’ had been particularly resonant during this period due to emergent 
contemporary theories concerning ‘live television’, television recorded ‘as live’, 
and the ‘live studio audience’. Thus artists were keen to destabilize the 
relationship between TV and the ‘live event’ on the grounds that this perceived 
equivalence fostered an epistemological basis for televisions claim to truth and 
                                                
9 Ibid., p. 52. 
10 Ibid., p. 53. 
11 Ibid., p. 55. 
12 Kaizen, p. 261. 
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immediacy. Many artists used public access TV to stream their performances 
‘live’ into the domestic sphere, not to bolster the rhetoric but in order to 
challenge it. Of note in this field is the work of Richard Serra, Nancy Holt and 
Martha Rosler. 
 
Through its well-established relationship to television, the observer has been 
trained to read video images ‘as live’ rather than as images recorded in the past. 
However, the notion of what constitutes the ‘live’ image is markedly scrambled 
in relation to home video and broadcast technology. William Kaizen, David 
Antin and Philip Auslander have all described the illusion of immediacy that is 
associated with tape, generating confusion between real time and recorded time. 
As Antin noted in 1975, ‘the live production on videotape, though delayed in 
reaching the home by a few hours or days, was generally accepted as actual live 
television by the average viewer.’13 This was perhaps easy to achieve since tape 
was associated with news broadcasts that covered world events, generating a 
perceptual link between instant playback and the real. News broadcasts enabled 
all sorts of production on tape to be perceived as live, since they would integrate 
items that needed to be live with those that didn’t, items where the broadcast 
could be delayed across different time zones and throughout the broadcast 
day.14 As such, the medium of tape becomes associated with the notion of live, 
almost regardless of content, to such a degree that other forms of artistic 
practice began to be considered in comparison to videotape’s capacity for not 
only re-playing but also actually producing truth and immediacy. For example, 
Auslander has suggested that the concept of live, as used to describe 
performance practice, was only developed after, and in relation to, the advent of 
tape recording.15 The idea of live was thus paradoxically only a result of the 
emergence of mediated imagery. Rather than playing into the connection that 
Krauss makes between the video camera and the mirror on the grounds of live 
re-presentation, I would argue that the fact that artists like Dan Graham or Joan 
Jonas use both devices in their projects suggests that there is not a similarity but 
                                                
13 Antin, David ‘Video: the Distinctive Feature of the Medium’ in Video Art, Schneider, I. & 
Korot, B. eds., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1976 (pp. 174-183) p. 174.  
14 Kaizen, p. 263.  
15 See Auslander, Phillip Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture, Routledge, New 
York, 1999, pp. 50-54. 
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rather a crucial distinction in the specificity of the images produced by each.16 
These works ask what is the difference between seeing through a mirror and 
through a video monitor?  
 
Wagner’s reading of both Boomerang and Lynda Benglis’ work Now (1973) 
(fig 2.7) is particularly interesting in this context since it picks out the way in 
which those works – and other early video art practices – used technology to 
highlight the moments of failure in the visual exchange between audience and 
performer. Unlike film, but similar to performance, the threat of failure or 
breakdown is always present with video. Wagner poses the question whether 
‘confidence in the directness of vision can survive translation and reproduction 
by technological media,’17 and for her the early video art projects were trying to 
work through the problematic notion of the ‘real’ in technologically mediated 
experience. This, of course, is the cornerstone of TV’s claim to truth: because it 
is live, it is therefore real. As Wagner writes, ‘truth and immediacy have been 
on special offer since the 1950s.’18 While Wagner has argued that performance 
and video came together to open up this question to exploration rather than 
naturalization, I believe that the use of technology in these projects ultimately 
reveal the inherent failure of any reading of vision as direct.  
 
Working from within the terms already set out in video theory, such as the live 
playback capabilities of the technology, I will demonstrate that there has been a 
fundamental mis-reading of information and systems theory. The feedback loop 
established in early video art practices is not comprised solely of the spatially 
and temporally flat surface of the subject reflected between two mirrors in 
infinite regress, as Krauss argued, but actually describes an embodied 
engagement with, or integration into, technological systems of representation, 
                                                
16 For a discussion of this see O’Dell, Kathy ‘Performance, Video and Trouble in the Home’ in 
Illuminating Video: an Essential Guide to Video Art, Hall, D. & Fifer, S. J. eds., Aperture, San 
Francisco, 1992 (pp. 135-151). Joan Jonas has explicitly written, ‘I chose as my first 
technological tool the mirror, a device that transmits light.’ See Jonas, Joan ‘Transmission’ in 
Women Art and Technology, Malloy, J. ed., MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. and London England, 
2003 (pp. 114-133) p. 117.  
17 Wagner, p. 74. 
18 Wagner, p. 76. 
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rather than a disembodied flow of information, visual or otherwise.19 As such, 
the idea that the early history of video art is inseparable from the live event is 




In Enclosure, there is a repetition of the subject through layers of re-
presentation, as the images of the cat and the man appear both on the screens in 
the studio and on our screen as we watch the work. Likewise in Benglis’ work 
Now, the self/image is repeated across several representational levels. Here, 
Benglis becomes the subject of the video camera’s gaze: her image multiplied 
as she stands between a monitor showing her pre-recorded image and a camera 
filming her, so that the resultant video shows her ‘live’ self/image interacting 
with her recorded one. Each Benglis tries to French kiss the other, in what could 
be interpreted as a literal staging of Krauss’ model of narcissism through the 
autoerotic act, reminding us of the French kiss between Schneemann and Cluny, 
and creating an encounter that asks us to begin to consider the ‘apparent’ act 
versus the ‘actual’ one in the context of bodily contacts. 
 
First we are shown one recorded Benglis behind the ‘real’ one, then two, then 
three. With each layer, the moiré pattern gets stronger, making it increasingly 
difficult to see the images. The film then ends as it began, with the familiar 
static interference left playing on the screen, signaling that we have been 
watching a video all along: the apparently ‘live’ Benglis was itself only ever a 
recording, thus collapsing the distinction between the body of Benglis the 
performer and the screen selves behind her. By performing with her own 
self/image, Benglis suggests the possibility of using the instant playback 
capability of video to replicate the live subject in infinite regress as multiple 
Benglis’ perform to one another in the mise en abyme. However, by using the 
image of static interference to imply that we have been watching a video, the 
sense of infinite regress does not simply extend outwards to a vanishing point, 
                                                
19 Antin, an early researcher on video art, suggests that this relation is also fundamentally social. 
He writes, ‘The most basic characteristic of the medium is the social relation between sending 
and receiving.’ See Antin, p. 175.  
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but rather suggests that the repetition continues ‘behind’ us too: there is a level 
in front of the one we watch, which perhaps includes us.  
 
In both Now and Enclosure, Benglis uses the motif of a subject apparently 
outside the system – whether it is in the role of a camera person, the spectator or 
a director – in order to challenge traditional models of systems that suggest 
infinite regress, such as the mise en abyme. As well as tacitly acknowledging 
our own position as the spectator, in Now the different images of Benglis are 
also seen talking to a third person, off camera, barking orders to ‘start 
recording!’ and asking whether ‘is it now?’ As such, the work suggests that the 
potential for the infinite repetition of the video image is not confined merely to 
those subjects represented within the filmic lexis but extends out into the space 
of the observer. Like a whirlpool, vision doesn’t simply spiral inwards but 
outwards also. In Now, the vanishing point does not occur simply in front of our 
field of vision, but also behind it, focusing in to the eye/I of the spectator. This 
is perhaps alluded to since the images of Benglis on the screen(s) in front of us 
increase in size as they move further away through the layers of video, in a 
move that is counter-intuitive to the decrease in size expected from distant 
objects within the structure of linear perspective.  
 
Benglis’ work both references and questions the structure of mise en abyme, 
both formally through the device of a potentially infinite volleying of the 
subject between self and image, and also metaphorically by providing a meta-
discourse on the structural capability of video to do this: in that the formal 
register of the system draws attention to the very structure of that system. André 
Gide first described the phenomenon of mise en abyme in a diary entry dated 
1893: 
 
In a work of art I rather like to find transposed, on the scale of 
the characters, the very subject of that work. Nothing throws a 
clearer light upon it or more surely establishes the proportions of 
the whole. Thus, in certain paintings of Memling or Quentin 
Metzys a small convex and dark mirror reflects the interior of 
the room in which the scene of the painting is taking place. 
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Likewise, in Velazquez's painting of Las Meninas (but 
somewhat differently). Finally, in literature, in the play scene in 
Hamlet, and elsewhere in many other plays. In Wilhelm Meister, 
the scenes of the puppets or the celebration at the castle. In The 
Fall of the House of Usher the story that is read to Roderick, etc. 
None of these examples is altogether exact. What would be 
much more so, and would explain much better what I strove for 
in my Cahiers, in my Narcisse, and in the Tentative, is a 
comparison with the device of heraldry that consists in setting in 
the escutcheon a smaller one ‘en abyme’, at the heart-point.20  
 
While the full term mise en abyme was first used by C. E. Magny in 1950, it is 
Gide’s journal entry that forms the foundation for most critical explorations of 
mise en abyme in literature studies.21 For Gide, mise en abyme is a function of 
reflexivity based on a model taken from British heraldry, in which an 
inescutcheon is mounted on an escutcheon so that a miniature replica of itself 
sits in the middle of a convex shield. In Gide’s work, three types of reflexivity 
have been identified as constituting mise en abyme: the single duplication, 
which functions like a mirror in that the whole is reproduced once in the form of 
an embedded part (the play within a play in Hamlet); the infinite duplication, 
where the embedded part itself embeds a part ad infinitum (often referred to in 
the literature as the ‘Morton Salt Box’ effect); and the paradoxical duplication, 
where the embedded part could also embed the whole in what constitutes a 
logical difficulty (an example given by Moshe Ron is that of Paludes, which 
plays on a deliberate confusion between author and narrator, work completed 
and work in progress).22 For Gide, mise en abyme is thus ‘any enclave 
                                                
20 Gide, André Journals 1889-1949, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1967, pp. 30-31.  
21 C E Magny’s term is largely rejected because the definition was not fully worked through and 
there was some confusion between single and infinite reflections. For a discussion of the 
historical uses of the term see Carrard, Philippe ‘From Reflexivity to Reading: the Criticism of 
Lucien Dällenbach’ in Poetics Today, special issue Representation In Modern Fiction, Vol. 5, 
No. 4, 1984 (pp. 839-856) especially p. 842. See also Hutcheon, Linda Narcissistic Narrative: 
the Metafictional Paradox, Methuen and Co. Ltd, London, 1990, especially chapter three 
‘Thematising Narrative Artifice: Parody, Allegory and the Mise en Abyme’ (pp. 48-56).  
22 See Ron, Moshe ‘The Restricted Abyss: Nine Problems in the Theory of Mise en Abyme’  
in Poetics Today, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1987 (pp. 417-438). 
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entertaining a relation of similarity with the work which contains it.’23 
 
In this respect, Benglis’ video works Now and Enclosure potentially function as 
mise en abyme on several counts: first, following from Krauss’ theory that the 
video monitor is ‘mirror-like’, the work could reference the formal register of 
single duplication; second, the images imply a repetition ad infinitum; third, the 
work itself stages an ambiguity about which body/image, if at all, constitutes the 
‘real’ Benglis, since all are presented as if ‘live’, and questions the relationship 
between Benglis and her recorded image. Perhaps the critical distinctions that 
have been determined in mise en abyme theories could be usefully deployed 
here to tease apart Krauss’ analogy that the video screen functions simply as a 
mirror. Likewise, Benglis’ video practice can also be seen to challenge 
prevailing assumptions in mise en abyme theory. 
 
The implication for this is that Krauss’ model of the evacuated flatness of the 
subject caught between two mirrors could be displaced in the theories of both 
video and mise en abyme. Following from Gide, several scholars of mise en 
abyme theory, including Lucien Dällenbach who wrote the key text 
contemporaneously with Krauss’ article, tend to assert the interchangeability of 
the mise en abyme and mirrors.24 By looking at the work Now, however, I 
would contend that while mise en abyme has a formal relation to the reflexive 
properties of mirrors, the type of transformation that the subject appears to 
undergo is complex and dynamic, and not a simple single duplication, such as 
the play within a play in Hamlet (which, as Moshe Ron notes, cannot be a true 
mise en abyme anyway because The Murder Of Gonzago does not contain 
essential components such as a figure like Hamlet himself)25. A shifting 
dialogue is thus set up between body and image: a dialogue that is perhaps 
present in all examples of recorded imagery. Posing the question of which 
                                                
23 Dällenbach quoted in Ron, p. 421.  
24 Dällenbach writes, ‘Mise en abyme is any internal mirror reflecting the narrative [recit] as a 
whole by simple, repeated or specious [specieuse] duplication.’ See Dällenbach ‘Reflexivity and 
Reading’ in New Literary History, special issue On Narrative and Narratives: II, Tomarken, A. 
trans., Vol. 11, No. 3, Spring 1980 (pp. 435-449). For a critique of Dällenbach’s position see 
Ron, and see Bal, Mieke ‘Mise en Abyme et Iconicité’ in Literature, Vol. 29, 1978 (pp. 116-
123).   
25 Ron, p. 421. 
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‘now’ is the real now, all of the images of Benglis in Now are presented as if 
live, as if the live subject inhabited several representational layers at once. By 
making each self/image autonomous, and performing actions that formally 
reference one another while remaining unique, the work implies that each one 
has its own subjectivity but simultaneously undermines that very implication. 
Since each Benglis is actually not identical, only apparently so, the association 
of the notion of the live image with instantaneous replication is broken. Indeed, 
the various Benglis’ often disagree with one another: ‘I said start 
recording…no, I said start recording!’ The self/image in Now therefore cannot 
be read as a simple reflection of the subject, since the self is effectively split 
from its own image by showing several apparently independent Benglis’. The 
audience of Now is thus asked to unpick the layered temporalities of the film in 
order to consider which image of Benglis might constitute the live subject, the 
source of the image. Yet, since we are aware that in fact all the Benglis’ are 
ultimately recorded images that have undergone various levels of duplication, 
there is a sense in which the live subject always fails to materialize within 
moving image technologies. As such, Now is both demonstrative of the uneasy 
notion of the live image, and implicated in re-affirming and exposing the means 
by which technologically mediated imagery has generated such a tension. 
 
Watching all these images, presented as if live, the spectator gets drawn into a 
system held in a sort of stasis: there is no present, only a series of recordings 
which exist in a past, present or future only relative to one another. The only 
moment when the presentness of the spectator is explicitly invoked – and by 
presentness I refer not only to the presence of the spectator but also the time 
which is perceived as present by that spectator – is the moment when the static 
interference covers the screen, reinforcing the material presence of the screen as 
a barrier. This has the paradoxical effect of apparently separating us from the 
system, but only so as to acknowledge our complicity with it. The diegetic 
boundary is reasserted by the static interference causing the film no longer to be 
viewed from within but rather from ‘without’, the space of the spectator. In an 
article on electronic presence, Vivian Sobchak has written that a key feature of 
electronic time is the ability to select, replay, and overcome the ‘irreversible 
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stream of objective time [in favour of] a recursive temporal network.’26 This is 
precisely the kind of network that Benglis has produced as Now speaks to those 
relativistic structures of time found in video. Furthermore, the questions that she 
poses, concerning the relationship between the temporality of the ‘live’ image 
and the lived body, are staged in the context of video time. 
 
Sobchak has argued that the experience of watching video is not only 
qualitatively different to watching film, not least in its non-linear viewing 
structures, but also that that difference is tied to the ways in which the different 
media interact with capital. Electronic imagery, for Sobchak, is like the 
simulacral precisely because it plays on notions of the real, through its 
perceived connection with live re-presentation. She writes, ‘the electronic 
semiotically constitutes a system of simulation – a system that constitutes 
copies lacking an original origin.’27 As such, Benglis is only ever an image, 
rather than a thing in itself, and the issue of presence (both in the sense of 
‘being there’ and ‘being in the present’) takes on a central critical role. Perhaps 
the static interference that ends the tape isn’t just a diegetic break to make us 
realize that we have been watching a tape all along, signaling that now we may 
re-enter the real, but rather confuses what might actually constitute the real, in 
much the same way that Jean Baudrillard has suggested that the explicit 
fakeness of a site like Disneyland is there to trick you into thinking that, by 
contrast, the world is real.28 As such, the break of the static interference seems 
only to highlight the very incorporation of the spectator into such a system and, 
by analogy, that the notion of ‘live(d)’ time itself is an artificial construction. 
 
                                                
26 Sobchack, Vivian ‘The Scene of the Screen: Envisioning Cinematic and Electronic 
“Presence”’ in Stam & Miller eds., (pp. 67-84) p. 79. 
27 Ibid., p. 79.  
28 See Baudrillard, Jean Simulacra and Simulation, Glaser, S. trans., University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor, 1994. This has also been noted by Antin, who writes, ‘In principle, TV 
seemed to combine the photographic reproduction capacities of the camera, the motion 
capabilities of film and the instantaneous transmission properties of the telephone. But just as 
the photographic reproduction capacity of the camera is essentially equivocal and mainly 
significant as mythology, so is the fabled instantaneity of TV essentially a rumour that combines 
with photographic duplicity to produce a quasi recording medium, the main feature of which is 
unlikeness in relation to any notion of reality…The industry wishes or feels obligated, to 
maintain the illusion of immediacy, which it defines rather precisely as “the feeling that what 
one sees on the TV screen is living and actual reality, at that very moment taking place.” The 
perfection of video tape made possible the careful manipulation and selective presentation of 
desirable ‘errors’ and ‘minor crises’ as marks of spontaneity.’ (Antin, p. 176-177). 
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Since the most prevalent model of mise en abyme involves an infinite 
replication of identical images in which the live subject is no longer discernible, 
a work such as Benglis’ Now places pressure on the theory, moving it away 
from being so rigidly likened to standing between two mirrors. By working with 
apparently live images that are non-identical, and in so doing thus calling 
attention to the problems of the structure of video being associated with the 
notion of liveness, the work operates more within the realm of the third stage of 
mise en abyme in which the part references the whole in a gesture that 
simultaneously consolidates and obliterates the very structure of the work.   
 
While the work certainly references reflection and repetition – often mistakenly 
equated in Dällenbach’s work29 – it does so only in order to subvert mimesis 
and representation. Benglis’ Now does perhaps seem to resonate more with 
repetition rather than reflection, echoing the heraldic figure of an escutcheon 
placed en abyme, in which we experience repetition on different scales, but this 
is not the same as reflection. Ultimately, Now fulfils the criteria of mise en 
abyme not because of repetition or reflection but in that ‘its essential property 
consists of bringing out the intelligibility or the formal structure of the work.’30 
As such, the mise en abyme demonstrated by Now closely describes the very 
challenge to representation that Dällenbach perceived in Gide’s theory 31: 
 
Moreover, mises en abyme such as Magritte's ‘picture within a 
picture’, which turns trompe l'oeil against itself, denounce 
pictural illusion and betray the ‘ideology of the window’ which 
has dominated Western painting since the Renaissance. 
Although presenting itself as a representation of a representation 
this mise en as second-degree mimesis, still subverts mimesis, 
                                                
29 Dällenbach has written, ‘As an organ of the work turning upon itself, mise en abyme appears 
as a modality of reflection.’ For a critique of this see Ron, p. 418.  
30 Dällenbach Le Rit Speculaire, Seuil, Paris, 1977, p. 16.  
31 Although it should be noted that Dällenbach made some changes to Gide’s original theory. He 
writes, ‘Whereas Gide understands by the term the repetition within a work of “the subject of 
the work” “on the level of the characters”, [(Gide p. 41)] my own use of the expression covers 
any sign having as its referent a pertinent continuous aspect of the narrative (fiction, text or 
narrative code, enunciation) which it represents on the diagetic level. The degree of analogy 
between sign and referent can give rise to various types of reduplication.’ (Dällenbach, 1980 p. 
436). 
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revealing it for what it is. [As S. Gablick writes] ‘The “painting- 
within-a-painting” theme is a stunning contraposition to the 
Renaissance concept of painting as a ‘window on reality.’32 
 
For Dällenbach, the critical function of mise en abyme is the use of the devices 
of repetition and reflection within a work not in and of themselves but in order 
to comment on the structure of that work, establishing a meta- or higher level 
discussion from within the work itself, thus ‘ensnaring representation in its own 
trap…undermining [the reader’s] referential illusion.’33 In relation to Benglis’ 
work, one of the crucial features of this theory is the role of the spectator, 
without whom the mise en abyme simply could not be completed, since, for 
Dällenbach ‘there is always an implied reader as a reading role is inscribed in 
the text.’34 Indeed, as I have earlier noted, Benglis’ works Now and Enclosure 
draw attention to that subject (the observer), apparently located outside the 
system.  
 
By working closely with the theory of mise en abyme, I argue that we might 
better understand the structures of viewing video, particularly in relation to the 
observer. The technology does not in fact, contrary to Krauss’ argument, 
produce a closed system, but facilitates the production of an open one that 
encompasses multiple subjects, including the observer. While Krauss argued 
that Vito Acconci’s Centers (1971)  (fig 2.8) caused the artist to collapse into a 
solipsistic closed circuit, several scholars have noted that the artist is not only 
pointing at himself but also at the viewer. Anne Wagner writes:  
 
Krauss’ analogy of the parenthesis means that the body ought to 
be held in qualified suspension: it is bracketed just as is a 
linguistic phrase or sign…My argument rests, by contrast, on the 
suggestion that these parentheses only apparently enforce a 
closure: the technology of the monitor opens outward as well as 
                                                
32 Dällenbach, 1980, p. 442-3.  
33 Ibid., p. 443. 
34 Ibid., p. 436. 
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in. Not only does it register a process of surveillance, it itself 
asks for monitoring.35   
 
Likewise, David Joselit states: 
 
What is striking about Krauss’ reading of Acconci’s work 
Centers – which has conditioned an entire generations 
understanding of video – is its occlusion of the obvious fact that 
in pointing at his reflected image on the playback monitor, 
Acconci simultaneously points out at the viewer of the tape.36 
 
The social aspect of the video ‘mirror’ was also emphasized in the editorial 
policy of the influential early publication Radical Software, whose model of a 
media ecology informs much of Joselit’s important work on video.37 If video 
works incorporate an observer into a system, then the type of narcissism that is 
played out in video art is thus, somewhat paradoxically, more of a social act, in 
which the observer is drawn in as an object and as an Other in relation to the 
subjectivity of the artist. To some extent, the narcissism of video is thus directed 
outward into the social realm, and is often founded on a distribution and 
proliferation of the artist’s self-image into that realm, rather than merely a 
reflection of that image back onto oneself through the device of the 
spectator/other. In contrast to Krauss, Joselit writes that ‘the video monitor 
situates psychological narcissism squarely within technologies of mechanical 
reproduction which proliferate rather than focus images of the performer.’38 
Perhaps the narcissism of video, for Joselit, exists in its potential for open-ended 
process (the possibility of infinite repetition and dissemination) while for 
                                                
35 Wagner p. 68 
36 Joselit, David ‘Tale of the Tape: Radical Software’ in Leighton, T. ed., (pp. 220-227) p. 225. 
37 Radical Software was published between 1970-1974 by the Raindance Corporation, a video 
collective headed up by the artist Frank Gillette. See www.radicalsoftware.org. In Joselit’s 2008 
article, the critique of Krauss is specifically filtered through an historical investigation of the 
publication Radical Software, the notion of media ecology – in which the social and psychic life 
is deeply intertwined with information technologies – and the democratization of TV. As a 
political gesture concerned with the democratization of the media and information flows, there 
has been an amnesia in the literature that Joselit is attempting to reclaim by critically investing 
in this small but influential publication. 
38 Joselit ‘Art as Information: Systems, Site, Media’ in American Art Since 1945, Thames and 
Hudson, London, 2003 (pp. 129-159) p. 156. 
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Krauss it is based in the closed system (which perpetually reflects the 
performer/viewer back onto his or her self). 
 
In literary theory, the creative potential of the mise en abyme lies in the way in 
which the self-referential structure creates gaps or breaks (leerstellen) which 
open up as productive spaces for this reader.39 These gaps, for Dällenbach at 
least, produce an interdeterminacy that offers space for critical reflection, and 
rejects fixed readings otherwise prescribed by traditional texts. As the images of 
Benglis first try to kiss each other, then disagree with each other, and the image 
increasingly breaks down with each screen overlay as the moiré pattern 
produces too much interference to see what is happening, the work produces 
such gaps, in which both reading and misreading might equally take place.  
 
While, following from Benglis’ work, I concur with Dällenbach that the gaps 
function as ‘stimuli’ to creative interpretation, I would also be wary of the 
suggestion that the gaps subsequently ‘aid readability…seal directly or 
indirectly the text’s vanishing points…condense the text…render the text more 
intelligible…’40 Instead, the formal properties of the mise en abyme are being 
employed here in order to open up the possibilities of interpretation and 
challenge them, rather than close them down. While, as Dällenbach notes, mise 
en abyme serves the purpose of integrating the spectator in order to weave the 
narrative to real life more closely, Now actually seems to prevent the body from 
being successfully re-integrated into its representation, instead making it 
fundamentally aware of its split from it through critical reflection.  
 
This split between the self and the image informs other important readings of 
video based practice. Joselit’s work on video is deeply concerned with Krauss’ 
oppositional notions of reflexivity (the critical analysis of the aesthetic and 
historical relation between an author and his or her medium) and reflection (the 
one-to-one mirroring as performed by video).41 In particular, for Joselit, the 
                                                
39 For a discussion of the role of leerstellen see Dällenbach 1980, pp. 436-441. 
40 Ibid., p. 440. 
41 See Joselit, 2008, 2003. 
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analogy of the video-monitor-as-mirror fails to consider the complexities of the 
relationship between self and image in video works. He writes:  
 
Not only is the one-to-one relationship between body and image 
shattered, but the ‘mirror’ reflects back not an ‘inner self’ but 
the kind of motley collection of exaggerated stereotypes… 
Rather than evoking a narcissistic collapse of the self into its 
reflection, the mirroring video art performs tends to heighten the 
difference between a person and their mechanical 
reproductions.42 
 
The subject that the video monitor plays back is fundamentally different from 
the reflection of the subject in the surface of a mirror. This difference is perhaps 
alluded to in Benglis’ tape since the images are not exact replications of one 
another: there are slight shifts in the register of scale, speech and action. The 
tape uses similarity – the apparent infinite repetition of the image of Benglis – 
in order to set up an awareness of difference. While compelling in its reading of 
the temporal and spatial experience of being caught in the video loop, I would 
argue that Krauss thus does not go far enough in her theory of the observer 
caught within the system, and cannot account for the way in which themes of 
repetition and reflection actually establish video in the context of a theory of 
difference through subject relations. The subject surely becomes integrated into 
the system and as such is fundamentally altered by the processes of 
representation and reflection. The image of the subject, and thus the subject 
itself, has undergone a shift through the merging of its subjectivity with the 
technological apparatus and the subsequent re-presentation of the live body on 
screen. While systems of gazes might be established between subjects within 
film and, in rare cases, across the film screen (as per Schneemann), the 
emergence of video allowed for a real-time exchange of gazes both between 
audience and performer and also between the performer and him- or herself: the 
performer might watch their own image live on a video monitor. As such, in 
using video as part of performance-based practice, the live body and the ‘live’ 
                                                
42 Joselit, 2003, p. 157. 
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image operate simultaneously but distinctly from one another in the system. I 
think the relationship between the live subject caught in such a system, the 
resultant ‘live’ image, the external viewer and the technology is potentially 
more complicated than a simple collapse of the distinction between subject (real 
body) and object (image body).    
 
Although the theory of mise en abyme was developed contemporaneously to 
Krauss’ text in the 1970s, it has only more recently been linked to contemporary 
video practices. Joselit implicitly deploys the concept of mise en abyme in his 
discussion of the early video work Wipe Cycle (1969-84) (fig 2.9) by Frank 
Gillette, in which a grid of monitors displays both the live images of audience 
members, two video tapes and a live television programme. The installation was 
rigged in a highly complex way: in four cycles, images wandered from one 
monitor to another delayed by eight or sixteen seconds, while counter-clockwise 
a grey light impulse wiped out all of the images every two seconds. 
 
Joselit argues that the viewer of this work is caught in a system of 
representation based on infinite regress, since the work is described as the 
‘image overloading (something like a play within a play within a play) to escape 
the automatic “information” experience of commercial television…’43 While the 
sense of an image overload alludes to the perceptual scrambling that occurs 
when looking at the mise en abyme, a work such as Now perhaps plays with the 
model more closely since it formally references the structure of infinite 
duplication whilst simultaneously problematising repetition and difference. 
Moving image technology appears to have here pried apart the body and the 




Historically, this rhetoric of networks and systems was at the core of the wider 
cultural milieu into which video emerged. Joselit has noted that two key 
                                                
43 Frank Gillette quoted in Joselit, 2003, p. 154. The notion of infinite regress is, in fact, at the 
heart of much of Joselit’s work. See Joselit Infinite Regress: Marcel Duchamp 1910-1941, MIT 
press, Cambridge, Mass., 2001. 
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exhibitions held in NYC in 1970 – Information and Software – were 
contemporaneous to the development of emergent computer and video 
technologies and TV.44 Hans Haacke’s interactive installation work MoMA Poll 
(1970) (fig 2.10) is in fact used by Joselit as the paradigmatic work in this 
context, not only to demonstrate the way in which art practices of the 1970s 
were trying to draw the viewer in to a quantifiable (and, he argues, potentially 
commodifiable) data stream, that is to say, making them part of the system and 
rejecting a contemplative model based on aesthetic distance, but also to 
highlight the failure of such art practices to grasp the implications for describing 
their work as ‘systems’. For Joselit, to describe a work like MoMA Poll as a 
‘system’ was inadequate because the word suggested a closed circuit of 
integrated actions whereas, as we have already seen with video based practice, 
what was actually occurring was more like an ‘open-ended process’ that 
encompassed numerous subject positions.45 As such, although he never 
explicitly states this, video might be read in Joselit’s terms as an open ended 
process rather than a closed system. For Joselit, video enables the self/image to 
proliferate, spiraling outwards from the subject through infinite repetition rather 
than a focusing-in on it.  
 
Although Joselit does not specifically refer to information theory for his critique 
of Haacke’s misappropriation of the term ‘system’ from computer science (itself 
passed on from Jack Burnham), his reading of such works as open processes 
rather than closed systems suggests a nuanced understanding of system theories, 
which is often mistakenly characterized as simply a flow of information 
between agents within a closed structure. N. Katherine Hayles’ groundbreaking 
study of information theory in How We Became Posthuman (1999) seems 
particularly useful in developing these ideas, especially in the context of the role 
of the observer. Hayles’ key contribution in analyzing the historical emergence 
of information and cybernetic theory was to question the way in which the flow 
of information was perceived as somehow autonomous from the thing through 
which it flowed (a material substrate), from the instruments of interpretation, 
and subsequently thus also from meaning itself. Within the context of the Macy 
                                                
44 Joselit, 2003, pp. 129-159. 
45 Ibid., p. 132.  
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Conferences (1946-1953), which aimed to look at the role of technology in 
society following the devastation of World War II, Claude Shannon and Norbert 
Weiner developed a theory of information, based on a principle of essentially 
having YES/NO choices out of a range of possible options. This model 
ultimately defined information as individual units that had the same value 
regardless of the context in which it was embedded. In the context of the 
questions raised at the Macy Conferences, this model was appropriate. 
However, ‘when taken out of context’, argues Hayles, ‘the definition allowed 
information to be conceptualized as if it were an entity that can flow unchanged 
between different material substrates, as when [theorists] have envisioned the 
information contained in a brain being downloaded into a computer.’46 Such 
ideas are instantly familiar to us through numerous representations in popular 
culture, and Hayles’ important work was to turn these theories around so that 
they pointed back to the body, in this case the body of an observer.47 
 
In this Hayles followed the work of Donald MacKay who tried to reintegrate 
information theory with meaning: structural information. Structural information 
contains semantic content as in the example of a piece of information like ‘it’s 
raining’. In this, Hayles suggests that not only does such a statement contain 
information about the world, it is also a representation of interactive phenomena 
that points back to the observer: the person who sees that it is raining. This 
person is essentially the ‘measuring instrument’ that contextualizes and gives 
meaning to the statement. Not only does such a theory integrate an observer into 
a system but actually extends this into a sort of open-ended process, by 
considering how the information and/or any changes in the semantic content 
might then be measured by other observers. In response to the question of how 
one might measure such changes, Hayles states: 
 
An observer looks at the mind of the person who received the 
message, which is to say that changes are made in the observer’s 
                                                
46 Hayles, N Katherine How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature 
and Informatics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1999, p. 54. For how such 
theories of information were developed, see section ‘The Meaning(lessness) of Information’ pp. 
51-57. 
47 The most popular examples cited include William Gibson’s novel Neuromancer (1984) or 
Ridley Scott’s film Blade Runner (1982). 
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mind, which in turn can also be observed and measured by 
someone else. The progression tends towards the infinite regress 
characteristic of reflexivity. Arguing for a strong correlation 
between the nature of a representation and its effect, MacKay’s 
model recognized the mutual constitution of form and content, 
message and receiver…subjectivity, far from being a morass to 
be avoided, is precisely what enables information and meaning 
to be connected.48 
 
Hayles’ important reconceptualisation of information as dependent upon a 
subject, and indeed an infinite regress of subjects, in order to give meaning to 
representation clearly echoes my own reading of mise en abyme theory as 
incorporating a viewing subject. This way of understanding processes and 
systems as fundamentally entangled with an observer has been increasingly 
working alongside more traditional notions within science and technology more 
generally. As such, as well as a shift in information theory, away from 
conceptualizing information as discrete, autonomous packets, there is also an 
increasing shift from Newtonian to Quantum mechanics, in which the 
interference of an observer with any given system might be taken into 
account.49 In this, scientific observations result not necessarily from any 
                                                
48 Hayles, p. 56. 
49 For example, quantum mechanics has demonstrated, through the Double-Slit experiment, how 
the wave-like and particle-like properties of light and other quantum particles are inseparable 
and, furthermore, that the properties they exhibit fundamentally change under observation, 
incorporating an observer into a system. In this experiment a point light source, one photon 
wide, shines through a plate with two parallel slits onto a screen behind them. The beam 
essentially splits, with some photons passing through one slit and some through another. The 
two emergent beams, since they derived from the same source, are described as being ‘coherent’ 
in that they are in phase with one another. The wave nature of light causes the waves passing 
through the two slits to interfere, causing a pattern of bright and dark bands on the screen on 
which the beams are essentially observed. This result both confirms and contradicts the light-as-
wave theory: if light did not behave like a wave then there would be no interference pattern, but 
if light were a wave then it would not arrive in discrete quantities or packets, and would be 
spread over more space the farther the screen was placed from the plate with the slits in it. 
Crucially, variations on this experiment have placed detectors in either or both of the slits to 
determine which slit any single given photon might pass through, but the use of a detector 
seems to result in the disappearance of the interference pattern (i.e. suggesting that light is not a 
wave). In order to observe the photon involves a physical interaction between photon and 
detector that fundamentally changes what is detected. For an overview of the mechanics of this 
phenomena see Greene, Brian The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the 
Quest for the Ultimate Theory, W. W. Norton, New York, 1999, pp. 97–109. What is 
particularly interesting about the double slit experiment, in the context of video, is that the 
interference pattern produced by the parallel light beams is the same kind as a moiré 
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inherent property of the object or particle under observation, but from the 
practice of observation itself: the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics 
states that measuring quantum data disturbs that data.50   
 
By deploying a sustained discussion of mise en abyme theory in relation to 
video practice, quantum and cybernetic theory, we can not only tease apart the 
problematic mirror analogy that exists across them, but also reignite a 
discussion of video in which the role of the observer is integral to the system. 
This is of particular importance in relation to the emergence of ‘home video’ 
(VHS) since, for the first time, moving image technology enabled a 
participatory mode of spectatorship.51 This is achieved on two counts: first, 
VHS can be participatory in the sense of ‘playback’, in that the viewer has 
control over the play, pause, rewind and fast-forward functions, destabilizing 
the linear time of film52; second, in Joselit’s sense of ‘feedback’, the viewer can 
readily produce, re-produce and distribute images through public access TV and 
the copying and exchanging of tapes for viewing on a home VCR. With the 
double inflexion of both ‘meaningful response’ and ‘electronic noise’, Joselit 
argues that feedback produces a space of critical reflection for considering the 
blind spots and breakdowns of moving image technology, undermining the one-
way flow of information that traditionally characterizes spectatorship. With 
feedback, you have a free-flowing, or bi-directional flow of information that has 
the potential to overcome psychic and social blockages. For Joselit, feedback 
                                                                                                                                      
interference pattern, giving video the distinctive spread of waving lines: both are beams that 
radiate out and interfere with one another at beats. The convergence of information theory and 
quantum mechanics in the context of video is thus highly serendipitous in setting up a model of 
vision in which an embodied observer is not only an intrinsic part of the system but actually 
engages with the object of perception at a level which has physical consequences on both. 
50 Quantum mechanics thus requires a relational or recursive interpretation of data, perhaps 
much in the same way that video sets up recursive temporalities and relations. On the relational 
interpretation of quantum mechanics see Fisk, Thomas ‘Relational Interpretation of the Wave 
Function and a Possible Way Around Bell’s Theorem’ in International Journal of Theoretical 
Physics, Vol. 45, 2006 (pp. 1205-1219). 
51 I am here referring to VHS since it became the most commonly used format of electronic 
tape, although it should be noted that several formats initially emerged, including Betamax on 
which Delicate Issue was filmed. For a discussion of the way in which VHS became the market 
leading format see Cusumano, Michael A. ‘Strategic Maneuvering and Mass-Market Dynamics: 
the Triumph of VHS over Beta’ in The Business History Review, special issue High-Technology 
Industries, Vol. 66, No. 1, 1992 (pp. 51-94). 
52 For a discussion of this see Tashiro, Charles ‘Home Video and Film: the Case of Who Framed 
Roger Rabbit’ in Journal of Film and Video, Vol. 48, No. 1/2, Spring-Summer 1996 (pp. 58-66) 
especially p. 64.  
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was a meaningful form of communication between two (or more) subjects that 
was also a democratic gesture, rejecting the one-way flows of information in the 
mass media.53 While Joselit has considered the notion of feedback in relation to 
artistic practice, this chapter is also concerned both with the way in which the 
concept has been deployed in wider visual cultures and how those cultures 
themselves influenced artistic practice. Specifically, by focusing merely on 
artistic practice, Joselit’s important work was perhaps unable to take into 
account the way in which gender and sexuality has shaped and been shaped by 
the technology. As well as artistic practice, there is a whole culture of amateur 
production, including home videos of weddings, birthday parties, and video 
pornography, in which VHS was used to reintegrate previously invisible 
subjects into visual economies from within the domestic sphere.54  
 
Video is Vengeance of the Vagina 
 
At the Western Front in Vancouver during the 1970s, a number of artists were 
pre-occupied with the emergence of new technologies such as video and 
satellite communications and the connected discourse of networks and systems, 
particularly in the context of how they transformed spatial and social 
organizations.55 While not every artist there used technology directly, much of 
                                                
53 Joselit’s notion of feedback was originally a reference to an eponymous section in Radical 
Software in which ‘blurbs from various video groups and individuals were crudely pasted 
together on a skewed grid.’ See Joselit, 2008, p. 222. 
54 Prior to the emergence of VHS there was a culture of amateur filmmaking and home movies 
shot on film. On this see Edmonds, Guy ‘Amateur Widescreen; or, Some Forgotten Skirmishes 
in the Battle of the Gauges’ in Film History, special issue Nontheatrical Film, Vol. 19, No. 4, 
2007 (pp. 401-4130); Erens, Patricia ‘The Galler Home Movies: a Case Study’ in Journal of 
Film and Video, special issue Home Movies and Amateur Filmmaking, Vol. 38, No. 3/4, 
Summer-Fall 1986 (pp. 15-240); Camper, Fred ‘Some Notes on the Home Movie’ in Journal of 
Film and Video, special issue Home Movies and Amateur Filmmaking, Vol. 38, No. 3/4, 
Summer-Fall 1986 (pp. 9-14). 
55 The focus on Canada and its relationship to video is particularly pertinent since in the late 
1960s and early 1970s there was an explosion of new media initiatives, and funding was made 
available for artists working in this field. For example: in 1968 the Canadian radio-television 
commission began instituting community access cable programming, signaling, for many artists, 
the possibility of a more inclusive distribution of information and cultural expression; 1961-71 
The Festival of Contemporary Arts ran annually at UBC, with a special emphasis on new media 
practices; 1967 Intermedia was founded, a Vancouver new media artist collective; 1968-70 
Intermedia collaborated with the Vancouver Art Gallery on a series of week long festivals, 
exploring the relationship between media and performance art; 1973 Matrix, an international 
video exchange conference/festival ran at the Vancouver Art Gallery, the condition of admission 
to the conference was a donation of a favourite video; Matrix then became the foundation for 
the Video In library, which ran video making workshops, mostly led by women; 1970 Report of 
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the work being produced was imbued with the (techno)logic of the network and 
a sense of inter-connectivity. As a whole, the practices coming out of the 
Western Front have been described as having a ‘network consciousness’.56 
Kate Craig’s videotape Delicate Issue (1979) (figs 2.11-2.13), which was 
produced there, perhaps started to open up some of these questions during the 
period when the technology began to enter the mainstream domestic sphere.57 
Using an extreme close-up lens, this video shows a roaming view of Craig’s 
naked body, as shot by her husband, Hank Bull, while directed by Craig from a 
monitor. The title is an allusion to the fine papery quality of the skin shot in 
close-up: delica-tissue. Both intimate in its depiction of the female body and 
domestic in its use from within the marital household, Delicate Issue questions 
the ways in which technology produces and distributes the gendered body 
across highly specific social and political spaces. Such an intimate depiction is 
both physically and conceptually possible only in the light of home video’s ties 
to the domestic sphere of the amateur. Within the space of the amateur new 
practices arose that both shaped and were shaped by video technology. The 
amateur video can be seen as domestic on two counts: the first being that it is 
produced and distributed from within non-professional sites such as the home, 
historically tied almost exclusively to the feminine; and the second being that 
the structure of the system itself alludes to domesticity through the production 
of an apparently enclosed space like the mirror box. By characterizing the 
sphere of amateur production as domestic rather than professional in this way, 
we might consider Delicate Issue as beginning to unpick the ties not only 
between social space and gender, but also gender and technology.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada published, included guidelines for 
pay equity, day care, abortion rights and equal opportunity; 1973 the Status of Women Action 
Coordinating Council of British Columbia sponsored the Women Alive Group in the production 
of a TV series broadcast on Cable Ten; 1974 Women in Focus was founded, a production centre 
that created weekly programmes on feminist issues at Cable Ten; 1980 Amelia Productions was 
founded to produce videos about women in the workplace. 
56 Arnold, Grant ‘Kate Craig: Skin’ in Kate Craig: Skin, Ex. Cat., Vancouver Art Gallery, 1998 
(pp. 1-16) pp. 2-3. 
57 In 1980 1% of U.S. households had VCRs, by the end of the decade 70% did. This was a rate 
of introduction that exceeds any other consumer communication appliance (including phones, 
record player and TV). Notably the price also changed from $1000 to $200. Many scholars 
suggest that most early purchasers of VCRs were significantly motivated to purchase the device 
to see porn at home. For example see Kleinhans, Chuck ‘The Change from Film to Video 
Pornography: Implications for Analysis’ in Pornography, Peter Lehman ed., (pp. 154-167) p. 
157. 
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Craig’s work seems to sit apart from the more prominent modes of video 
practice that have already been well explored in the literature: the work of 
Lynda Benglis, Vito Acconci, Joan Jonas, Dan Graham, and Martha Rosler, 
who concerned themselves with the problem of ‘live’ representation and the 
mirror analogy, and the troublesome political relationship between video and 
TV; or the work of Woody and Steina Vasulka, Nam June Paik and Peter 
Donebauer who investigated the technical limits of the medium, making 
abstract video art from feedback signals between camera and monitor and 
playing with image synthesizers. By contrast, Delicate Issue does not appear to 
formally reference such established video practices, and instead works with a 
visual register that has more in common with the emergent vocabularies of 
home movies, performance and body art. As such, Delicate Issue might be well 
situated amongst other practices that used video technology from within the 
home (the site of labour and production), in order to foreground women’s 
experience in this new emerging visual economy. Such videos emerged 
alongside feminist consciousness raising groups in the 1970s, and continued 
into the 1980s. For example, Carole Itter’s Happy Birthday (1972), which 
depicts a home movie type tape of her pregnant body; Catherine Elwes’ There 
is a Myth (1984) (fig 2.14), which shows images of her baby suckling and 
biting at her breast; Jayne Parker’s Almost Out (1985) (fig 2.15) in which the 
artist records her conversations with her mother; Michelle Citron’s Daughter 
Rite (1978) (fig 2.16); and Karen Ingham’s The Cutting Edge (1987), showing 
the artist engaged in various processes of depilation. 
 
What we see in such a body of work is a play with the emergent language of 
home video in artistic practice. By home video I am referring to tapes made by 
family members of one another, examples of which might commonly include 
the special family event (such as a child’s birthday or wedding), the portrait of a 
family member of the group (an auntie on her visit, or a child playing with their 
pet) and the travel movie (with or without family members).58 The home movie 
would also undoubtedly encompass the home sex tape, made by people in some 
sort of non-commercial relationship, possibly for their own personal use, 
                                                
58 These are some of the possible themes for structuring a national home movie archive, as 
proposed by Camper, pp. 9-14. 
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although this ‘genre’ is notably absent from much of the literature. In their focus 
on familial and/or sexual relationships, home videos are notably a domestic 
practice. Both the recording and viewing capabilities of tape offer a domestic 
convenience – camcorders, video rental – that perpetuates its ties to the register 
of the quotidian and the familial.59 
 
Video, and the forms of representation it gives rise to, are thus highly gendered. 
Almost all studies of home video from around this time note that it is the fathers 
who do the filming.60 In return, the women in home movies seem to strike the 
poses of classic Hollywood, appearing passive and seductive, so that they are 
actually transformed into the ideal models of femininity through the 
technological act of looking.61 Michelle Citron’s Daughter Rite and Marjorie 
Keller’s Daughters of Chaos are two works that look at the way in which home 
video is highly gendered, by using clips of home movies of themselves as 
children, shot by their fathers, in order to highlight the way in which the 
technologies that capture and record family events are themselves functions of a 
patriarchal logic of control and order in which family members play their 
designated roles.62  
 
Craig’s tape references this type of practice, since it is her husband holding the 
camera, but, like Citron or Keller, she also uses the technology to undo itself. 
While Citron and Keller both used editing to re-frame the images as a question 
concerning the relationship between father and daughter as staged through 
                                                
59 This is in contrast to film which, as Tashiro notes, is shaped both to and by the social, rather 
than the domestic. This is especially the case when film is viewed in a cinema. See Tashiro, pp. 
58-66.  
60 See Camper; Erens; Turim, Maureen ‘Childhood Memories and Household Events in the 
Feminist Avant-Garde’ in Journal of Film and Video, special issue Home Movies and Amateur 
Filmmaking, Vol. 38, No. 3/4, Summer-Fall 1986 (pp. 86-92); Nicholson, Heather Norris 
‘Seeing How It Was?: Childhood Geographies and Memories in Home Movies’ in Area, Vol. 
33, No. 2, Jun. 2001 (pp. 128-140). 
61 For a discussion of this in relation to a specific set of family home movies see Erens, pp. 22-
23.  
62 For a discussion of the work by Citron and the presence of patriarchy as exerted through the 
gaze of the home camcorder see Williams, Linda and Rich, B. Ruby ‘The Right of Re-Vision: 
Michelle Citron’s Daughter Rite’ in Film Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1, Autumn 1981 (pp. 17-22). 
For a discussion of works by female artists that have been influenced by or include home movie 
clips see also Turim. Male artists who either used home movie clips (although not necessarily 
video) or were influenced by the aesthetic language of them include Stan Brakhage and Jonas 
Mekas. 
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moving image technology, Craig watches herself on a video monitor so as to 
direct Bull: watching herself in the process of being watched. This establishes 
an interesting link with Schneemann’s Fuses, and other practices from around 
the same time such as Robert Smithson’s Swamp from 1971, in which he 
directed a ‘blind’ Nancy Holt around the swamps of the Passaic N.J., in terms of 
the way in which the male partners are credited in title sequences and the 
different roles ascribed to each (camera-man, actor, director). In this, Craig also 
uses the live playback capabilities of the handheld camera, as discussed 
previously in relation to Benglis’ Now. This was also a crucial aspect of the 
family home video, as one could watch back what had just been recorded in 
order to continually re-stage one’s appearance. Unlike film, in which the 
viewing of the home movie might be more of an event, taking place inside a 
darkened room, the home video could be viewed in a lit room and, crucially, is 
seen ‘as part of, rather than separate from, its surround.’63  
 
The home sex tape is perhaps a particularly useful example to think about in this 
respect. Not only does it record an event, which can be viewed multiple times at 
a later date, the act of filming itself is bound up in the construction of an erotic 
scenario as people simultaneously watch themselves on tape whilst having sex. 
Several scholars have noted that with the emergence of video, the home movie 
itself therefore becomes a part of, and occasionally even displaces, the event 
being recorded. As Patricia Erens has argued, while everything else in the home 
movie is ostensibly ‘real’ (there are no props, make-up or actors) there is in fact 
usually a great deal of performing for the camera so that, she writes, ‘an 
awareness of the filming process is ever present.’64 Certainly, as we will see, it 
is precisely this awareness of the filming process itself that filters through 
Craig’s tape. This ‘liveness’ is also what differentiates it from Schneemann’s 
work, in which the instant images of the artist and Tenney having sex are 
removed from the scene for processing, developing and editing at a later date: 
the recording device is present, but the representation is not.  
 
                                                
63 Camper, p. 13.  
64 Erens, p. 20. Camper also writes, ‘the movie itself, rather than the event depicted, is the real 
event.’ Camper, p. 12.  
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Although Craig was a professional artist, co-founding The Western Front in 
Vancouver in 1973, Delicate Issue seems to use the visual languages of 
amateur production in a way that recalls the historical relationship between 
marginalized female practices of image making and video. As Christine 
Tamblyn has eloquently written, 
 
Video seems ideally suited to serve as a vehicle for the 
heterogeneous discursive practices of contemporary women 
artists. Its capacity for accommodating hybrid expressive modes 
facilitates the feminist project of constructing alternatives to the 
dominant dichotomous patriarchal world-view. Modernist-
inspired attempts to identify intrinsic properties of the video 
medium failed not only because of the medium’s fluidity but 
also because technological advances are continuously altering its 
physical apparatus. By taking advantage of video’s potential to 
function as a palimpsest for the inscription of multiple 
messages, feminist video artists have forged a new hybrid of the 
genres of social documentary and portraiture.65  
 
Arguably more than any other moving image technology, video has historically 
been tied to feminist art practice on several counts: as a new medium video was 
seen to be unburdened with a critical history and pre-defined discourse66; 
because of its unusually close relationship to TV, it allowed artists to draw on 
the resonances of a technology that was premised upon the broadcast of public 
information into the private sphere of the home, and the role of that technology 
in the construction of the subject67; finally, it was cheap and easy to use, 
                                                
65 Tamblyn, Christine ‘Significant Others: Social Documentary as Personal Portraiture in 
Women’s Video of the 1980s’ in Illuminating Video: An Essential Guide to Video Art, Hall, D. 
& Fifer, S. J. eds., Aperture, San Francisco, 1992 (pp. 405-417) p.417. The participatory 
capabilities of video have been used as part of a feminist project of looking in a range of 
disciplines, for example see Kindon, Sara ‘Participatory Video in Geographic Research: a 
Feminist Practice of Looking?’ in Area, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2003 (pp. 142-153). 
66 For a discussion of this see David A. Ross quoted in Meigh-Andrews, p. 8. See also Roy, 
Marina ‘Corporeal Returns: Feminism and Phenomenology in Vancouver Video and 
Performance 1968-83’ in Canadian Art, Summer 2001 (pp. 58-65) p. 61. 
67 See Tamblyn, p. 406, 417. See also Martha Gever quoted in Meigh-Andrews, p. 241.  
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precisely what initially drew the artists of the Western Front to it.68 Certainly, 
Craig’s tape seems to use the low-tech production values associated with 
amateur works, such as long unedited takes, minimal camera angles or 
movements, and a reliance on sync sound and autofocus, that Tamblyn has 
suggested characterized the feminist video art movement.69 Indeed, the apparent 
lack of technical dexterity required to complete Delicate Issue was commented 
on in a review of her 1998 retrospective Skin at Vancouver Art Gallery.70 In that 
it exhibits technically low production values, the tape again aligns itself with the 
home video, in which one of the distinguishing features most commonly 
remarked upon in the literature is the inclusion of mistakes.71 In the tape, the 
white balance has not been set, causing a greenish tinge to permeate much of 
the film as the camera attempts to adjust to the tungsten of light bulbs (the tape 
having been made indoors under artificial light), images move in and out of 
focus giving the screen a milky opaque appearance, and the camerawork is 
frequently jerky, rattling the images around in the frame. 
 
Of course, to suggest that feminist art practice relied on low-tech values clearly 
runs the risk of reinscribing long standing beliefs about women’s ability to 
engage with technology in a sophisticated manner. While this is an argument 
that is no doubt effectively countered by a work of visual and technical 
complexity such as Benglis’ Now, or indeed almost any of Steina Vasulka’s 
videos, but perhaps especially Progeny (1981), the use of the technology 
throughout the 1970s did lend itself to practices that were fundamentally 
                                                
68 Arnold, p. 3. For a contemporary document listing the cost of VHS tape and a VCR machine 
see Pepper, Larry ‘Mediatmosphere: Home Videocassette Recorders: the Ever-Changing State 
of the Art’ in American Libraries, Vol. 10, No. 10, Nov. 1979 (pp. 622-624). Note also that low 
costs were considered to be at the heart of video’s appeal for women artists. In her discussion of 
why women artists were so heavily restricted by issues such as cost, Martha Gever has written, 
‘The collective economic status of women in the USA has barely improved in this period (70s-
80s) in spite of increased participation by women in the waged and salaried work force.’ Gever, 
Martha ‘The Feminism Factor: Video and its Relation to Feminism’ in Hall, D. & Fifer, S. J. 
eds., (pp. 226-241).  
69 Tamblyn, p. 406.  
70 Robin Laurence has written, ‘Craig is not hugely interesting as a video artist. She has not 
been particularly innovative in her use of the medium, nor particularly skilled technically. Until 
she finally came into her own with Mary Lou in 1989…Craig’s early videos reveal a rather 
shaky grasp of the possibilities of the then-young medium, and a crude understanding of its 
challenge to and engagement with visual and narrative traditions.’ Laurence, Robin ‘Skin deep 
video’ in Border Crossings, May 1998 (pp. 57-59) p. 58.  
71 Erens, p. 17; Camper, p. 11. 
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deskilled. This was a widely accepted phenomenon, as a journalist reported in 
1985, ‘the first generation to grow up watching television could make television 
themselves. You didn’t need a studio any longer, just a Portapak and something 
to aim it at.’72 Therefore, to expand on Tamblyn’s work, I would specify that 
the turn in feminist practice towards using moving image technologies that 
required little technical skill was perhaps borne more from economic and social 
considerations rather than biological essentialist ones, so as not to run the risk of 
further denying women access to the realm of material production. 
 
What is weaving through all of this is a connection between video and the 
domestic sphere, both in the way in which video produces enclosed systems of 
psychic reflection, as I have discussed in relation to Lynda Benglis’ work, as 
well as shifting the modes of production and distribution into the home. All that 
was needed was a camera, a monitor and two VCRs and you essentially had a 
home editing suite. Indeed, much feminist performance video was produced in 
an intimate setting such as the home, as in the work of Kate Craig or Lynda 
Benglis, or in the artist’s studio, as in the work of Joan Jonas. Again, while re-
iterating the links between video and the home runs the risk of further tying 
women to domestic forms of labour, the portability of the camera certainly 
allowed individuals to become image-makers who otherwise would not have 
had access to the technology and skills to do so, and we must acknowledge the 
historical importance of this innovation. Shigeko Kubota’s Video Poem (1968-
76) is an interesting document relating to the ways in which issues of cost and 
portability were central to feminist practices of image making during that 
period: 
 
I travel alone with my Portapak on my back, as Vietnamese 
women do with their babies 
I like video because it is heavy. 
Portapak and I traveled over Europe, Navajo land, and Japan 
without male accompany [sic] 
Portapak tears down my shoulder, backbone and waist. 
                                                
72 Johnson, Eve ‘Artvid’, The Sun, March 9, 1985. 
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I feel like a soviet woman, working on the Siberian railway. I 
made a videotape called ‘Europe on half an inch a day’ instead 
of a popular travel book ‘Europe on five dollars a day’… 
Behind the video life 
Man thinks ‘I think therefore I am’ 
I, a woman, feel ‘I bleed therefore I am’ 
Recently I bled in half-inch…3M or SONY…ten thousand feet 
every month. Man shoots me every night…I can’t resist. 
I shoot him back at broad daylight with vidicon or tivicon 
flaming in overexposure. 
Video is Vengeance of the Vagina 
Video is Victory of the Vagina 
Video is Venereal disease of intellectuals 
Video is Vacant apartment 
Viva Video…73 
 
Like Kubota’s poem, Delicate Issue seems to explore some of the relationships 
between video, the gendering of vision and/or the spaces of image production, 
and the ways in which technology has been implicated in that gendering. 
Craig’s videotape used the vocabulary of amateur production to reference the 
history of women’s image-making practices and perform their relationship to 
emergent technologies. Delicate Issue foregrounds the role of video technology 
in the construction of gendered subjects by presenting the body at the limits of 
representation and at the limits of its technical capacity. 
 
The tape shows an extremely detailed view of the body at an almost 
microscopic level, described by one reviewer as an ‘excruciatingly close up 
examination of Craig’s entire naked body – all the pores, blemishes and details 
of her skin are magnified.’74 The framing is so tight that the body never resolves 
itself into a coherent self/image but rather is presented as an undulating surface 
of skin and hairs punctuated with isolated, but recognizable, features: an eye, a 
                                                
73 Shigeko Kubota quoted in Schneider, I. & Corot, B. eds. Of note is that Kubota was married 
to Nam June Paik, famously held up as a pioneer of video art practice, and discussed widely in 
literature that makes negligible reference to the gendering of the technology. 
74 Thom, Ian ‘A Study of Surface’ in Blackflash, Summer 1998, Vol. 16, No. 1 (pp. 22-25). 
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nipple, the clitoris. All of which seem notably wet and fleshy in the midst of the 
vast expanses of skin. This view, clearly, is too close for comfort.75 Craig 
herself has said ‘I’m not surprised that people are compelled by it, what 
surprises me is that people are so afraid of it’, both in terms of the radical 
presentation of the naked body and also in the use of a medium like video as an 
artistic practice.76  
 
In this close up view, there is a sense in which the camera defeats its own logic: 
it produces an image that wants to show so much, and in such great detail, that it 
only ever obscures vision by becoming exponentially myopic, providing an 
unrecognizable account of the body and its experiences. The tape dramatizes the 
way in which the video camera seems to come up against the skin like a barrier, 
and yet is frustrated in its quest for exposure. As the voiceover to the images 
asks:  
 
How close can the camera be?   
How close do I want to be?   
How close do you want to be?   
How real do you want me to be?   
How much do you want?   
How much do I want from you?77  
 
Many texts note this paradoxical phenomenon in Craig’s work, asking whether 
intimacy might actually ‘blur or obliterate the object of the gaze’78, and 
questioning the appropriate distance for looking in the production of desire. 
While Craig herself has suggested that perhaps the work is less about the 
mechanics of voyeurism and the trespass of a desiring gaze, and more about the 
dynamics occurring between body, camera, monitor and viewer, there is a very 
real sense in which the technology can only be foregrounded precisely because 
                                                
75 Arnold, p. 11. 
76 Craig quoted in Laurence ‘Getting under Kate Craig’s skin’ in Front, special issue Kate Craig 
Memorial Issue, Vol. XIII, No. 5, Nov./Dec. 2002. 
77 Kate Craig (1979, Betacam video, 12mins, colour, sound). 
78 Gingras, Nicole Shifts and Transfers: on Some Tendencies in Canadian Video, ex. pamphlet, 
Galerie d’Art d’Ottawa, 2003. See also Arnold, p. 11. 
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of the limits that it puts on the gaze.79 As curator Nicole Gingras has concisely 
noted, echoing my earlier discussion of Schneemann’s Fuses, ‘skin imposes 
limits on the gaze, just as it invites the gaze to brush against it; it serves as a 
screen and it is also a screen. It therefore sets a limit.’80 What is different in 
Craig’s work, however, is that whereas the film stock in Fuses turned itself into 
a highly tactile point of encounter, ultimately merging with the skins of 
Schneemann and Tenney and the fur of Kitch, the screen in Delicate Issue does 
not appear to facilitate a haptic mode of encounter. The screen certainly 
references the skin of Craig’s body, but only in so far as skin might act a limit 
or a barrier. Neither the screen/skin nor the image/skin are tactile in the way 
developed in Fuses, and instead reflect the gaze of the observer rather than 
drawing them into an erotic complicity. This is largely because VHS simply did 
not allow for the manipulation of the image or the surface of the work that film 
did. Essentially all that was available was cutting, splicing, looping and some 
visual effects such as solarisation. As such, the screen/skin in Delicate Issue 
functions much like the static interference that spreads across the screen in 
Benglis’ Now: both works consciously and provocatively play on the tension 
between drawing the observer in to a system of images and positioning them 
outside or separating them from it. The question of presence is always at stake. 
 
What is perhaps interesting about configuring the screen as a limit point whose 
surface runs both physically and conceptually parallel with the limit point of 
skin, is the way in which, as a barrier, these screens paradoxically then drive a 
sort of desiring gaze. They operate in a frustrated visual economy, as there is a 
palpable sense in which the camera wants to show more but is unable to do so. 
As Lynda Nead observed in her important 1992 study of the female nude in the 
context of obscenity and sexuality:  
 
In many ways, pornography can be seen to reenact continually 
the boundary dividing visibility and invisibility. In each repeated 
attempt to ‘show’ the truth of female sexuality, pornography 
inevitably reinstates the impossibility of this project. In its 
                                                
79 Laurence, 2002.  
80 Gingras ‘The Movement of Things’ in Kate Craig: Skin, Ex. Cat. (pp. 17-29). 
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endless quest for clarity, objectivity and disclosure, it endlessly 
reinvokes that alternative, anxious sense of the female body as 
dark, mysterious and formless. As it seeks to render the female 
body knowable and possessable, so it calls up the frightening 
possibility that it is beyond knowledge or absolute possession.81  
 
At one point, in a remarkable passage of Delicate Issue, the video camera 
actually looks like it has penetrated Craig’s vagina, as we see her cervix on the 
screen. The images are clearly internal: pink, wet, soft, open, almost surface-
less in contrast to the never-ending surface of the skin. The imagined proximity 
of the genitals to a video camera in this passage seems aggressive, underwriting 
the suggestion that the politics of looking are often violent and traumatic. The 
camera has penetrated the body in its quest for the ultimate ‘close up’.  
 
In the following chapter, I look at Mona Hatoum’s installation Corps Étranger 
(1994), a work that looks like a striking return to Craig’s questioning of 
technologies of vision, but in the context of medical imaging. This later work 
almost seems to yield to that logic of wanting to see ever deeper below the 
surfaces of the body, as Hatoum sends an endoscope through the interior 
gastrointestinal tracts and reproductive passages of her body. These two works 
were exhibited next to each other at the exhibition Close Up: Proximity and 
Defamiliarisation in Art, Film and Photography, which ran at the Fruitmarket 
Gallery, Edinburgh between October 2008 and January 2009. Notably, this 
exhibition also featured Carolee Schneemann’s photographic work Portrait 
Partials (1970) in which isolated features of the body – eyes, nose, nipple, anus 
– are arranged on a grid.82 What is useful in staging a brief encounter between 
these works is that it exposes the way in which the development of 
technological vision has historically been driven by a desire to probe below 
surfaces, to dissect and view everything in microscopic detail. In this, Delicate 
Issue has much in common, not only with Corps Étranger, but also other video 
                                                
81 Nead, Lynda The Female Nude: Art, Obscenity and Sexuality, Routledge London and New 
York, 1992 p. 99. 
82 Other connections between these two artists include a period in 1988 when Craig and Hatoum 
work together, and Craig’s retrospective Skin exhibition at the Vancouver Art Gallery in 1998 
exhibited the works So Much I Want to Say (1983) and Measures of Distance (1987) by 
Hatoum.  
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works such as Martha Rosler’s Vital Statistics of a Citizen, Simply Obtained 
(1977) (fig 2.17), Lisa Steele’s Birthday Suit: Scars and Defects (1974) (fig 
2.18), Elizabeth Chitty’s Telling Tales (1979) and Marianne Heske’s 
Phrenological Self-Portrait (1976) (fig 2.19) in which the female body is staged 
simultaneously as an object of scrutiny and an object of desire. 
 
This type of ‘close-up’ looking circulates in practices that are medical, artistic 
and also pornographic. Although I will return to the mechanics of the inter-
relationships between these three fields more fully in the following chapter, it is 
worth bringing in this thread now in order to situate my discussion of 
technology and explicit representation within a conceptual framework of vision 
that has many offshoots. Linda Williams’ foundational study of pornography, 
Hard Core (1991), forcefully laid claim to this intertwining of different 
technologies of vision in her model of the ‘optimisation of visibility’. This 
distinguishes hard- and softcore pornography in that hardcore, for Williams, 
uses a variety of strategies including pose, camera position and lighting to 
ensure maximum visibility of the female genitals, in order to account for and 
make up for the anatomical invisibility of the female orgasm.83 As such, 
pornography thus references numerous visual economies, most notably medical, 
which seek to chart the terrain of the mysterious female body. As Williams has 
written, linking pornography to medical imaging technologies, ‘what is at issue 
[with pornography] is not the appearance of the first hard-core films, but instead 
an earlier moment when scientists first subjected the body’s own movement to 
the mechanical eye of a camera that saw better than the human eye.’84  
 
The question of how technology produces desire is, of course, central to Delicate 
Issue. Craig’s use of video to generate explicit imagery is crucial in that it 
references a variety of material practices, notably gynaecological imagery, 
pornography and home movies (and pornographic home movies), which have 
themselves been radically altered by the emergence of video technology. In his 
article ‘Pornography, videotape and the internet’ (2000), Jonathan Coopersmith 
                                                
83 Nead, p. 98. 
84 Williams, Linda Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the “Frenzy of the Visible”, Pandora, 
London, 1991, p. 37.  
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argues that not only did the emergence of home video affect pornography in 
terms of its content, modes of production and distribution but that, in a cycle of 
mutual co-constitution, pornography itself actually aided the widespread 
diffusion and subsequent development of the technology. As people were 
prepared to invest in the equipment at an initial stage of its development, when 
prices were still high, predominantly for the purpose of producing and watching 
pornography from within the home, more funds were thus made available for 
research and development, enabling prices to come down and make the 
technology more affordable to all.85 The evidence that Coopersmith gives for the 
mutual expansion of porn and video is, paradoxically, the relative shrinking of 
pornography’s market share of VHS sales. In the late 1970s porn tapes 
represented over half of all VHS sales but by the mid 1980s it had fallen to 
between 10-25%, and 13% in 1995. ‘This was not’, argues Coopersmith, 
‘because porn demand had dropped but because the VHS market had grown.’86 
The large number of porn sales made during its early history drove the 
expansion of the VHS market. 
 
There were practical reasons which aided this mutual expansion: VCRs 
encouraged the growth in porn audiences because it increased privacy in both 
production and consumption; people could make their own porn (either for 
themselves or for distribution) as it didn’t require external developers for the 
film, eliminating the distinction between producer and consumer; videotape was 
also faster and easier to edit and reproduce; finally, as we have already seen, it 
was cheap and easy to use.87 Crucially, as with feminist art practice, the new 
parameters of cost and skill in image making allowed an amateur market to 
flourish in which, by 1991, DIY or amateur porn represented 30% of the entire 
industry. By looking to the technical histories with which early video is 
                                                
85 Coopersmith, Jonathan ‘Pornography, Videotape and the Internet’ in IEEE Technology and 
Society Magazine, Spring 2000 (pp. 27-34) p. 28. 
86 Ibid., p. 29. 
87 In the 1990s a budgeting rule of thumb assumed two video features could be made for about 
$15,000 and that involved a two-day shoot. (Kleinhans, p. 156). The production costs associated 
with amateur video were also considerably less, producing a price difference that was passed 
onto the consumer. In the early 1990s, the average price of an amateur pornographic videotape 
was around $15 compared to a $25 film. (Coopersmith p. 30). Because video was cheap, it was 
also frequently seen as inferior, resulting in pornographic movies tending to specify if they had 
been shot ‘on film’ so as to lend credibility to the production, such as the work of Andrew 
Blake. See also Kleinhans, p. 155.  
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associated we see an interesting overlap in what might initially appear as 
conflicting positions: the amateur pornographer and the feminist artist, both 
turning to the medium because it offered some control over the means of 
production in which one could work directly with their own self/image so that 
actors became directors. 
 
One of the reasons why video pornography was so popular was that, as with 
artistic practice, the new medium allowed for new forms of representation. The 
concept of the amateur – someone who does it for ‘love’ – brought with it 
allusions to willing self-participation, self-production by participants free from 
pimps and studios, and the ‘accessible’ girl next door paradigm. These, of 
course, all represent new, often veiled, forms of oppression in visual culture 
and, since the arena of production and distribution moved out of the 
mainstream, video also enabled illegal pornographic practices (such as bestiality 
and paedophilia). Niche tastes were well suited to the emergent field of amateur 
pornography.88 Video thus simultaneously generated new forms of 
representation and new forms of oppression. Craig’s tape, of course, is set in 
precisely this kind of domestic space of production, and it is a man turning the 
camera to the naked body of a woman, but Craig directs the video.  
 
Chuck Kleinhans’ work on the shift from film to video pornography is useful in 
describing the ways in which the modes of production and reception are bound 
up with the capabilities of the medium itself.89 The lower budgets and thus 
shorter shoot times associated with video resulted in fewer rehearsals for the 
                                                
88 Subsequently, by 1987, there were only about 250 cinemas showing film pornography. In 
1987 the x-rated rental market was at 100,000,000 (this was the same number of rentals as 
admissions to porn cinemas four years earlier). See Kleinhans p. 157. 
89 Previous work has noted the way in which different media give rise to different forms of 
pornographic representation. A noted example is Nead’s discussion of photography and 
pornography. She writes, ‘If pornography is popularly held to represent sex devoid of human 
feeling, then equally it is seen to be produced by means that are mechanical and dehumanized. 
We might expect, therefore, that the difficult or borderline cases will be those that blur the 
distinguishing characteristics of art and pornography, those that confuse the media, locations 
and audiences associated with these cultural categories. A memorandum from 1970 to the 
Obscene Publications Squad lists a number of instances where there might be some difficulty in 
categorizing material, including “displays in recognized galleries and books expensively 
published”… In its legal and criminal classification, pornography tends to be defined in terms of 
being mass-produced, cheap and new. This understanding could only be formulated against a 
conception of art as unique, valuable (priceless) and marked with the aura of age.’ (Nead, pp. 
94-95). 
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actors and shorter scripts to memorise. That the camera could be hand-held and 
record sync sound also led to the advent of gonzo porn, presented in 
documentary style, in which a male star/director tapes episodes with amateur 
female talent.90 The centre of the pornographic industry moved from NYC to 
LA, and in particular the San Fernando Valley, which was an area where 
pornography could not legally be shot out of doors, leading to an increase in the 
use of interior locations, underwriting the already established links between 
video, pornography and the domestic sphere.91  
 
While Kleinhans has noted that such technical, legal or financial constraints 
made the narrative aesthetic of the porn film move ‘backwards’ towards early 
stag films, premised on fractured episodic series rather than feature-length 
narrative, he does not consider the ways in which the capabilities of the 
technology itself impacted on the production of sexual tastes. For example, the 
increased popularity of amateur films, originally a result of financial 
considerations, can arguably be seen to have actively produced the sexual tastes 
of a generation brought up on this style of pornography. Similarly, he has 
argued that the rise in pornographic home video was concurrent with ‘a new 
wave in sexual image censorship, changes in sexual practices and ideologies 
due to the AIDS crisis and increased public visibility of previously stigmatized 
sexuality such as BDSM.’92 However, he considers them to be mutually 
occurring events rather than perhaps mutually constitutive. An examination of 
the forms of explicit representation at this time is absolutely fundamental, 
however, since, with the shift in the 1970s in films being regulated by a 
Production Code to a ratings system, there was a marked increase in the number 
of mainstream films being produced containing images of sexual violence.93 
 
                                                
90 Producer stars such as Ed Powers, John ‘Buttman’ Stagliano and Ben Dover have 
recognizable serial product lines in this field. 
91 The pornographic industry moved to LA following the Traci Lords affair, in which a porn 
actress, Lords, was exposed as being underage, causing thousands of tapes to be recalled, re-
shot, or destroyed on the grounds of trafficking in child pornography. 
92 Kleinhans, p. 154. 
93 See Projansky, Sarah ‘The Elusive/Ubiquitous Representation of Rape: a Historical Survey of 
Rape in U.S. Film, 1903-1972’ in Cinema Journal, Vol. 41, No. 1, Autumn, 2001 (pp. 63-90). 
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What is surprising, therefore, is the lack of critical response from artists within 
this context. There is a strange silence concerning the mutual histories of home 
VHS and amateur pornography in artistic practice from this time. While artists, 
such as Joan Jonas, did play with gender stereotyping in highly nuanced 
accounts of the construction of the female body using different representational 
technologies, very few question the role of the technology in the production of a 
sexualized subjectivity. What is important in Craig’s work is that Delicate Issue 
references this logic of technological vision, using the camera to produce an 
analytic study of her body, while simultaneously overturning that logic by 
obscuring vision, and thus challenging an identificatory or desiring gaze. It 
would perhaps be counterintuitive to situate Craig’s work within a reading of 
pornography, a genre whose dominant critical reception has focused on the 
problems of the representation of women in perpetuating uneven gender power 
relations.94 Indeed, ‘sexual representation’ is not necessarily synonymous with 
‘pornography’. However, Craig uses sexual representation not to produce a 
pornographic tape, nor even a particularly erotic one, but she does use the 
language of pornographic vision – the gaze that wants to show as much as 
possible – and the video technology that has been complicit in producing and 
perpetuating this language in the mainstream, in her challenge to the practices 
of looking at women. 
 
In Delicate Issue, as we have seen, representation actually seems to stop itself 
short, as the practice of showing the body as closely as possible simply obscures 
it. This challenge to vision is perhaps most explicitly mounted in the voiceover, 
which poses questions to the viewer about the construction of ideal modes of 
looking. But, as Grant Arnold has noted, ‘the camera goes on looking without 
regard to the viewer’s response’, thus shutting down any dialogue between 
image and observer, and establishing ‘an uneasy oscillation between a sense of 
control and powerlessness in the relationship between image, desire and 
technology.’95 Both the voiceover and the image seem to address the viewer, but 
there is a lapse both between them and also between the image and the observer. 
The voice does not listen and, with the image, perspective is rejected in favour 
                                                
94 On this, see especially the work of Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon. 
95 Arnold, p. 11. 
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of an extreme accumulation of detail that fragments and dismantles the subject. 
In some ways, the voiceover is like a framing, or rather a re-framing of the 
image, inserting it into a context that makes the act of looking political, 
analytical and critical. As a frame, the voiceover perhaps functions much like a 
passé partout, or matte, which frames an image within a frame. This device was 
of interest to Craig, as she uses it in her later work Mary Lou (1989), and is also 
particularly important in the context of video art since it resonates with the 
notion of mise en abyme. Delicate Issue knowingly displaces vision by 
simultaneously engaging with and then rejecting the observer.  
 
The tape is therefore an interesting articulation of the way in which technology 
is complicit in producing certain modes of looking in which desire and sexuality 
is foregrounded, but also the way in which technology itself might mount a 
challenge to problematic tropes of representation, by offering alternative forms, 
forcing the observer into committing to a political act of looking and troubling 
the identification of the body of the observer with the image through a mediated 
type of looking. Rather than reinstating the link between the close up and 
sexualized imagery, therefore, Delicate Issue seems to use the rhetoric of the 
close up in order to actually de-eroticize the image. Arnold’s comment that the 
work is simply ‘too close for comfort’ is absolutely at the root of this de-
eroticization.96 Likewise, a contemporary reviewer seems to find repulsion and 
claustrophobia in the work: 
 
Delicate Issue’s close reading of Craig’s body seems to leave a 
trail of scopophilia behind it, like a snail’s glistening track of 
slime. Craig is present through her skin, moles, pores, nipples, 
eyelids, underarm hair, fingertips, pubic hair, labia, clitoris and 
vagina, shot in extreme and often distorting close up…Bull is 
present through the camera lens – a relentless eyeball – and his 
heavy breathing on the soundtrack. The laboured breathing does 
not sound like sexual arousal, it sounds like much-magnified 
                                                
96 Ibid., p. 11.  
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inhalations and expirations of someone on a life support 
machine.97 
 
Although the issue of gender and sexuality has been almost entirely neglected in 
the literature on video, the medium clearly offered a new vocabulary of 
representation. Indeed, in a rare discussion of how video technology itself is tied 
to feminist practices, and specifically in relation to Delicate Issue, the artist Nell 
Tenhaaf, whom I discuss in the last chapter of this thesis, argues that video 
actually opens up a space for the feminine in electronic media practices, 
contesting female invisibility in the discourses of technology.  
 
Using Luce Irigaray’s theory of the speculum alongside particle physics, 
Tenhaaf demonstrates the way in which video technology might provide a new 
tool for looking at women.98 In a CRT monitor (now obsolete as a result of the 
emergence of LCD screens) electron beams hit a concave surface coated with 
phosphor. A description of the technological processes sound like an 
insemination metaphor: the negatively charged beam starts in an electron gun at 
the back of the tube and is accelerated down a long neck toward the concave 
tube face by a large positive voltage. The phosphor glows and produces light: 
the images that we see on the screen. As we have already discussed in relation 
to both mise en abyme and cybernetic theories of feedback incorporating an 
observer, particle physics seems to demonstrate that the wave-like and particle-
like behaviour of light are direct results of our interaction with it, even as an 
apparently detached observer. Tenhaaf therefore argues that looking at light in 
display patterns is thus a confirmation of spectator subjecthood. ‘But’, she 
writes, ‘in one of the paradoxes of quantum mechanics, it is a subjecthood 
confirmed by computation from probability waves that describe only a tendency 
to a pattern. Unfixed subjectivity is the embracing condition of our late 
                                                
97 Laurence, 1998 p. 58. 
98 For an important discussion of the relationship between feminism and quantum physics more 
generally, see Barad, Karen Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2007, 
especially chapter 5 ‘Getting Real: Technoscientific Practices and the Materialisation of 
Reality’ (pp. 189-222). 
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twentieth century technologised world.’99 The subjecthood that the spectator 
may confer upon him- or herself through observation is thus always emergent 
and unfixed, echoing perhaps Irigaray’s plural model of feminine autoerotic 
(but not narcissistic) sexuality, produced by the constant touching of the labia, 
as discussed in my previous chapter on Schneemann. As such, Tenhaaf suggests 
that video is a rejection of the ‘fixed, framed systematicity’ that characterizes 
masculine models of technologies, traditionally associated with militaristic or 
instrumental applications, as described variously by Donna Haraway and Martin 
Heidegger.100 For Tenhaaf, it is precisely the shift towards electronic forms of 
representation that allows artists to operate outside of a critical framework 
dominated by theories of uneven power relations: 
 
The TV monitor can be read as other than a bachelor machine 
because it isn’t a mechanical model but an electronic one. 
Rather than a set of moving parts that go round and round 
perpetually, it is an instantaneous and ephemeral event, a burst 
of electrons like a Promethean lightning bolt from within the 
monitor. The double-sided mirror of the monitor screen focuses 
light on one side and on the other emits light as it reflects an 
image. Superseding the mirror effect (the constitution of the 
spectator as a desiring subject, or the cinematic experience) and 
the look (the male gaze situating the subject within the 
dominance of the phallic), even before representation itself 
(establishing the symbolic order of the phallus), the monitor 
produces an effect of pure light. The bias of technological 
progress persuades us to think of video display as post-
cinematic, but it might also be seen to correspond to a much 
                                                
99 Tenhaaf, Nell ‘Of Monitors and Men and Other Unsolved Feminist Mysteries: Video 
Technology and the Feminine’ in Critical Issues in Electronic Media, Penney, S. ed., State 
University of New York Press, NYC, 1995 (pp. 219-234) p. 227. 
100 See Haraway, Donna ‘A cyborg manifesto: science, technology, and socialist-feminism in 
the late twentieth century’ in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, 
Routledge, London and New York, 1991 (pp. 149-181); and Heidegger, Martin ‘The Question 
Concerning Technology’ in Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger, Krell, D. F. ed., Harper Collins, 
San Francisco, 1994 (pp. 283-318). 
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more primary, generative event: coming into light out of 
darkness.101 
 
While I am wary of the enlightenment rhetoric at the end of the passage here, 
and its ties to platonic theories of vision and knowledge and the metaphor of the 
cave, the suggestion that the actual way in which the technology works might 
challenge traditional models of spectatorship is interesting and productive. 
Tenhaaf here both continues Krauss’ mirror analogy by using Irigaray’s 
speculum and describing the video monitor as a double-sided mirror – although 
arguably she looks to Irigaray’s concave speculum mirror in opposition to the 
flat mirror of Lacanian subjectivity, to which I shall return in my discussion of 
Hatoum – but also begins to subvert it by suggesting that the video monitor 
actually exceeds the analogy in its construction of the spectator as only ever 
being a desiring subject, and as the only desiring subject in any given system, a 
model which has historically refused the sexuality of the body/image itself.102 
While film requires a screen, and a subject, to be projected onto, the video 
image emerges from behind the screen. Perhaps as a double-sided mirror, the 
video screen offers room for a two-way reflection that might free the 
(traditionally) female body/image from its status as a reflection to be looked 
upon. 
 
Perhaps the intermingling of technology and the forms of representation that it 
gives rise to is where video might establish its foothold as a critical tool in 
feminist art practice. Using not just the language of video pornography, but the 
language of the amateur and the language of home movies (both erotic and 
domestic or quotidian), Delicate Issue positions itself as a historical focal point 
in new types of image making and/or looking. Video’s unique early position as 
a technology that allowed for simultaneously performing with or to one’s 
self/image, as in both Delicate Issue and Benglis’ Now, enabled it to integrate 
                                                
101 Tenhaaf, p. 226. 
102 The relationship between the video monitor, the mirror and strategies for looking at women, 
which Tenhaaf reads through Irigaray, might also be developed with reference to the mirror of 
gynaecological self-examination. The mirror was a key tool in consciousness raising groups of 
the 1970s, and referred to in Joan Jonas’ performance work Mirror Check (1970), which is also 
then seen in the opening sequence to the video performance piece Organic Honey’s Vertical 
Roll (1973-1979).  
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the body of the artist or the observer into a visual system. This system was 
highly self-referential, offering the means for its own critical analysis, re-
framing technological vision as a political practice of highly mediated 
relationships between bodies and between bodies and their images. 
 
By looking to other video practices, such as the emergence of home movies 
(whether erotic or not), we might also potentially re-evaluate the terms in which 
certain types of explicit representation are understood, without overturning the 
invaluable work done by numerous scholars in challenging the deeply 
problematic representations of women in pornography, which have widespread 
social, political and legal implications. In so doing, following the work of Laura 
Kipnis, I hope to make a case not for pornography, but toward a serious 
consideration of its critical potential: 
 
It seems quite impossible to think of pornography as a form of 
culture or as a mode of politics. There’s zero discussion of 
pornography as an expressive medium in the positive sense – the 
only expressing its presumed to do is of misogyny or social 
decay… Porn can be both a legitimate form of culture and a 
fictional, fantastical even allegorical realm; it neither reflects the 
real world nor is it some hypnotizing call to action. The world of 
pornography is mythological and hyperbolic, peopled by 
characters. It doesn’t and never will exist, but it does – and this 
is part of its politics – insist on a sanctioned space for fantasy.103 
  
Kipnis suggests that the critical promise of pornography lies in its ability to 
perform as a counter to dominant models of sexualities and bodies. This claim is 
both a serious challenge to innumerable feminist practices that actively reject 
pornography, on the grounds that it is precisely the site at which dominant 
models of sexuality are formed, but is also a potentially liberatory prospect. 
Like Fuses, Delicate Issue uses the visual languages of explicitly (in these cases 
hetero-) sexualised representation set within an intimate, quotidian conceptual 
                                                
103 Kipnis, Laura ‘How to Look at Pornography’ in Lehman, P. ed., (pp. 118-132) p. 119. 
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space. But Delicate Issue also deploys explicit representation to address the 
complicity of video technology in constructing those sexualities, and constantly 
questions its own logic: it foregrounds the fact that histories of sexuality have 
both determined, and been determined by, technological practices of image-
making. The work references some of the technical and visual economies of 
pornography, and particularly the language of the home movie, in the way it 
establishes a desired and desiring subject, even while it undoes any ready 
identificatory processes and questions the very act of looking itself. Perhaps a 
work such as Delicate Issue could be conceived as the type of practice that 
Kipnis calls for: a work that is critical and knowing in its use of the visual 
histories it employs and yet simultaneously draws on those histories in the 
production of a tape that is delicate and intimate, both performing and 














The part-body and body parts 
 
1952: A psychology experiment reports that ‘out of ten persons, all in perfect 
health, only one on the average recognizes his hands out of a small series of 
photos of which they were told that it would contain a likeness… Our own hand, 
foot, face, etc., may become curiously strange to us, when we begin to regard 
the parts of our body attentively, begin to “study” them. Whereas our body is 
unalienably ours, we do not “recognize” it, when we come to face it in some 
way or other.’1 
 
After being extruded through the system of photographic representation, the 
body has here become ‘strange’. Perhaps it is because the body part has become 
a part-object, as the sort of close observation that is enabled by photography has 
caused that part to become detached from the whole: the hand in question now 
takes on a life of its own.2 As with other technologies or techniques which 
represent the body, photography is deeply concerned with focus. That is to say, 
it is a practice that involves making decisions about the cutting and cropping of 
the body as part of its conversion into image. It is a practice in which the 
excision or omission of some parts is as critical a decision as the inclusion of 
others. The process of re-presentation that the body has undergone thus causes 
                                                
1 Wolff, quoted in Van Den Berg, J. H. ‘The Human Body and the Significance of Human 
Movement: A Phenomenological Study’ in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 
13, No. 2, Dec., 1952 (pp. 159-183) p. 169. 
2 For a discussion of part objects, see Melanie Klein’s work on object relations in ‘The Origins 
of Transference’ in The Selected Melanie Klein, Mitchell, J. ed., Penguin, London, 1991 (pp. 
201-210) esp. pp. 202-210.  
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the part-object to become a free-floating signifier, disconnected from the 
proprioceptive sense of ‘being in’ a body that traditionally underwrites 
phenomenological experience. In such instances, the affect of technology is the 
production of a relationship between body and image that is based upon 
strangeness or alienation.  
 
While painting, drawing and printmaking are also capable of such ellipsis, 
photography draws on its capabilities for verisimilitude, and its associations 
with an indexical likeness to the object that it represents, in order to actually 
foreground strangeness, but paradoxically through its very similarity. Just as 
Early Modern anatomical studies and treatises were, at least in part, driven by a 
quest for this verisimilitude, and archeiropoieta (i.e. not made by the human 
hand), such as the Turin Shroud or the Veil of Veronica, supposedly have an 
indexical relationship to the object, so too does the photograph here present a 
case for foregrounding a splitting or difference between self and image that is 
ultimately founded on likeness, or might even itself be seen as a producer of 
archeiropoeita. Yet, perhaps there is something about the camera itself – the 
technological eye – that does something novel to the representation of the body 
in terms of this splitting. In the first instance, there is a rather unusual link 
between the photographic image and the part-body, exemplified by the fact that 
the French word opérateur has the double meaning of both ‘surgeon’ and 
‘camera person’. The link that this word introduces between these two 
professions is not only about the process of cutting and cropping described 
above, but also the way in which the eye of the surgeon necessarily performs a 
type of looking that operates below the surface of things, a way of getting inside 
the body/self that can be carried over into the photographic image.  
 
While technology and the category of the part-body already intersect and align 
in several areas of overlapping cultural, political and visual concern, which have 
been widely explored3, one area which remains largely omitted in the context of 
                                                
3 Some examples of how the fragmented body is aligned with cultural and visual theory include 
discussions of the notion of the appended body, particularly in relation to post-colonial theory 
(see Gonzalez, Jennifer ‘The Appended Subject: Race and Identity as Digital Assemblage’ in 
Race in Cyberspace, Kolko, B., Nakamura, L. & Rodman, G. eds., Routledge, New York, 
2000); prosthetics (see The Prosthetic Impulse: From a Posthuman Present to a Biocultural 
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a visual analysis is the creation of the part-body by the clinical gaze. While 
Carolee Schneemann and Kate Craig, for example, engaged imaging 
technologies in the process of constructing bodily sexuality and subjectivity, the 
clinical image has historically tended to treat technology as separate from the 
subject. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, the clinical image tends to isolate 
the part or organ of concern from the body, in order to subject it to observation, 
tests and treatment.4 In this it perhaps is part of a history of image-making that 
includes ex votos, representations of body parts caught up in processes of 
fetishizing, objectifying and curing. However, I do not want to argue that 
technology will always necessarily make the body strange. It is not because of 
technology that the body becomes unfamiliar or alien, but that technology 
reveals a pre-existing uneasy relation between body and image, demonstrating 
that the body-image might be always already foreign or Other to us. This 
‘demonstration’, with its etymological ties to monstrare, suggests that it might 
be a monstrous sort of showing, difficult to encounter and to reconcile because 
of what it reflects back to us.5  
 
Nowhere is this sense of alienation potentially more pronounced than in the 
technologies of the clinic. Within the clinic, the part-body is isolated under 
observation (which might include any combination of visual and non-visual 
tests, imaging and analysis), enabling it to be coded according to categories of 
normal/abnormal and then, if disease is found, referred to as something foreign 
to us, as something ‘not self’.6 What I hope to demonstrate in this chapter is the 
                                                                                                                                      
Future, Smith, M. & Morra, J. eds., MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006) and the body in pieces 
(see Nochlin, Linda The Body In Pieces: The Fragment as a Metaphor for Modernity, Thames 
and Hudson, London 1994). 
4 My use of this phrasing, however, is not to adhere to the concept that the body and soul exist 
in an eternal union and which necessitates the preservation of a unique body that stands at the 
centre of ideas of identity. By contrast, this chapter intends to demonstrate that the body is 
already fragmented and diaphanous. 
5 The root of the word monster has been well documented and the origins of the term are found 
in the Latin monstrare (to show or reveal) and monere (to warn). Thus the monster describes an 
exclusively visual category founded on display and de/monstration.  This emphasis on visuality 
ties the monster to the scopic regimes and empiricism of Western thought, whose 
epistemological structure claims that to see is to know. See Huet, Marie-Helene Monstrous 
Imagination, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1993, 
p. 6; and see also “monster” definition in The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition 1989, 
Oxford University Press (OED Online, URL: http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00315137).    
6 For an interesting discussion of the way in which the immune system serves as a metaphor for 
boundaries of self and other see Haraway, Donna ‘Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies: 
Determinations of Self in Immune System Discourse’ in Knowledge, Power, Practice: The 
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way in which clinical imaging technologies might thus be aligned with other 
forms of representation, most notably pornographic, in which the body is made 
strange through its almost exclusive focus on parts. If technology is able to 
produce a relation of strangeness between image and body (effectively re-
enacting an experience of splitting not dissimilar to Cartesian dualism) with 
regards the parts of the body that are visible to us and which we see everyday, 
what then is the nature of this strangeness with regards the (invisible) internal 
spaces, or with pathology and disease, both of which are already unfamiliar and 
alien to us?  
 
The performance and installation work of Mona Hatoum has often involved the 
transformation of familiar objects into something strange and threatening. For 
example Webbed 1 (2002) turns the supporting struts of a hospital bed into a 
spiders web, Daybed (2008) is a human-sized cheese grater, and 
Incommunicado (1993) a crib-cum-hospital trolley (figs 3.1-3.3). In several 
cases, Hatoum has also used technology in order to effect such a transformation 
(see Corps Étranger (1994) which will be discussed below; Homebound (2000), 
Sous Tension (1999), and Electrified I & II (2002 and 2010) in which domestic 
spaces and objects have an electric current running through them; and 
Testimony (1995-2002), Deep Throat (1996), Don’t Smile, You’re on Camera! 
(1980), and Look No Body! (1981) which use medical imaging technologies to 
magnify body parts, switch genders and make the body unrecognisable) (figs 
3.4-3.12). While much has been made of the re-presentation of domestic objects 
as threatening and dangerous,7 very little work has been done on the role that 
technology plays in this transformation, and the way in which this aspect of 
Hatoum’s work – perhaps unknowingly – plays on historical and cultural 
anxieties surrounding science and new technologies.8 In this chapter I will 
                                                                                                                                      
Anthropology of Medicine and Everyday Life, Lindenbaum, S. & Lock, M. eds., University of 
California Press, Berkeley, L.A., and London, 1993 (pp.364-410). 
7 See Bell, Kirsty Mona Hatoum: Unhomely, Holzwarth Publications, Berlin, 2008; Tamar 
Garb, ‘Hairlines’ in Women Artists at the Millennium, Armstrong, C. & de Zegher, C. eds., 
October Books, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, England, 2006; Steward Heon, 
Laura, Antoni, Janine & Glencross, Jo Mona Hatoum: Domestic Disturbance, Ex. Cat., MASS 
MoCA, North Adams, Massachusetts, 2001. 
8 For example, in both Homebound (2000) and Sous Tension (1999) Hatoum uses assemblages 
of household furniture wired up with an audibly active electric current, playing with the aspect 
of danger often perceived in technology by cautionary tales such as Mary Shelley’s 
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demonstrate how Hatoum’s work considers the interior representation of the 
female body within three different visual cultures (pornographic, artistic and 
medical) and the way in which technology is used to put pressure on the 
boundaries between them, revealing the mechanisms by which these institutions 
are mutually implicated in the construction of a masculine scopic drive. 
 
Hatoum’s work with medical imaging and medical images might be read as an 
implicit investigation of the role of technologies of representation in the 
processes of making the body seem at odds with itself. For example in Don’t 
Smile, You’re on Camera! (fig 3.13)9 Hatoum trained a live video camera on an 
audience, panned up and down the rows, and occasionally stopped to focus on 
one person. As the camera scanned the chosen individual, the recorded image 
was played on a video monitor. Simultaneously, two assistants at the back of the 
gallery would scan the same part of their own body, in gradual stages of 
undress, and then mix all the images with X-rays so that the resultant film 
showed the body being peeled away layer by layer by the video camera: first the 
clothes, then the skin then the flesh. Likewise, in Look No Body!10, the same 
procedure was used but the gender of the person being scanned would also be 
altered by replaying images of a torso of the opposite sex on the public facing 
video monitor. Of note is that both of these works manipulate the association of 
the video camera with the notion of ‘liveness’, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, in order to be effective. In many of her works, Hatoum uses 
technologies of representation and effectively turns them back on themselves to 
reveal the mechanisms by which they underwrite the logic of making the body 
strange.  
 
Importantly, Hatoum’s work also acknowledges that there are sites at which the 
visual registers of the clinical and the pornographic gaze might, in fact, overlap. 
In the works Testimony and Corps Étranger, Hatoum uses medical imaging 
technologies to present extreme close-ups of both male and female genitalia, 
                                                                                                                                      
Frankenstein. For a discussion of the reaction to new technologies in popular culture see Rutsky, 
R. L. High Techne: Art and Technology from the Machine Aesthetic to the Posthuman, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London, 1999. 
9 First performed at the event ‘Five Days at Battersea’ at the BAC, London, 26th March 1980. 
10 Performed at The Basement Gallery, Newcastle upon Tyne, 1981. 
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focusing in detail on specific body parts and then de- and re-attaching them in 
order to scramble or disrupt what the audience expects to see. Working, as I see 
it, as a sort of companion piece to Craig’s work in the previous chapter, Corps 
Étranger (1994) uses endoscopy to continue the project of investigating the 
points of connection and rupture between artistic and pornographic 
representation, while simultaneously also drawing medical imaging in to the 
analysis. In so doing, Corps Étranger expands my earlier discussions of the way 
in which the female body and technology come together in explicit forms of 
representation. While Craig’s tape and Schneemann’s film pointed toward the 
mutual co-constitution of pornography and technology and the gendering of 
technological forms of vision, Hatoum looks at the way in which newer imaging 
technologies are also giving rise to potential new forms of representation, as 
well asoffering an implicit critique of the clinical gaze. 
 
A continuation of some of the ideas found in earlier works such as Look No 
Body! and Don’t Smile, You’re on Camera!, Corps Étranger shows a one-take 
endoscopic investigation on the interior spaces of Hatoum’s body, as accessed 
via mouth, vagina and anus.11 The recorded images are projected onto a circular 
screen on the floor of a cylindrical installation environment lined with black 
cloth. A heavy, rhythmical soundtrack of breathing and a heart beating, taped 
during the procedure, is played inside the enclosure. As we enter the 
installation, we are encouraged to step directly on to the circular screen on the 
floor, watching the projection at our feet so that the distance at which we 
apprehend the images is equivalent to one’s height.12 The images on the screen 
move from eyes to nose to the inside of the throat, vaginal canal and anus, 
presenting a continuous, looping view of the interior spaces of the body of the 
artist, formally aligning this work with Craig’s tape Delicate Issue (1979).  
 
Where these two works differ, however, is that the endoscope, unlike the video 
camera, can fulfil that sense of wanting to see deeper below the surface of the 
body, which generated such a tension in Craig’s work. The endoscope gives in 
                                                
11 In interviews Hatoum has stated that Corps Étranger is a fulfilment of earlier projects. See 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio3/johntusainterview/hatoum_transcript.shtml 
12 Interestingly, each time I have visited the work, I have never seen anyone challenge this by 
bending over or kneeling down to touch the screen or have a closer look. 
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to our desire, but perhaps ultimately shows us something that we do not really 
want to see. Each time the endoscope comes across an orifice, it penetrates as 
far as it can go before it recedes and continues on its seemingly blind journey, 
as if feeling its way around the spaces of the body.  
 
The image of the intestine pulsates below us, opening and closing, sucking us 
in, into the bile, that awful yellow fluid with semi-digested bits of food floating 
around in it. The tunnel vision and the stomach-churning images are both 
reminiscent and representative of a drain or sewer; the entire body becomes a 
bowel and we drain out of ourselves down through the floor onto which the film 
is projected. Hairs become nasal, become aural become pubic. We do not know 
what we are looking at. The recognizable surfaces of the body give way to 
unrecognizable depths, to voids that are within us yet are wholly strange and 
alien to us. Just as we are on the threshold of identifying a mouth, a vagina or an 
anus, the images become something else altogether again. As we enter the 
mouth, for example, the almost imperceptible transformation from external 
squamous cells to the mucous membranes of columnar cells confuses the 
boundary between inside and outside. Furthermore, immediately just inside the 
lips already looks like the deeper internal parts of the body. It is at these 
boundary sites, or orifices – dangerous and privileged borders that, as discussed 
in chapter one, have historically been tied to theories of alterity13 – that the 
images almost resolve themselves into a recognizable body part, before 
becoming once again a network of uncharted tunnels.  
 
Formally, Corps Étranger seems to reference historical models in which the 
body has been imag(in)ed as a sort of navigable terrain in scientific and/or sci-fi 
representation.14 Typical examples from wider visual cultures include Arthur 
                                                
13 Key texts in relation to this debate are Douglas, Mary Purity and Danger: An Analysis of 
Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, Penguin, London 1970; Kristeva, Julia ‘From Filth to 
Defilement’ in Powers of Horror, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982 (pp. 56-89); and 
Miller, William Ian The Anatomy of Disgust, Harvard University Press, 1997 especially the 
chapter ‘Orifices and Bodily Wastes’ (pp. 89-108).  
14 Indeed, this is how the work was frequently received in the cultural press: ‘vous embarquiez 
pour un voyage visuel par l’un des orifices que l’anatomie ménage, filant à travers les cavités 
internes du corps.’ (Leboevici, Elisabeth ‘Mona Hatoum, Intérieur Nuit’ in Libération, 2nd July 
1994 (p. 111); ‘Corps Étranger proposant au visiteur une veritable immersion dans les 
profondeurs internes.’ (Brignone, Patricia ‘Mona Hatoum’ in Art Press, October 1994 (p. 113); 
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Lidov’s fantastical illustrations for LIFE magazine, including Down a Long 
Canal and Digestive Journey (3 November 1962), which depicts the body as a 
sort of mountainscape through which river-like digestive passages furrow their 
way (fig 3.14); the film Fantastic Voyage (1966) and later remake Inner Space 
(1987) in which miniaturised ‘spacecraft’ enter and travel around the body; and 
Alexander Tsiara’s interactive CD-ROM Body voyage: a three dimensional tour 
of a real human body (1997), itself based on the Visible Human Project (1989 
to present) which presents a three dimensional fly-through of CT scans of both a 
male and a female subject (fig 3.15). Such depictions of the body, while a 
radical challenge to more traditional representations such as static anatomical 
drawing, nonetheless also provided the cultural basis for the perpetuation of 
enlightenment tropes of exploration in relation to the ‘wild’ landscape of the 
body, that is foregrounded through references to space and deep sea 
‘adventure’.15 
 
Historically, this sort of imagery developed out of emergent scientific imaging 
technologies (particularly electron microscopy in the 1930s and scanning 
tunneling microscopy in the 1980s), which altered the way that the body is 
perceived in non-scientific contexts.16 The infinitesimally minute detail that 
these technologies produced destabilized notions of scale and space and 
fundamentally transformed our relationship to the body.17 Kim Sawchuck, who 
has written widely on the representation of gender and/in science, has suggested 
that these developments in imaging technology have thus produced a visual 
                                                                                                                                      
‘A pool of light at the viewers feet draws us into an exhilarating journey through illuminated 
caverns. These are reminiscent of Jules Verne’s Journey to the Centre of the Earth…or rather, 
the film of the book.’ (Abrioux, Yves ‘Mona Hatoum at the Pompidou: Two Responses’ 
responses’ in Untitled, September 1994 (p. 116))); ‘on the screen we are taken on a visual 
journey around Hatoum’s body.’ (Grant, Simon ‘Mona Hatoum at the Pompidou: Two 
Responses’). 
15 For further discussion of representations of the body as a ‘wild’ landscape, particularly in 
relation to popular visual cultures, see Beaulieu, Anne ‘The Brain at the End of the Rainbow: 
the Promises of Brain Scans in the Research Field and in the Media’ in Wild Science: Reading 
Feminism, Medicine and the Media, Marchessault, J. & Sawchuk, K. eds., Routledge, London 
and New York, 2000 (pp. 39-54) and Sobchak, Vivian Screening Space: The American Science 
Fiction Film, Ungar, New York, 1987, especially p. 101.  
16 For an excellent overview of the history of microscopy and the impact it had on medicine, 
with a particular emphasis on the development of scanning tunnelling microscopy, see the 
introduction to Manson-Smith, Sacha Investigation into Scanning Tunnelling Luminescence 
Microscopy unpublished PhD thesis, University of Strathclyde, 2000.   
17 See Stewart, Susan On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the 
Collection, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1993, especially p. 54. 
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economy in which the body is understood as a terrain or geography to be 
explored. This, she argues produces a fantasy of ‘biotourism’ in which one can 
travel through the ‘inner space’ of the body.18 What Sawchuck’s model of 
biotourism speaks to is a sense in which new imaging technologies have 
encouraged a way of reading the body – in both science and popular culture – as 
a navigable, quantifiable subject of analysis and colonization that is comprised 
of legible parts and systems. While I do not want to generalize and say that this 
is the case for all forms of scientific imaging, it seems to be largely true in the 
case of medical imaging and images. While I will return to the question of 
legibility later in the analysis, of immediate importance is the way in which the 
narrow visual field of these imaging technologies (which alters our sense of 
scale so dramatically) focuses on specific parts or systems in a way that perhaps 
feed into clinical interpretations of the body as a sort of assemblage. This idea 
was certainly being widely theorized in the medical literature around the time 
that Hatoum made Corps Étranger. For example, in ‘The body of the future’ 
(1992) Eric J. Cassell, a Clinical Professor in Public Health at Cornell University 
Medical College, proposed that: 
 
Twentieth century medicine is characterized by a trend which 
Pedro Lain-Entralgo has called ‘molecularisation’. In this view 
all processes of normal or abnormal physiology are described in 
molecular terms. Proteins are proteins, genes are genes etc, no 
matter where you find them (plant or animal). They are best 
studied in isolation, causing a tendency to see these systems as 
closed: systems in which everything necessary for their 
completion exists within the system itself. If the system is 
enzymatic, genetic, neural (impulse transmitting) or muscular 
(contractile), it must be abstracted from the organ in which it 
operates and the organism in which the organ is found.19 
 
                                                
18 Sawchuk, Kim ‘Biotourism, Fantastic Voyage, and Sublime Inner Space’ in Marchessault & 
Sawchuk eds., (pp. 9-23) p.10.  
19 Cassell, Eric J. ‘The Body of the Future’ in The Body in Medical Thought and Practice, 
Leder, D. ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston and London, 1992 (pp. 233-
249), pp. 235-237. 
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For Cassell, the clinical gaze is premised on a continual re-focusing to allow for 
greater detail, reducing the visual field so that organs, parts and systems of the 
body become categorised according to smaller and smaller units.20 This 
(techno)logic of fracturing the body into discrete parts so that it might be better 
observed, is at the core of many clinical technologies. By ‘clinical technologies’ 
I am referring both to the mechanical, electronic or digital devices that are used 
as well as the languages and discourse of clinical method (c.f. definitions of 
technology as both a device and a system of representation). This includes: the 
division of the field into specialty training (gynecology, dermatology, 
neurology); the classification and treatment of diseases; and, of course, medical 
imaging technology itself. Taking a textbook as a case study, Diagnostic 
Imaging by Peter Armstrong et al (fifth ed., 2004), we can see just how this 
logic continues to be put into practice. With the exception of ultrasound, we are 
told, all other nuclear imaging technologies have fixed projections or fields of 
inquiry21, meaning that the way that they work is by focusing a steady gaze on 
one part of the body at a time and, preferably, that such images will be made 
using standardized projections or viewpoints. After an overview of the basic 
principle of each imaging technology, the book itself is then divided according 
to body part, so that each chapter is focused on a different (and well 
differentiated) organ, part or system (chest, cardiovascular system, 
gastrointestinal tract).  
 
From looking at this literature, what is unclear however, and what could be 
further questioned beyond this thesis, is to what degree the technology defines 
the very parts or systems that it hopes to represent. That a particular type of 
imaging is good at representing a particular system might have actually 
produced that system, thus causing the body to become divided accorded to the 
way in which the technology appears to work, in a model of technological 
                                                
20 It is of note that current scientific practice appears to continue this trend beyond the cellular 
level toward ‘molecularisation’, since particle physicists are now involved in medical research. 
An excellent example is the work of the Institute of Nanoscience for Medicine, part of the 
James Martin 21st Century School at the University of Oxford, in which nanotechnologies are 
being applied to medical practices in the fields of imaging (scanning probe techniques in 
biology), pharmaceuticals (nanostructure-based drug delivery), and DNA structure and cell 
mechanics investigations. For more information see http://nanomed.bioch.ox.ac.uk/ 
21 Armstrong, P. et. al. Diagnostic Imaging, 5th Edition, Blackwell, Malden Mass., and Oxford, 
England, 2004, p. 8. 
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determinism. However, whether or not all the various taxonomies of organs, 
parts or systems have a historical lineage beyond the application of technology 
to them, it is notable that the division of the body into parts remains an integral 
process in the clinical practices of observing, naming and treating pathology.  
 
By stratifying the body into a sort of navigable terrain (and I would argue that 
both scientific and non-scientific visual cultures feed into the continuing 
production of this form of representation) the system or part under analysis is 
not only made less complex in its modeling – by removing interactions between 
them – but also makes any transgression or failure easier to identify and contain. 
Corps Étranger is perhaps notable for its radical rejection of this logic, instead 
choosing to use the endoscope so as to produce a continuous, looping view of 
the body that not only problematises any sense in which the body might be 
made of disconnected parts (they are very much, and seamlessly, connected to 
one another), but also that the body might be made less complex through this 
sort of visual modeling. The body is not presented schematically, but rather as a 
difficult, messy thing in which one might have trouble identifying inside from 




Following from the work of Michel Foucault, Rosi Braidotti is one of the few 
scholars who have questioned the politics of this visual logic of the part-body, 
particularly in relation to women. What distinguishes her valuable work further 
from that of someone like Cassell, for example, is that she makes the link 
between medicine and pornography, and considers the points at which these two 
visual economies might overlap, as well as the implications for that in the 
representation of women. Again, around the same time that Corps Étranger was 
first being shown, Braidotti made the case in ‘Body images and the 
pornography of representation’ (1994) that medicine always strived for forms of 
representation that would standardize and quantify the body. For her, there was 
a sort of an analogy between the mathematisation of the body perceived by 
writers like Foucault – a sort of exposure of the subject to numerical or 
statistical analysis – and the realm of pornographic representation. She thus 
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describes the standardization of the body in clinical practice as ‘medical 
pornography’, in which pornography is defined as ‘a system of representation 
that reinforces the commercial logic of the market economy. The whole body 
becomes a visual surface of changeable parts, offered as exchange objects.’22 In 
other words medicine, like pornography, seeks to standardize the body in order 
that it can be rendered into an economy, able to be prostheticised along lines 
that make flesh (re)productive within the terms of a biopolitical order.23 
Referencing her Deleuzian background, she calls this a system that produces 
‘organs without bodies’24, or ‘de/re/tachable parts’25 that can circulate across 
bodily, cultural and national borders. Importantly, both pornography and the 
clinical gaze work in this way by visually isolating body parts so that they might 
be inserted into regimes of looking, such as analysis or scopophilia. In other 
words, the part body becomes an object of (scopic) consumption and circulation 
which, for Braidotti, has far reaching implications, including the sale or 
regeneration of organs and other body parts26, as well as the somewhat 
inaccurate perception that because we can see at the atomic level that 
                                                
22 Braidotti, Rosi Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary 
Feminist Theory, Columbia University Press, New York, 1994, p. 68. More generally see the 
chapter ‘Body Images and the Pornography of Representation’ (pp. 57-73). 
23 See also J. G. Ballard, who writes, ‘bizarre experiments are now a common place of scientific 
research, moving ever closer to that junction where science and pornography will eventually 
meet and fuse. Conceivably, the day will come when science is itself the greatest producer of 
pornography. The weird perversions of human behaviour triggered by psychologists testing the 
effects of pain, isolation, anger etc. will play the same role that the bare breasts of Polynesian 
islanders performed in the 1940s wildlife documentary films.’ (Ballard, J. G. The Atrocity 
Exhibition, with illustrations by Pheobe Gloeckner, Re/Search publications, San Francisco, 1990 
p.68). 
24 In opposition to the Deleuzian ‘Bodies without Organs’ see Braidotti, Rosi ‘Organs without 
bodies’ in Braidotti, 1994 (pp. 41–56).  
25 Braidotti, p. 47. Medical imaging thus becomes a disciplinary technology which resonates 
with Elisabeth Grosz’ model of ‘etching’ in which, she argues, ‘the body is an intricate yet 
pliable instrument, capable of being trained, tuned to better, more efficient performance, a fine 
machinery of parts to be segmented, regulated, put to work, reordered and replaced where 
necessary.’ See Grosz, Elizabeth Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994, p. 151. For her discussion of etching 
more generally, see the chapter ‘The Body as Inscriptive Surface’ (pp. 138-159). 
26 An interesting visual example of this type of concept that body parts might be easily 
transferable or regenerating are illustrations by J. P. Vacanti (who developed the Vacanti Mouse 
at MIT in 1995, images of which circulated internationally) which featured as cover images for 
key popular culture magazines such as ‘The Replaceable Body’ (Life Magazine, 1989), in which 
the body was represented as being comprised of functional replacements and ‘Can I Replace My 
Body’ (Time Magazine, 1999), in which the parts that were previously replaceable, are 
subsequently depicted as regenerable. 
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biomedical interventions on the body like IVF are straightforward and well 
understood.27  
 
The link that Braidotti makes between pornographic and clinical images 
formally resonates with the representation of the body in Corps Étranger, both 
in terms of Hatoum’s decision not to divide up the body into parts, and 
subsequently produce a piece of ‘medical pornography’, but also because the 
work actually depicts extreme close-ups of female genitalia. In fact, it is more 
than an extreme close-up, it is the ultimate close-up: the view that actually goes 
beneath the surface, deeper in, to show what the camera usually cannot see. By 
showing both the vulva (external anatomy) as well as the vagina and the cervix 
(internal anatomy) Corps Étranger references the visual practices of both 
pornography and gynaecology, in presenting us with a body that has been 
subjected to a penetrating gaze.  
 
The image of the vagina is a particularly interesting case study since, as Terri 
Kapsalis has demonstrated in the book Public Privates: Performing Gynecology 
from Both Ends of the Speculum (1997), the isolated female genitalia (a.k.a. the 
‘beaver-shot’, which ties back in to the links between the female and the animal 
body explored in chapter one) is an image that re-occurs across medical, artistic 
and pornographic imagery. Furthermore, at times, it is almost impossible to 
categorize within any one of these fields. Importantly, as Kapsalis argues, male 
genitalia are rarely exposed to the sort of extreme close-up and scrutiny that 
women’s genitals are, whether in pornography, art or medicine.28 While 
Kapsalis focuses on material from contemporary pornography and live 
performance art (for example by engaging in a close analysis of the work of 
Annie Sprinkle), I believe that there are also relevant links to be made to 
                                                
27 The work of the Critical Art Ensemble (henceforth CAE) is perhaps an interesting 
intervention into such representations, particularly the mobile platform The Society for 
Reproductive Anachronisms (1999-2000), which was intended to respond to the issues raised by 
the larger project Flesh Machine (1997-98), through a series of lectures, information 
distribution, DNA extraction and genetic testing. As the CAE state ‘The greatest colonial 
initiative, perhaps ever, is underway – the full scale body invasion at the molecular level.’ 
(Critical Art Ensemble, ‘Body Invasion’ in Art Journal, Vol. 59, No. 3, Autumn 2000 p. 48). 
28 Kapsalis, Terri ‘Apparent Females and Female Appearances: On the Status of Genitals in 
Medical Textbook Illustration’ in Public Privates: Performing Gynaecology from Both Ends of 
the Speculum, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1997 (pp. 81-112).  
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historical artistic practices which center on the realistic depiction of female 
genitalia in extreme close-up, including Gustave Courbet’s L’Origine du Monde 
(1886) and Marcel Duchamp’s Étant Donnés: 1° La Chute d'Eau / 2° Le Gaz 
d'Éclairage (1946-66). Of particular interest in the context of our discussion is 
that the latter also makes explicit the link between the (visual) penetration of the 
female body and the enlightenment theories of sight and light that provided the 
foundations of science and medicine.29 This is notably achieved through the 
second subtitle 2° Le Gaz d'Éclairage. What these links begin to show us is that 
there is something about the way in which both pornography and the clinic sees 
that is the same; that it is premised on the same drive, perhaps, or gives rise to 
the same type of image. 
 
Certainly, theories of pornography from this period have picked up on this link 
between science and pornography and their mutual desire for knowledge, in 
which the secret depths of the mysterious female body must be probed or 
opened up. This argument has perhaps been most notably made by Linda 
Williams in Hard Core (1990), her early history of pornography. For Williams, 
both types of representation were founded on an economy of maximum 
visibility, which she positions in relation to Michel Foucault’s distinction 
between the science of sexuality, scientia sexualis, and older forms of ars 
erotica. Pornography, Williams argues, thus evolves not out of ancient 
traditions of erotic art, but the nineteenth-century ‘frenzy of the visible’ in 
which surveillance mechanisms started to see in place of the naked eye: a 
technologic in which the eye of the camera offered new ‘truths’ about the body. 
She writes, ‘in contrast to both mainstream fictional narrative and soft core 
indirection, hard core tries not to play peek-a-boo with either its male or female 
bodies. It obsessively seeks knowledge, through a voyeuristic record of 
confessional, involuntary paroxysm, of the “thing” itself.’30 For Williams, and 
this point perhaps goes to the heart of the entire thesis, the intersection between 
pleasure and power – as perceived by Foucault – is crucially conceived in terms 
                                                
29 For a discussion of the notion of female bodies being probed by the medical gaze in the 18th 
and 19th centuries see Jordanova, Ludmilla ‘Nature Unveiling Before Science’ in Sexual 
Visions: Images of Gender in Science and Medicine Between the Eighteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wis., 1993 (pp. 87-110).  
30 Williams, Linda Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the ‘Frenzy of the Visible’, Pandora press, 
London, 1990 p. 49. 
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of technology. Referring to the example of Eadward Muybridge’s work on the 
analytic study of the human body in motion, Williams argues that the power 
exerted over bodies in technology is rendered pleasurable through technology.31 
Which is maybe another way of saying that power itself is pleasurable if you are 
the one wielding it, and technology is one way in which that can be done. 
 
Although Williams identified that both pornography and medicine perform a 
sort of probing or penetrating of the body, this drive is somewhat complicated in 
the case of pornography. Although desire is here produced through vision, 
importantly, it is through a type of vision that actually rests on the edge between 
concealing and revealing, so that there is always a (frustrated) desire to see.32 In 
this, pornography ultimately reinstates the failure of any project adequately to 
represent female sexualities, invoking the historical formulation of the female 
body as dark and mysterious against the quest for disclosure brought about by 
over-lit close-ups of genitals.33 It seems as though Corps Étranger 
provocatively plays into the logic of hyper-visibility through a strategy of 
explicit self-representation, in which nothing is hidden and everything is shown, 
even while what is shown remains largely unrecognisable. By going below the 
surface of the body, into its innermost spaces such as the digestive, respiratory 
or reproductive passages, the endoscopic camera tries to show everything about 
the body, and yet these passages very quickly become indistinguishable from 
one another. The folding, looping canals and caverns suggest not a well-
differentiated body architecture but an amorphous system that is at odds with 
traditional schematic representations. 
 
                                                
31 Ibid., p. 39. 
32 See the chapter ‘Prehistory: the “Frenzy of the Visible”’ in Williams (pp. 34-57). Williams’ 
arguments here are informed by the work of Christian Metz in The Imaginary Signifier: 
Psychoanalysis and the Cinema, Williams, A. et al. trans., Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1977 and Baudry, Louis ‘The Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches to the 
Impression of Realism in the Cinema’ in Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory 
Reader, Rosen, P. ed., Columbia University Press, New York, 1986. Of note in the pornography 
debate about showing/hiding is that female sexual pleasure, unlike male, is not apparent or 
visible. See Williams, p. 49; Giles, Dennis ‘Pornographic Space: The Other Place’ in The 1977 
Film Studies Annual: Part 2, Redgrave, Pleasantville, New York 1977 (pp. 52-65); and Lardeau, 
Yanne ‘Le Sexe Froid (du Porno au Delà)’ in Cahiers du Cinéma, 289, 1978.  
33 See Nead, Lynda The Female Nude: Art, Obscenity and Sexuality, Routledge London and 
New York, 1992 p. 99. 
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One of the areas in which Corps Étranger resonates with the problematic 
history of representing the explicit female body, and the continual tension 
between exposing and concealing it, is the link between the work and the 
practice of self-imaging in gynaecological contexts. While Craig’s video 
demonstrated that pornography and the home sex tape were actually two 
fundamentally different categories of representation, Hatoum’s work does not 
emphasise the differences between the categories of gynaecology and 
pornography, but rather draws out the similarities. This is achieved not only 
through the visual content of the works but also the means of their projection. 
The downward pull of Hatoum’s installation and projection seems to invite us to 
let ourselves be taken over by an objectifying gaze premised on power and 
distance.  
 
As has been well documented, in the U.S. during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
a series of women’s health collectives and alternative art practices were 
established, presenting a challenge to historical methods of looking at and/or 
into women, that had been driven by a supposed need to see the otherwise 
invisible female (reproductive) organs.34 These collectives had an emphasis on 
vaginal and breast self-examination, and self-abortion practice, enabling women 
to familiarize themselves with their most ‘taboo’ parts, in order that they might 
become de-objectified.35 Looking or, more specifically, self-examination, took 
on a fundamental role for these groups in the destabilization of power 
structures, which entailed a form of embodied knowledge production that 
largely opposed the model of knowledge as mediated through representation. 
 
                                                
34 For a discussion of the notion of making women’s bodies visible, see O’Bryan, C. Jill Carnal 
Art: Orlan’s Refacing, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London, 2005 p. 98. 
The making visible of the female body which was finally achieved by James Marion Sims’ 
‘discovery’ of the speculum – and upon which gynecology is founded as a distinct specialty 
(Kapsalis, p. 7) – is part of the historical practice of attempting to demystify the relationship 
between the womb and human creation. Up until the eighteenth century the invisibility of the 
womb, and the female capacity to harbor ‘internal organs’ had provided grounds for considering 
women as suspicious (O’Bryan, p. 175). 
35 For a discussion of the vagina in representation as taboo, particularly in the context of 
medical imaging, see Braidotti, p. 67 and Murphy, Michelle ‘Immodest Witnessing: the 
Epistemology of Vaginal Self-Examination in the U.S. Feminist Self-Help Movement’ in 
Feminist Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, Spring 2004 (pp. 115-147). 
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Furthermore, during this period, there was a close involvement of many artists 
with these collectives, as they were often recruited to produce drawings or 
photographs of female anatomy for the purposes of sex education, 
gynecological training and self-examination. This led to a blurring of the 
boundaries between art and medicine, which perhaps prefigures later practices 
such as Hatoum’s. Notable historical examples include Tee Corinne’s Cunt 
Coloring Book (1975); Annie Sprinkle’s pornographic photographs making 
their way into medical textbooks; Ida Applebroog’s Monalisa vagina drawings 
(1969),36 which demonstrated the fact that women necessarily always see their 
own vagina as an image reflected in a mirror, i.e. always mediated, a 
representation, which could, potentially, be confounded, undermined or 
reinforced by touch (as a counter to vision); and the illustrations that Suzann 
Gage – a registered OB/GYN nurse – produced for A New View of a Woman’s 
Body (1981) (figs 3.16-3.20) which, very much like The Boston Women’s 
Health Collective’s publication Our Bodies, Ourselves (1969), included semi-
transparent renderings of the body that simultaneously showed external and 
internal features of the body.37 Although these last examples are not forms of 
artistic production, they are formally and conceptually linked to some of the 
other practices in that they reject a standard, diagrammatic view of the body. 
Instead, these projects all sought to represent the female body not only as highly 
individualized, and placed historically and culturally through reference to dress 
                                                
36 For a discussion of Applebroog’s drawings in relation to vaginal self-examination practices of 
the 1970s see Bryan-Wilson, Julia ‘Our Bodies, our Houses, our Ruptures, Ourselves’, in Ida 
Applebroog: Monalisa, Exh.Cat., Hauser and Wirth, New York, 2010 (pp. 13-39). 
37 While the work of comparing these alternative systems of (gynaecological) anatomical 
representation to established medical textbooks like Danforth’s has already been done by Terri 
Kapsalis (see Kapsalis pp. 81-112), suffice it to say that key differences between these systems 
are distinguishable: the former shows only healthy genitalia, moving away from the 
predominant focus on pathology, so that recognition of what counts as ‘healthy’ might also 
come to have epistemological or medical value; it also discusses the clitoris, thus expanding the 
remit of the female reproductive anatomy and women’s health discourse into sexuality. 
Danforth’s, by comparison makes no discussion of female sexuality and desire, even while 
urology textbooks have a whole chapter on the physiology of erection and pathophysiology of 
impotence. A New View of a Woman’s Body, by contrast, maintains that both men and women 
have physiological responses to sexual arousal; books like A New View… also consistently 
invoke self-touch and, like touch, reflexively perform a relationship to its own system of 
representation by discussing at lengths the various choices made for framing, lighting and so on; 
and finally, A New View… is divided up into areas of practice (‘self-examination’, ‘birth 
control’) as well as by function (‘the clitoris: a feminist perspective’, ‘menstrual extraction’) and 
in so doing, it challenges the majority of medical text books which divide the body up by part. 
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and style, but also as an active participant in the practice of looking that gave 
rise to the representation. 
 
However, these examples are notable not just for what they achieved politically 
and medically, but also visually, since they made the internal and external 
genitalia visible outside of a professional medical context. If self-examination 
and self-representation were historically repressed modes of working with 
female sexuality it is because, in traditional gynaecological practice, forms of 
self-imaging (-examination, -inspection, -representation, -looking) were denied 
or screened out by the ‘drape sheet’, used to cover the lower half of a woman’s 
body during internal or external gynaecological examination. During the 1970s, 
the drape sheet was theorized as a literal and metaphorical device that operated 
to ‘hide the vagina from herself’, and ensure the patients modesty when 
confronted by (almost invariably) male gynaecologists. Again resonating with 
this sense of the body becoming comprised of parts, Kapsalis expands, ‘[The 
woman] is a pelvis disassociated from a person… the person is reconstructed as 
an object.’38  
 
The detachment of the sexual and reproductive organs from the subject was thus 
seen to have a visual component in that it was achieved through practices of 
(in)visibility, in which certain individuals (i.e., the doctor) had access to the 
gynaecological view, while others (i.e., the patient) simply didn’t. The drape 
sheet thus played a crucial role in several histories of imaging or seeing women 
(gynecology, pornography, art) because of its role in the separation of female 
genitalia from the body.39 It was not, in fact, until the second half of the 
twentieth century, that self-spectatorship became a part of the gynaecological 
practice.40 Interestingly, this also coincided with the introduction of themes of 
                                                
38 Kapsalis, p. 11. For discussion of the reduction of the vagina to an object, as achieved through 
the dramaturlurgical device of the pelvic exam, see Henslin, James & Biggs, Mae 
‘Dramaturgical Desexualisation: the Sociology of Vaginal Examination’ in Studies of the 
Sociology of Sex, Henslin, J. ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1971 (pp. 243-72).  
39 For a critique of the concept of the invisibility of the vagina, or its role as an ‘anesthetised 
organ’, (notably as compared to the clitoris) in models of sexuality deriving from 
psychoanalysis, see Mitchell, Juliet ‘The Clitoris and the Vagina’ in Psychoanalysis and 
Feminism: A Radical Reassessment of Freudian Psychoanalysis, Penguin, London 2000 (pp. 
105-108). 
40 Kapsalis, p. 166.  
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self-spectatorship in the fields of pornography and art, as women started 
producing images of themselves in the ‘live’ or ‘body’ art practices of the 
1960s.41 Perhaps one of the most familiar examples of bringing the questions of 
self-spectatorship into the artistic realm is Schneemann’s Interior Scroll (1975), 
in which the artist drew a long, narrow scroll from her vagina while reading 
aloud from it (fig 3.21). The scroll recounted a conversation with a ‘structuralist 
film-maker’, in which the artist sets bodily processes, traditionally associated 
with ‘woman’, against ‘male’ notions of order and rationality, questioning the 
gendered relations of power that underscore the practices of both looking at and 
making images. 
 
There is a sense here in which ideas around visibility and invisibility also feed 
into a discussion of the public and the private. After all, female ‘privates’ seem 
to enter the ‘public’ spectacle predominantly in the forms of art, pornography 
and medicine, leaving us with a complex interplay of screening (off) and 
showing (off). Furthermore, Kapsalis has noted the etymological ties of the 
words pubes to ‘public’ and pudere to ‘shame’, emphasizing both the public 
presence of the penis in contrast to the vagina, and the conceptual problem of 
making ‘public’ something that is ‘private’ and of which one ought to be 
ashamed.42 The notion of the public versus the private is thus highly pertinent 
here, in the literal reference to concepts of inside and outside, and the 
feminization of the domestic/private/interior sphere. This is played on in 
Hatoum’s work Jardin Public (1993) (fig 3.22), in which a genital triangle is 
sewn, in pubic hair, onto a cast iron garden chair (recognizable as one from the 
Luxembourg Gardens in Paris), referring back to the fine line between 
concealing and revealing that is so crucial to pornography.43   
                                                
41 Perhaps of interest in the context of this discussion of the drape sheet, is that Courbet’s 
L’Origine du Monde, already referred to in the context of this work, was kept behind a curtain 
when it was in the private collection of Jacques Lacan. 
42 Kapsalis, p. 5. 
43 As Lynda Nead argues, ‘pornography exists on the margins of visibility. It circulates in terms 
of being both explicit and illicit; it is characterized both by a relentless display of sexual 
difference and the sexualized female body, and by its existence within the covert, hidden and 
disguised spaces of public and private culture.’ (Nead, p. 97). Furthermore, the report of the 
Williams Committee on obscenity found that ‘Pornography crosses the line between the private 
and the public since it makes available in the form, for instance, of a photograph, some sexual 
act of a private kind and makes it available for a voyeuristic interest: since it is itself a public 
thing, a picture book or a film show, it represents already the projection into public of the 
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What is so important about Corps Étranger is that it draws on these important 
political histories of looking at women, and considers the points of connection – 
and disconnection – between art, pornography and medicine. While all three 
visual cultures share the common tension between public and private, Corps 
Étranger actually demonstrates the way in which representation in one field 
often appears to transgress the limits of representation in others. Hatoum’s work 
not only references the formal qualities of pornographic and gynaecological 
imagery, but also refers to that very particular and peculiar history of imaging 
women that has been simultaneously an excess of vision and a complete lack of 
it. The stakes are high in Hatoum’s representation of the interior spaces of the 
body, therefore, since it straddles and problematises representation across all 
three fields.  
 
Although the image of the vagina appears in art, pornography and medicine, 
gynecological images, for example, actually potentially negate pornographic 
readings by simply showing too much: an excess of representation which 
obliterates pornography’s more particular emphasis on showing just enough. 
Despite the possibility for slippage between the three fields, because of the use 
of the ‘beaver-shot’, Hatoum largely exceeds pornographic readings by turning 
the body inside out so thoroughly as to perform it as emetic rather than erotic, 
destroying the tension between concealing and revealing. Corps Étranger thus 
perhaps not only prompts us to think critically about the different (or similar) 
ways in which women’s bodies have been represented by various institutions, 
but also to re-think the use of technology in self-imaging as a potential site of 
resistance to these systems. As Ella Shohat argues in ‘Lasers for Ladies’ (1992) 
‘feminist critique cannot afford to surrender the interior body to the curtained 
authority of the medical office.’44  
 
                                                                                                                                      
private world – private, that is to say, to its participants – of sexual activity.’ (Report of the 
Williams Committee paragraph 7.6. For a discussion of the report in relation to themes of 
public/private see Brown, Beverly ‘Private Faces in Public Places’ in Ideology and 
Consciousness, No. 7 (pp. 3-16)).  
44 Shohat, Ella ‘Lasers for ladies: endo discourse and the inscription of science’ in The Visible 
Woman: Imaging Technologies, Gender and Science, Cartwright, L. & Treichler, P. eds., New 
York University Press, New York and London, 1998 (pp. 240-272) p. 240. 
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The work Deep Throat, made two years after Corps Étranger in 1996, and 
which likewise shows an endoscope going inside the mouth of a woman, 
perhaps overtly enacts these differences between clinical and pornographic 
representation. Deep Throat, of course, is also the name of the 1972 
pornographic film starring Linda Lovelace (as ‘herself’). In the film, the heroine 
is deeply unsatisfied by her sex life and so seeks the advice of a doctor who 
informs her that she has an unusual condition in which her clitoris is situated at 
the back of her throat. This discovery is made during a clinical investigation in 
which a telescope directly replaces a speculum. Fortunately, there is a very 
simple remedy to the problem that the doctor and other men thus proceed to 
demonstrate…45 Using medical imaging technologies against the visual logic of 
hard-core pornography, this work parodically and excessively represents the 
promised fantasy of infinite penetration. In Corps Étranger, as with Deep 
Throat, the use of technology is therefore fundamental in the disruption of 
traditional systems of representation, and the destabilization of core principles 
of medical epistemology. As such, it is the technology itself (in this case 




Endoscopy is the parent name given to a range of (usually) non-surgical 
interventions, which allow the interior spaces of the body to be recorded on 
camera by accessing them through, in this case natural, orifices.46 The term is 
derived from the Greek ‘endon’ (meaning ‘within’) and ‘scopein’ (meaning not 
just ‘to look at’ but also, crucially, ‘to examine’). While there are many 
different endoscopes available for a variety of applications, they all have 
common features: there is a control head with valves for air insufflations and 
suction, a flexible shaft carrying the light guide and one or more service 
channels, and a maneuverable bending section at the tip. An ‘umbilical’ or 
universal cord connects the endoscope to the light source and processor, air 
                                                
45 For a discussion of this film in relation to ‘seminal’ tropes of visual pornography such as ‘the 
money shot’ and how it plays on the problems of visually representing male and female 
pleasure, see the chapter ‘Fetishism and Hard Core: Marx, Freud and “the Money Shot”’, in 
Williams (pp. 93-119).  
46 Although it should be noted that endoscopy can be used in conjunction with artificial orifices, 
as in the case of arthroscopy, and therefore does occasionally come under the remit of surgery. 
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supply and suction (figs 3.23-3.25). The image is captured with a CCD (charge 
coupled device) chip, transmitted electronically, and displayed on a video 
monitor. In addition to being a technique for ‘seeing into’47 the internal spaces 
of the body, endoscopy is also a therapeutic tool, carrying such features as a 
biopsy port, to enable abnormal sections to be cut and cauterized as and when 
they are seen.48 It is both diagnostic and therapeutic. 
 
Although Hatoum maintains that the procedure ‘didn’t hurt at all’, as a result of 
receiving ‘a drug that seemed to dull the pain,’49 undergoing endoscopic 
investigations carries with it difficult or unpleasant preparation: an upper 
gastrointestinal endoscopy (also called esophagogastroduodenoscopy, or EGD) 
should ‘only be performed after the patient has fasted for 6 hours or more to 
ensure an empty stomach… in conscious patients, a topical anesthetic is applied 
to the pharynx to numb the gag reflex’; in lower gastrointestinal endoscopy ‘tap 
water or commercial enemas usually are sufficient preparation for either rigid or 
flexible sigmoidoscopy…’; in colonoscopy ‘1-2 days of clear liquid diet 
followed by a strong cathartic and perhaps enemas. Alternatively, a balanced 
electrolyte lavage can be used. Typically about 1 gallon of the solution must be 
consumed either PO [by mouth] or through a nasogastric tube over about 2 
hours. The lavage solution is consumed about 6-12 hours before the procedure. 
One drawback is the difficulty some patients have in consuming a gallon of 
fluid that tastes like seawater over a short period.’ 50 All this is generally 
referred to as ‘adequate bowel preparation’. 
 
The different types of endoscopy also carry risks, which are both general and 
specific. These range from ‘perforation of the oesophagus or stomach, 
                                                
47 I qualify this term so as to distinguish it from diagnostic imaging, which covers radiology-
based imaging technologies such as X-ray, MRI, ultrasound and CT scanning. These do not 
actually see the body, but are numeric (or sonic) representations of the body, which are then 
turned in to a visual pattern for diagnostic purposes. 
48 For an overview of the core functions of the practice of endoscopy, see Cotton, Peter B. & 
Williams, Christopher Practical Gastrointestinal Endoscopy: The Fundamentals, 6th edition, 
Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2008. 
49 ‘Mona Hatoum: Interview with Janine Antoni’ in Bomb Magazine, No. 63, Spring 1998. 
Available online at http://www.whitecube.com/artists/hatoum/texts/98/. 
50 Eastwood, Gregory L. & Avunduk, Canan Manual of Gastroeneterology: Diagnosis and 
Therapy, 2nd edition, Little, Brown & Co, Boston, New York Toronto and London, 1994, 
p. 16-22. 
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generation of new hemorrhage, pulmonary aspiration and serious cardiac 
arrhythmia, to medication reactions, vasovagal reactions and cardiac failure or 
hypotension, related to over- or underhydration of a susceptible patient during 
bowel preparation. Mortality ranges from 1/3000 to 1/16000.’51 In spite of the 
not insignificant risks associated with any medical procedure, and the 
unpleasant preparation of the body necessary prior to undergoing endoscopy, 
Hatoum’s refusal to show pain, or discuss it as part of the work sets the project 
aside from much body- or endurance-based art of the 1960s or 70s, which has 
been read as a performance of gender.52  
 
By contrast, Hatoum’s (lack of) discourse around pain would align the project 
more closely with the work of Orlan who, around the same time that Hatoum 
was producing Corps Étranger, was undergoing the nine surgery-performances 
entitled Images, New Images and the Reincarnation of Saint Orlan (1990-1993). 
These surgery-performances were recorded and broadcast at institutions around 
the world, including the Centre Georges Pompidou, which had commissioned 
Corps Étranger for a major exhibition of Hatoum’s work that year.53 In so 
doing, such works represent a novel historical period in which there is a 
displacement of these technologies away from a clinical setting, traditionally 
associated with pain and illness, instead inserting these practices into an artistic 
realm, from which they might exercise some degree of critical autonomy and 
reflection on the construction of one’s own body/image.54 
 
                                                
51 For an overview of risks/complications of all different endoscopies, see Eastwood & 
Avunduk p. 16-22. 
52 See the discussion by Hal Foster and Amelia Jones on body art, and the differences between 
male and female artists. For Foster, male artists ‘assume an infantilist position to mock the 
paternal law’ as they enact ‘oedipal naughtiness… wallowing in shit with the secret faith that 
the most defiled might reverse into the most sacred.’ (Foster, Hal ‘The Artifice of Abjection’ in 
The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., and London, 1996 p. 153). See also Jones, Amelia ‘Dis/Playing the Phallus’ in Art 
History, vol. 17, no. 4, 1994 (pp. 546-584) p. 546. 
53 For a discussion of this aspect of Orlan’s work see Auslander, Philip From Acting to 
Performance: Essays in Modernism and Postmodernism, Routledge, London and New York, 
1997, especially the chapter ‘The Surgical Self: Body Alteration and Identity’ (pp. 126-140).  
54 While this is not to suggest that art does ever truly have critical autonomy from the social or 
political sphere (for a discussion of this in relation to recent art practice see Martin, Stewart 
‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’ in Third Text, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2007 (pp. 368-86)) I am 
optimistic that it might at the least be in a position to mount some sort of a challenge to it.  
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As such, Corps Étranger perhaps encounters endoscopy as a technological 
intervention on the body (a means of rendering it visible in the service of 
diagnosis and, therefore, a ‘technology’ in the sense of producing a language 
about the body) rather than a purely medical one, thus permitting it to operate in 
distinct representational realms. Indeed, endoscopy is not inherently a medical 
practice even while it is certainly a technological one. This is perhaps well 
evidenced by the fact that, as the gastroenterologist C.C. Booth writes, 
‘technology, even more than science, has been responsible for major 
developments in the practice of gastroenterology.’55 Before the development of 
fibreoptic endoscopes in the 1960s, the only devices for seeing in to the body 
were rigid tubes called electroscopes, as designed by Bruening in the 1900s, 
which were difficult to pass into the stomach. In 1932, Schindler introduced a 
semi-flexible gastroscope, in which half of the instrument could be flexed as it 
was being put inside the body, but which had to be straightened once inside to 
accommodate the 50 or so lenses spaced along the shaft. Such an instrument 
necessitated a compliant patient (especially given that general anesthesia could 
not be used as the swallowing reflex needed to be in place) and light levels were 
so low that the duodenum could not be seen as miniature incandescent light 
bulbs were used for a light source. As the developer of the contemporary 
flexible fibreoptic endoscope Basil Hirschowitz writes, ‘gastroscopy with the 
Schindler instrument required good training, a good assistant and a patient with 
a compliant anatomy approaching that of a sword swallower.’56 With the 
discovery and development of fibreoptics, therefore, a new endoscope could be 
developed that was not only flexible but also provided a separate bundle of 
glass fibers for illumination using light transmitted from an external high-
intensity source. This high intensity source is what makes photography of all 
                                                
55 Booth, C. C. ‘What has Technology Done to Gastroenterology?’ in The History of 
Gastroenterology: Essays on its Development and Accomplishments, Chen, T. S. & Chen, P. S. 
eds., The Parthenon Publishing Group, New York and London, 1995 (pp. 107-113), p. 107.  
56 Hirschowitz, Basil I. ‘The Development and Application of Fibreoptic Endoscopy’ in The 
History of Gastroenterology (pp. 99-105) p. 99. Although it should be noted that 
contraindications for Upper gastrointestinal endoscopy (also called 
esophagogastroduodenoscopy – EGD) still include the fact that it ‘should not be performed if 
the patient is in shock, is combative, or is unwilling to cooperate.’ (Eastwood and Avunduk, p. 
16). This is reminiscent of Kapsalis’ argument, who states that ‘in most cases the ideal patient is 
one who is compliant, passive and accepting…this is perhaps epitomized in some of the ‘model’ 
patients chosen by contemporary medical educators to teach students pelvic exams – cadavers, 
plastic dolls and anaesthetized women, prostitutes. (Kapsalis, p. 6).  
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kinds possible and permits endoscopy to be documented, as in Corps Étranger. 
The first fibreoptic endoscope, the ACMI 4990 Hirschowitz Gastroduodenal 
Fiberscope, was made commercially available in 1960, and continues to form 
the basic design of all endoscopes in use today.57 The final technological 
development of note in this potted history of endoscopy is perhaps the transition 
from side-viewing to end-viewing instruments with the introduction of the 
Fibreoptic Flexible Oesophagoscope in 1963.58 This innovation meant that the 
interior spaces could be better visualized:  
 
The tubular lumen of organs such as the esophagus, duodenum, 
intestine, colon, bronchi, bile ducts and ureters could be 
inspected, and for guided intubation of tubular organs under 
direct vision. A washing device kept the end clean. The end 
view allowed the second advantage to be fully developed: an 
open channel allowing aspiration as well as the precise siting 
under direct visual control of many accessories of endoscopes… 
Endoscopy is, or should be, an extension of the physical 
examination, being to the eye what the stethoscope is to the ear. 
Beyond the immediate or primary visual diagnosis lie the 
interrelated applications of endoscopy to diagnosis, surveillance 
and therapy, and to education, photography, documentation and 
research.59  
 
Aside from the clinical advantages described above, the development of the 
end-viewing endoscope also played in to contemporary epistemological values 
concerning sight and knowledge. As we can see, Hirschowitz perceived a direct 
analogy between what was seen by the end-viewing endoscope and the eye of 
the doctor using the technology (a technology of vision). This development is 
clearly understood as clinically beneficial. The endoscope is thus perceived as 
an extension of the eye of the doctor and current training in the field seems to 
                                                
57 For a fuller historical overview of the development of the fibreoptic endoscope see 
Hirschowitz, pp. 99-105. 
58 As announced in the Lancet, August 1963. 
59 Hirschowitz, pp. 103-105. 
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extend the analogy so that the technology is characterized as prosthesis of the 
body of the doctor: 
 
At first, it is important to replace the twisted position of 
endoscope at passing the pyloric ring… The endoscope should 
then be advanced into the duodenal second portion carefully 
while confirming the lumen… A radial scan scope with forward 
oblique view consequently changes from the push condition to 
stretch condition, when the scanning begins, and therefore, the 
observation actually starts from deeper part of the duodenum… 
By looking one can see when to add an up-angle a little, to leave 
the position of the endoscope unchanged, furthermore to rotate 
the endoscope counter-clockwise. The endoscope will then 
become stretched, but the operator does not have to pull it up 
consciously… The transitive part from the pancreatic head to the 
body is demonstrated, as it seems to go away from the 
endoscope when you pull the endoscope more.60 
 
As ‘an extension of the physical examination’, endoscopy actually entails a high 
degree of technical skill, of knowing how to introduce, pull back, twist and 
manipulate. It is not enough for the individual performing the examination to be 
able to interpret the images; they must also be highly skilled in the very 
production of those images. Thus, endoscopy becomes an embodied practice, in 
which knowledge about the body is produced through the process of using the 
technology, rather than simply through what the images subsequently show.  
 
While shaped by the needs of clinical practice, it is the technological 
developments in endoscopy that determine the resultant forms of representation. 
What, it is worth considering, would be the difference had Hatoum used a side-
viewing endoscope?61 While we would perhaps have a better sense of the pink, 
                                                
60 Extract from Hirooka, Yoshiki et. al., ‘Standardization of Endoscopic Ultrasonography 
Procedures for the Pancreas Using Radial and Convex Methods’ in Digestive Endoscopy, Vol. 
14, 2002 (pp. 34-39), pp. 34-35. 
61 It should be noted that side-viewing endoscopes are still used, particularly in cases where 
forward-viewing ones cannot adequately visualize behind mucosal folds or bends in the bowel. 
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undulating organ walls, we would not perceive so clearly the relationship 
between the cylindrical technology and the tubular lumen; between the eye of 
the spectator – be it doctor, gallery visitor or patient (since endoscopy allows for 
self-examination) – and the black hole in front of us; and between the tunnel 
vision of the images and the narrow field of enquiry (the ‘narrow gaze’) of the 
clinical eye. Thus, in Corps Étranger we recognize a series of highly complex 
relationships between the results of technological development and several 
different bodies: the individual undergoing the procedure, the one performing it, 
and those who might be watching it. The nature of the images thus opens up 
such relationships to critical reflection. 
 
The seeming equivalence between the eye of the doctor and the eye of the 
endoscope is, however, highly mediated. Endoscopes are adapted to video 
monitoring systems and, as a result, the endoscopist conducts the examination 
by viewing the video screen rather than looking directly through the fibreoptic 
system of the endoscope. This allows not only for the recording and replaying 
of images, but also enables a number of people other than the primary 
endoscopist to witness the investigation, including the patient, if desired, thus 
allowing for a degree of self-observation usually not viable during a clinical 
procedure. Hatoum was thus able to watch and direct the film, in a process of 
self-monitoring, much like Kate Craig in Delicate Issue.  
 
As such, the endoscope actually produces several levels of disconnection 
between the body under observation and the viewing subject. Highly mediated 
through computer screens and fibreoptics, endoscopy in fact does not represent 
such a simple one-to-one relation between the body and its representation, as it 
might at first appear. Unlike diagnostic- or nuclear-imaging, which is the field 
that covers technologies that are ways of visualizing rather than seeing the body 
(since radiology-based images are numeric data sets that have been converted 
                                                                                                                                      
See Frimberger, E. S. et. al., ‘Colonoscopy and Polypectomy with a Side-Viewing Endoscope’, 
in Endoscopy, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2007 (pp. 462-465). Of further note is that when using a side-
viewing endoscope for endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography (ERCP), a procedure 
to visualize the bile ducts and pancreatic duct on fluoroscopy, an X-ray technologist is also an 
integrated part of the exam, since the endoscope cannot see inside the duct system. As such, an 
ERCP is performed by placing a camera down to the bile duct system, before injecting contrast 
in the duct, and taking X-rays. 
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into visual representations rather than a photograph of the actual thing), 
endoscopy is a branch of medical imaging that purports to show the interior 
spaces of the body. As such, it is considered to bear the same relationship to the 
object as photography, and thus seems to escape much of the critical analysis 
focused on practices such as fMRI.62 Such studies, by focusing on the 
problematic relationship between the object and the image in diagnostic 
imaging, often neglect the problematic relationship between the thing and the 
image in non-radiology based imaging such as endoscopy.  
 
In projects such as Don’t Smile, You’re on Camera and Look No Body!, which 
used technology to apparently undress the bodies of her audience or switch their 
genders, Hatoum appears to have set up just such an equivalence between two 
vastly different systems of representation: X-rays and photography. By using 
them interchangeably to purportedly represent one individual, and playing on 
the rhetoric of the video camera as ‘live’, both are intended as depictions of the 
actual body and not as numeric data about that body converted into visual 
representation. And yet, Hatoum actively and consciously rejects any claim to a 
faithful representation of the body (hoc est enim corpus meum) by scrambling 
the appearance of the subject on the video monitor, for example by switching 
the subject’s gender. The epistemological status of the X-ray image is therefore 
ultimately challenged since we are made to realize that they do not belong to 
that body at all: the image referent has been destabilized. By using such 
technologies together, in order to make the body seem étranger, these earlier 
projects began to probe the way in which technology effects an uneasy relation 




The very title of the work, Corps Étranger, refers to a slippage in the 
understanding of what it means for something to be ‘strange’, alluding to a body 
                                                
62 See Joyce, Kelly ‘Appealing Images: MRI and the Production of Authoritative Knowledge’ in 
Social Studies of Science, Vol. 35, No. 3, June 2005 (pp. 437-462) especially p. 440; Joyce, 
Kelly Magnetic Appeal: MRI and the Myth of Transparency, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
and London, 2008 especially p. 51; and Prasad, Amrit ‘Making Images/Making Bodies: 
Visibilising and Disciplining through MRI’ in Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol. 30, 
No. 2, Spring 2005 (pp. 291-316) especially p. 296. 
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that is simultaneously ‘foreign’ (which could also be an ‘object’ in the sense of 
a ‘foreign body’). This corpus refers to a number of objects (technological and 
organic) and is always about both familiarity and unfamiliarity simultaneously. 
As Ursula Panhaus-Buhler writes:  
 
Once the camera-eye – itself a corps étranger – has entered the 
body, another corps étranger – the spectator – becomes an 
uneasy witness, caught on the narrow rim of a deepening crevice 
as though the floor itself had been shifted to the upper edge, and 
drawn into the circular projection of images of a body that, even 
as a corps étranger, is a physically tangible reflection of our 
own lives.63  
 
It is precisely that layering of different objects and bodies that might stand in for 
the ‘foreign body’, which is echoed in Hatoum’s own writings: 
 
I called it Corps Étranger because the camera is in a sense this 
alien device introduced from the outside. Also it is about how 
we are closest to our own body, and yet it is a foreign territory 
which could, for instance, be consumed with disease long before 
we become aware of it. The ‘foreign body’ also refers literally to 
the body of a foreigner.64 
 
Furthermore, when viewing the work, the overwhelming sense is of 
displacement. What are we looking at? Is that really inside my body also? The 
visual representation of the body as strange and unsettling in Corps Étranger 
underwrites phenomenological accounts of the body as distant from us, and the 
conceptual distance between body and image as highly mediated by various 
technologies of image capture and replay. There are few – if any – visual 
trajectories into which such a representation of the body might fall. A body so 
                                                
63 Panhaus-Buhler, Ursula ‘Mona Hatoum: Being Involved’ available on the White Cube 
website: http://www.whitecube.com/artists/hatoum/texts/99/.  
64 ‘Mona Hatoum: interview with Janine Antoni’. I would note however, that when she refers to 
‘the body of a foreigner’ perhaps Hatoum doesn’t necessarily mean herself, as earlier in this 
interview she strongly rejects the endless interest in her cultural or racial identity and the 
homogenization of terms such as Lebanese, Palestinian and Arabic. 
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pink, fleshy, open and wet is beyond the remit of ordinary visual experience of 
the body as very few individuals have experience of viewing the internal spaces 
of the body. As the outer layers of signification (the face, the hair, the skin) are 
largely rejected in favour of deeper recesses, Corps Étranger presents a body at 
the limits of representation, at a point where the artistic might collapse in to the 
scientific, and vice-versa.  
 
In the installation, as if encased in a dark womb/room65, we are surrounded by 
the rushing noise of a heartbeat. At our feet we see the pulsation of the tubular 
lumen, the pinkness of the flesh, the sloshing of the bile. That the installation 
environment resembles the white-plastic casing of fMRI or CT machines 
perhaps implies that it is our body being scanned.66 Both the images on the 
screen and the format of the projection thus invite associations with the body 
and an embodied encounter with the work.67 Yet, at the heart of Corps Étranger 
is actually a displacement between the body and the image in which, by virtue 
of laying claim to the body so openly, the failure of the work to sufficiently 
represent it is laid bare. That the body seems to elude representation is here 
magnified by the visual appeals to it, emphasizing the troublesome gap between 
experience of our own bodies and the images we apprehend in the installation, 
underlining the estrangement we feel when we look at them. In Corps Étranger, 
there is not a simple reflection or doubling of the body of the spectator in the 
body on the screen, but instead a complex and shifting dialogue between one 
and the other is set up. As the circles and cycles give way to one another – the 
tube, the screen, the eye, the lumen – there is an interplay between bodies. 
                                                
65 From May 2009 through February 2011 the work was on display at the Centre Georges 
Pompidou as part of the exhibition ‘Elles@CentrePomidou: Artistes Femmes dans les 
Collections du Musée National d’Art Moderne’. It is installed in a section entitled ‘A room of 
one’s own/Cellules d’habitation’ drawing on the historical associations of the feminine with the 
domestic and the notions of domesticity or interiority associated with the womb.  
66 The tube of the installation environment also mimics the cylindrical structure of the bodily 
paths traveled by the endoscope. See Lajer-Burcharth, Ewa ‘Real Bodies: Video in the 1990s’ in 
Art History Vol. 20, No. 2, June 1997 (pp. 185-213) p. 200.  
67 For a discussion of the embodied encounter set up in this work through touch see Ross, 
Christine ‘To Touch the Other: a Story of Corpo-Electronic Surfaces’ in The Feminism and 
Visual Culture Reader, Jones, A, ed., Routledge, London and New York, 2003 (pp. 514-19). 
However, in opposition to Ross, it seems to me almost as if we are not meant to touch the work, 
since there is a narrow ledge that runs around the edge of the projection that actually forces the 
spectator up against the wall, rather than encourage them to stand on the screen.  
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Hatoum’s body is simply not a reflection of ours; it is a reflection of the absence 
of our bodies that we paradoxically (don’t) experience. 
 
It is precisely this disconnected relationship between the body and its 
representation that is at the heart of Jean-Luc Nancy’s text Corpus (1992). This 
disconnection has its origins in Christianity, for Nancy, with the hoc est enim 
corpus meum. The Eucharist, said over bread and wine to invoke the body of 
Christ (either literally or symbolically) produces a primary splitting between the 
body and the attempt to represent it. From the Eucharist, he writes, subsequently 
comes numerous variants of this phrase: ‘ego sum, the nude in painting, the 
Social Contract, engravings by Vesalius or Leonardo…Hoc est enim corpus 
meum can generate the whole corpus of a general encyclopedia of western 
sciences, arts and ideas.’68  
 
Following from Nancy, therefore, I contend that scientific – and especially 
medical – images become a part of this trajectory since the very mode of 
representation seems to engender a splitting between body and image. Corps 
Étranger insists on the presence of the body by appealing to the certitude 
granted by the sight and light of western medical epistemology. Yet it is 
precisely in this mode of representing the body – using the technologies of the 
clinical eye – that the body becomes more elusive, due to the levels of 
technological mediation that it has undergone. It is a body, but as seen through 
fibreoptics, a computer screen, a projector, a gallery installation, and several 
pairs of human eyes. The body, therefore, always eludes its own representation 
since hoc est enim corpus meum, is countered by an anxiety of absence, a this 
that is insisted upon so incessantly that it necessarily entails its own 
disappearance:  
 
But we certainly feel some formidable anxiety: ‘here it is’ is in 
fact not so sure; we have to seek assurance for it. That the thing 
itself would be there isn’t certain. Here, where we are, amounts 
to nothing more, perhaps, than a reflection, or floating 
                                                
68 Nancy, Jean-Luc Corpus, Rand, R. A. trans., Fordham University Press, New York, 2008 p. 
5. 
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shadows… Sensory certitude, as soon as it is touched, turns into 
chaos, a storm where all senses run wild… Body is certitude 
shattered and blown to bits. Nothings more proper, nothings 
more foreign to our old world… The anxiety, the desire to see, 
touch and eat the body of God, to be that body and be nothing 
but that, forms the principle of western (un)reason. That’s why 
the body, bodily, never happens, least of all when it’s named 
and convoked. For us, the body is always sacrificed: Eucharist.69 
 
Far from the corporeal materiality at the heart of phenomenological accounts of 
embodiment, Corps Étranger demonstrates that the experience of our bodies is 
ultimately structured around estrangement and absence. Nancy, writing during a 
period of convalescence after receiving a heart transplant, argued that the 
body/self should be conceived in terms of otherness since it is always a stranger 
or intruder upon itself (l’intrus70).71 The body is always Other, always strange, 
always foreign (étranges corps étrangers72). In fact, ‘the body’, he writes, 
‘might serve as a name for the Stranger.’73 As such, the title Corps Étranger 
invokes a kind of textual looping as the strangeness of the body becomes folded 
back onto itself: the term ‘corpus’ might not need ‘étranger’ if the two already 
share semiotic content.  
 
Corps Étrangers, étranges corps étrangers, these words establish the interplay 
between self/other and inside/outside that structures the scientific – and more 
                                                
69 Nancy, p. 5.  
70 See Nancy’s essay ‘L’Intrus’ in Corpus (pp. 161-170), in which Nancy’s discussion of his 
transplanted heart reveals that the relationship between stranger/self is always premised on 
notions of sickness/health and inside/outside. 
71 He writes, ‘I’ll never know my body, never know myself as a body right there where corpus 
ego is an unqualified certainty. By contrast, I’ll always know others as bodies. An other is a 
body because only a body is an other. It has this nose, that skin colour, this texture, that size, 
this fold, tightness. It weighs this weight. It smells that way. Why is this body thus, and not 
otherwise? Because it is other – and alterity consists in being-thus, in being the thus and thus 
and thus of this body, exposed all the way into its extremities. The inexhaustible corpus of a 
body’s features.’ (Nancy, p. 31). 
72 ‘Étranges corps étrangers’ is the title of a section of Corpus, which is translated as ‘strange 
foreign bodies.’ See Nancy, p. 7. 
73 Nancy, p. 8.  
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specifically medical – gaze which is played out in the work.74 Indeed, the term 
‘strange’ has a notable (or strange) relationship to the extraneous, external, 
exterior. The Oxford English Dictionary explicates the term ‘extraneous’ with 
reference to the ‘strange’, tying them at their etymological origins:  
 
[f. L. extrne-us external (f. extr outside) + -OUS. (Cf. strange, 
ad. OF. estrange:L. extrneus.)]  
    1. a. Of external origin; introduced or added from without; 
foreign to the object in which it is contained, or to which it is 
attached. 
    b. Of an action, etc.: Proceeding from without. 
    c. nonce-use. Brought from abroad, ‘exotic’. 
    2. a. External to, not comprised in or forming part of, the 
object under consideration. 
    b. Of a person: Not belonging to a specified community, 
country, or family. 
    c. Foreign in nature, having nothing in common. Obs. rare.75 
 
‘Foreign to the object in which it is contained’, the strange thus plays the role of 
something both self and not self: incorporated but under threat of expulsion, 
excision, surgical removal. The interior spaces, organs and fluids of the body 
are ‘strange’, part of me yet alien to me. Simultaneously part of us and foreign 
to us (both within and without), the interior body is extraneous in this dialectical 
sense of the strange. This looping is undoubtedly figured in Corps Étranger by 
the deliberate confusion over whose body is intended to be perceived as strange, 
since the strangeness of Hatoum’s body/image is reflected back onto that of the 
spectator, as we are made to realize that such a strange space exists within us 
also. Especially when we stand over the image as if the camera were actually 
inside of us too. Nancy writes, ‘my self becomes my intruder… The intruder is 
                                                
74 Of note is that Corps Étranger was commissioned by the Centre Georges Pompidou, which 
itself is a building that has been turned ‘inside out’ as the working parts of the building (pipes, 
ducts etc) are external. 
75 Entry for ‘Extraneous’ in The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition 1989, Oxford University 
Press (OED Online: http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50081045) 
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nothing but myself and man himself.’76 The title Corps Étranger thus refers to 
the layering of strange foreign bodies in the work, in which several objects 
might be perceived as the stranger: the spectator, Hatoum, the endoscope, and 
the clinical gaze. That the body is strange, for Nancy, is by virtue of it being 
diaphanous, neither inside nor outside, a corpus which defies interpretation, 
touch, reading: 
 
Bodies aren’t some kind of fullness or filled space (space is 
filled everywhere): they are open space, implying, in some 
sense, a space more properly spacious than spatial, what could 
also be called a place. Bodies are places of existence, and 
nothing exists without a place, a there, a here, a here is, for a 
this. The body-place isn’t full or empty, since it doesn’t have an 
outside or an inside, any more than it has parts, a totality, 
functions, or finality. Its acephalic and aphallic in every sense, 
as it were. Yet it is a skin, variously folded, refolded, unfolded, 
multiplied, invaginated, exogastrulated, orificed, evasive, 
invaded, stretched, relaxed, excited, distressed, tied, untied.77 
 
While Nancy characterizes one’s relationship with one’s body as an ‘intruder’ – 
with the association of penetration that might fit all too neatly with models of 
the endoscope as an appendage of a phallic clinical gaze78 – perhaps Corps 
Étranger in fact shows that such a relationship is based on a more nuanced 
system of bodies looking and being looked at, in which the strange is 
simultaneously both internal and extraneous. The body is perhaps not simply re-
integrated into its representation in Corps Étranger but rather made 
fundamentally aware of the split between the two. The use of endoscopy in 
Corps Étranger thus serves to demonstrate the mechanisms by which 
technologies of seeing the body become internalized so that the eye of the 
viewer becomes co-extensive with the eye of the doctor, the endoscope, and the 
artist producing the film, thus reflecting that gaze back onto oneself.  
                                                
76 Nancy, pp. 168-170. 
77 Nancy, p. 31.  
78 See Creissels, Ann ‘Foreign Bodies: the Spectator’s Metamorphoses’ in Cahiers du Musée 
National d’Art Moderne, No. 80, 2002 (pp. 41-55). 
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This split between the body and its self/image is indicative of a wider sense in 
which the body is always underwritten by absence. In his important early work, 
The Absent Body (1990), Drew Leder argues that core phenomenological 
experiences are, in fact, absences of experience. Examples he cites include: the 
invisibility of the eye within its own visual field79; the diaphanous embodiment 
of language; the inaccessibility of the visceral organs; the embryonic body prior 
to birth; the autonomous rhythms of breathing and circulation; the body of 
sleep; and the corpse. Following from my work on Schneemann in relation to 
Jacques Derrida and Nancy in chapter one, I would also add touching to this list, 
as touch always simultaneously entails a not touching. Despite these 
fundamental experiences of absence, theories are generally absent in the core 
literature on phenomenology. For example, Leder has noted that Merleau-Ponty, 
one of the most influential writers on embodiment and phenomenology, has 
entirely neglected to deal with these examples of ‘corporeal disappearance’ in a 
way that inscribes his work into the histories of Cartesian dualism, where an 
emphasis on the ‘higher’ regions of the body forgets that it is ‘fleshed out with 
bone and guts’.80 Since it structures so much of our ontology, the lack of 
engagement with the phenomenology of absence has arguably left our 
understanding of the body/self somewhat incomplete, and enabled 
phenomenological theory to perpetuate longstanding (but problematic) 
philosophical questions about personal identity. Rather, it might be more 
productive to recognise a phenomenology that is suspended between presence 
and absence: asserting embodiment even while our experience of it is fleeting or 
diaphanous.81  
                                                
79 As also touched upon by Jacques Derrida in On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, Irizarry, C. 
trans., Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2005, p. 2. For a discussion of this idea 
see chapter one. 
80 Leder, Drew The Absent Body, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1990 p. 36. 
For further discussion of the link with Cartesian dualism see also p. 3. 
81 It is perhaps worth noting Leder’s point that ‘in his discussion of lived embodiment, Merleau-
Ponty makes use of the term corps propre (ones own body) in Phenomenology of Perception, 
which might suggest a privileging of the first person point of view. However, as Merleau-Ponty 
emphasizes, especially in his later work, it is intrinsic to lived embodiment to be both subject 
and an object available to an external gaze.’ (Leder, p. 6). For a further discussion of these ideas 
see Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Smith, C. trans., Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London and Henley, 1962 (pp. 346-65); and Merleau-Ponty The Visible and the Invisible, 




Although Leder is concerned with theories of absence in non-visual categories 
of experience, such as death or language, he acknowledges that it is the act of 
seeing that primarily forms the basis for this absence, as interior spaces of the 
body recede from (visual) perception. Thus, while both models are clearly 
concerned with vision, Nancy’s argument is concerned with representation and 
Leder’s is concerned with looking.82 Therefore, the use of endoscopy in Corps 
Étranger is crucial, since the exposure of the internal spaces of the body 
reinforces the bewildering sense of their disappearance from everyday 
experience. Hatoum’s work suggests that both visibility and invisibility pose a 
problem: the inability to see the internal organs in a quotidian context makes 
them strange, but they paradoxically also become strange the moment they are 
made visible. 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I recounted the experiment concerning a study 
group’s (in)ability to recognize photographs of their own hands, and posed the 
question about how further complicated this might be if we considered parts of 
our anatomy not normally visible to us. In the case of our internal organs, the 
absence that we experience in relation to the parts of our body is, in fact, so total 
– as a result of spatial ambiguity and the spatio-temporal discontinuity brought 
about by a lack of nerve endings – that we do not even feel it. We do not notice 
the emptiness, which would then make the absence some kind of thing or 
presence. Instead, the very absence that we don’t experience cements the logic 
of its own disappearance from critical inquiry and reflection. As Leder writes, 
‘the absence of the liver parenchyma is so total that few would ever realize or 
remark upon it.’83  
 
What is particularly important for me in looking at the work of Leder in relation 
to Hatoum, however, is his model of dys-appearance, which foregrounds my 
discussion of the overlapping discourses of visibility and pathology. In Leder’s 
                                                
82 For a discussion of Nancy’s ideas in relation to Leder’s, see Shildrick, Margrit ‘Contesting 
Normative Embodiment: Some Reflections on the Psycho-Social Significance of Heart-
Transplant Surgery’ in Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1 
Inaugural Issue: Body and Embodiment, 2008 (pp. 12-22) especially pp. 19-20. 
83 Leder, p. 43. 
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concept of dys-appearance, there is a complex relationship between the healthy 
and the invisible and the unhealthy and the visible. The disappearance of the 
body, which characterizes ordinary or ‘healthy’ functioning (in which there is 
an absence of vision/awareness), occasionally gives way to what he calls dys-
appearance. That is, the appearance or an awareness of the interior organs or 
spaces of our body only when something is wrong. They become visible to us 
when they are in a dys state, from the Greek meaning ‘bad’, ‘ill’ or ‘hard’. This 
neologism both differs from the Latin disappearance (meaning ‘away’, ‘apart’, 
‘asunder’) while simultaneously acknowledging it. It is both homonym and 
antonym. What dys-appearance proposes is that we are only made aware of our 
daily experiences of absence by virtue of something being in a dysfunctional 
state. This state can occur through disease (pathology of the organs) as well as 
at other times of corporeal limit such as hunger, thirst or tiredness: ‘it is 
precisely because the normal and healthy body largely disappears that direct 
experience of the body is skewed towards times of dysfunction.’84 What is 
crucial in this formulation is that the malfunctioning or diseased body part or 
organ not only begins to function independently as a ‘part’, outside of its 
customary function in relation to the ‘whole’ (cf. the discussion of the part-body 
at the beginning of this chapter), but it also makes its presence known by 
becoming manifest or visible.85 This relationship between pathology and 
visibility takes us back to our discussion of the (in)visibility of the vagina, 
situating it as a social construction within this notion of dys-appearance. 
 
This question of visibility and illness also resonates with the work of Nancy, 
who has written, ‘Up to this point, it was strange by virtue of not being even 
perceptible. From now on it fails, and this strangeness binds me to myself. ‘I’ 
am, because I am ill.’86 The body is thus perpetually caught in a cycle of being 
strange: either it is strange because it recedes from our experience (it is foreign 
to us) or it is strange because it has become visible to us by transforming itself 
into a threat to our health. It is notable that Hatoum’s work was being developed 
                                                
84 Leder, p. 86. 
85 See also Grosz, who writes that ‘in the case of illness or pain, the effected zones of the body 
become enlarged and magnified in the body image…illness engorges specific regions of the 
body image.’ (Grosz, p. 76). 
86 Nancy, p. 163. 
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around the same time that both Leder and Nancy were publishing these texts, 
since it points toward a particular theorization of the body – and an anxiety – in 
which medicine and pathology (as technologies of vision) were having a 
profound effect on ontology. Hatoum’s work certainly plays on the perpetual 
bind perceived by these writers, in which the body is always strange, by 
demonstrating that the body is strange both when it is in and out of sight. Corps 
Étranger expands and problematises Leder and Nancy’s formulation that the 
visibility/experience of the interior of the body is founded on pathology (i.e. we 
only see it when it is abnormal) by giving visibility to an otherwise healthy 
body.  
 
So, what of Hatoum’s direct exposure of the viscera of her healthy body? 
Usually, there are no periods when the interior spaces of the body are shown 
outside of pathology or crisis. As such, the very appearance of the internal 
viscera signifies abnormality.87 Something is wrong so it must be seen, but also 
that something is seen signifies that something must be wrong. In most visual 
cultures – artistic, medical or otherwise – the internal organs are unlikely to be 
exposed except at times of extreme threat to the body. Corps Étranger thus 
draws on these associations so as to consider how this attention to, or focus on, 
the abnormal – ‘that which implies or threatens the death of the person’ – 
characterizes Western clinical medicine as a whole, and medical imaging in 
particular. Indeed, the work takes on particular significance in the context of the 
positioning of the female body in relation to this system of medical 
epistemology, since the only time at which a healthy body is brought into the 
clinician’s purview is when the body has become culturally coded as deviant, as 
opposed to biologically pathological. Such states refer almost totally to women 
since menstruation, pregnancy, menopause and childbirth are all considered 
pathological states88 (or perhaps ‘hysterical’ is a more apt term, given the 
relationship of these conditions to the uterus).  
 
                                                
87 Leder, p. 44. 
88 See Wertz, Richard W. & Wertz, Dorothy C. Lying In: A History of Childbirth in America, 
Schocken Books, New York, 1979; and Young, Iris Marion ‘Pregnant Embodiment: 
Subjectivity And alienation’ in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1984 
(pp. 45-62).  
 166 
Foucault’s foundational work The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of 
Medical Perception (1963), which continues to be at the core of critical studies 
of various medical institutions such as imaging, training, and surgery, first 
demonstrated the link between Western anatomy practice and pathology: 
 
Pathological anatomy was given the curious privilege of 
bringing to knowledge, at its final stage, the first principles of its 
positivity… The day it was admitted that lesions explained 
symptoms, and that the clinic was founded on pathological 
anatomy, it became necessary to invoke a transfigured history, 
in which the opening up of corpses, at least in the name of 
scientific requirements, preceded a finally positive observation 
of patients; the need to know the dead must already have existed 
when the concern to understand the living appeared.89  
 
This key passage describes three important developments in western clinical 
medicine: that causes of death might give us knowledge about disease; that the 
attainment of this knowledge is bound up with a scopic drive characterized by 
the enlightenment belief that to see is to know90; and that the whole purpose of 
such an opening up is to look for something deviant from the normal, so that 
disease, illness and sickness have subsequently become tied to abnormal 
physiology or pathology.91 For Foucault, vision has thus historically become the 
most privileged way of representing the body (both healthy and diseased), 
which is well demonstrated by the fact that diagnostic imaging technologies 
such as MRI or ultrasound operate by transforming numeric data sets in to a 
visual representation in order better to read and interpret them.  
 
                                                
89 Foucault, Michel Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, Sheridan, A. M. 
trans., Routledge, London and New York, 2003 pp. 152-154. 
90 For a fascinating example of the way in which such rhetoric continues to be employed in 
relation to endoscopy see Riegler, F. M. ‘Light, Echnaton and modern medical science’ in 
European Surgery, Vol. 41, No. 6, 2009 (pp. 247-48). 
91 Well cited examples of the repercussions of this is the way in which mental health problems 
and ‘abnormal’ sexualities were/are brought under the domain of pathology, since it was/is 
believed that there must be an organic reason for the problem. For an excellent discussion of 
this in relation to the definition of terms like ‘disease’, ‘sickness’ and ‘health’ see Boorse, 
Christopher ‘Health as a theoretical concept’ in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 4, 1977 (pp. 
542-573). 
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While numerous scholars have focused on the seminal shift in Western anatomy 
from the live to the dead body92, relatively few have considered Foucault’s link 
between pathology and illness and the implications for representations of 
healthy bodies in a medical context. The focus of the medical gaze is always on 
the sick rather than the healthy, even when representations of the normal might 
have epistemological value, especially in disciplines like gynecology where the 
range of what counts as normal is incredibly broad. For example, in Public 
Privates, Kapsalis has discussed representations of the female reproductive 
system in a key medical textbook – Danforth’s Obstetrics and Gynecology – 
noting that in the entire volume there is not a single representation of a ‘healthy’ 
or ‘normal’ cervix or genitalia. She writes, ‘If only abnormal or pathological 
anatomy is shown, it must be assumed that practitioners and students understand 
the wide range of healthy and normal anatomy that exists.’93 As with Leder’s 
model of dys-appearance, the clinical gaze is thus premised on the assumption 
that visibility is necessarily entwined with pathology. What this results in is a 
gaze that is blind to the healthy, and sees only the deviant. As Foucault writes, 
‘the clinical gaze was not bound by the narrow grid of structure (form, 
arrangement, number, size) but that could and should grasp colours, variations, 
tiny anomalies, always receptive to the deviant.’94  
 
 In Corps Étranger, in contrast to the traditional medical model, the gaze of the 
oeil clinique95 has here been trained not on a sick body but on a healthy one. I 
am not suggesting, however, that Hatoum’s work ought to be read in a clinical 
context, as if it were simply positioning itself as an example of healthy anatomy 
in the midst of a sea of images of diseased bodies. But rather that, by using 
medical equipment within an artistic context, it begins to question the visibility 
of certain types of bodies in certain representational contexts. By removing the 
conventional, instrumental function, the technology also renders both itself and 
                                                
92 For example see Leder, Drew ‘A Tale of Two Bodies: the Cartesian Corpse and the Lived 
Body’ in Leder ed., (pp. 17-35); Catherine Waldby, ‘The Visible Human Project: Data into 
Flesh, Flesh into Data’ in Marchessault and Sawhuck ed., (pp. 24-38); Braidotti pp. 57-73; 
Prasad, pp. 291-316. 
93 Kapsalis, p. 85. 
94 Foucault, 2003, p. 109. 
95 This is how the endoscope is described in the Centre Georges Pompidou’s ‘Direction de la 
communication’ for the 1994 Hatoum retrospective.  Pompidou archive DP1997 W102/8.  
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the body visible for non-diagnostic purposes. It makes us re-frame the question 
of the ‘pathological’ female body in gynecology, the ‘healthy’ female body in 
pornography (noting, however, that at times these different states would not be 
obvious because of the clinics habitual rejection of representations of healthy 
anatomy), and the ‘sick’ body in Body Art or extreme performance practices. 
Here I am using the term ‘sick’ with the inflexion of deviance rather than 
simply disease, a label frequently applied to artists whose practice is founded on 
endurance-based performance, bodily modification or subversive practices. In 
these cases, bodies become deemed pathological by virtue of the fact that they 
choose to display bodily experiences outside the range considered normal for 
the (artistic) context.  
 
The logic of the medical gaze which Hatoum’s endoscope here troubles is 
therefore an epistemology which decrees that the visible and the intelligible are 
interconnected: that to see is to know, since to see a body part or organ meant 
that it could be marked healthy, diseased or normal, but also that one has to 
know in order to be able to see. That the internal viscera are usually only 
exposed at times of extreme violence or pathology, means that the images in 
Corps Étranger become devoid of their usual signification. In this way, there is 
a sense in which the continual, looping activity of the endoscope as it travels 
throughout every possible orifice of the body, is a failure of a certain type of 
vision. The clinical gaze is frustrated in its search for pathology and its mode of 
‘seeing’ is laid bare. 
 
When the work was exhibited at the Tate in the show Rites of Passage: Art for 
the End of the Century (1995), a gastroenterologist reviewed it for the BMJ. 
Even though Hatoum’s body was ostensibly ‘normal’ at the time of the 
procedure, by virtue of the use of endoscopy it warranted a review in medical 
literature, and became pathologised and incorporated into this rubric. The 
gastroenterologist chose not to consider the way in which medical technologies 
might have been used in new representational contexts, but instead approached 
the images as if they were awaiting a diagnosis. Reading the 
gastroenterologist’s description, we encounter the frustration of the clinical gaze 
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when confronted with healthy anatomy, as if attempting to make up for the lack 
of pathology perceived by the endoscope: 
 
Two woman-size slots [my emphasis] allow the visitor to enter 
and stand against the black, cloth lined, inside wall around the 
perimeter of the floor, which is a screen for a continuous video, 
of the artist's alimentary tract. Upper gastrointestinal endoscopy 
began with filled teeth, then a normal tongue, uvula, 
oesophagus, stomach, and duodenum. The pylorus was 
deformed, both on entry and withdrawal, suggesting previous 
juxtapyloric inflammation. Colonoscopy gave extended views of 
the perineal hair and anus with normal rectum and colon in a 
well-prepared bowel. Heart sounds were much amplified, but 
blurred: I thought I heard a pansystolic murmur.96  
 
The only way in which the gastroenterologist was able to approach the work 
was in the context of pathology: the images signified to him only normality or 
abnormality.97 That the endoscope is equipped with tools to cut and cauterize 
abnormal sections of the gastrointestinal tract suggests that it is both designed 
and used with the expectation of encountering pathology: it is both diagnostic 
and therapeutic. Indeed, the endoscope has a rather full complement of 
accessories to perform various functions: aspiration, biopsy, brush cytology, 
cannulation (ERCP, Manometry), catheterisation (feeding, nasobiliary 
drainage), cauterisation (snare polypectomy, sphincterectomy, coagulation, 
tumour fulguration), dilation, gastronomy, guide wires, heater probe, 
coagulation, laser (coagulation, tumour fulguration), needle (variceal sclerosis, 
injection of alcohol/hemostasis, injection of dye), scissors/suture cutting.98  
 
Hatoum’s use of the endoscope in Corps Étranger thus doubly undermines the 
original function of the technology, putting it to new and novel uses. Hatoum’s 
                                                
96 Baron, Jeremy Hugh ‘Passing Fair’ in BMJ, Vol. 311, August 1995 p. 517. 
97 The emphasis on the filled teeth is particularly interesting since it is both legible to a wider 
audience and is also one of those peculiar conditions which results from pathology but is not 
classified as disease or sickness. See Boorse, p. 566. 
98 Hirschowitz, p. 104. 
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body is not diseased, and the interior spaces exhibit no pathology; there is 
nothing for the endoscope to ‘see’ and nothing for it to treat. Thus, Hatoum here 
abstracts the body from the pathological, challenging the operation of medical 
imaging in a system of representation based on the deviant. By removing 
pathology from the work, Corps Étranger forces us to consider several key 
questions concerning how these types of images might then ‘operate’ (with the 
inflexion of functioning and surgical intervention) outside of their usual 
representational context? Without pathology, as the clinical gaze would have us 
believe, are the images even visible or legible, and what is the nature of the 




Medical representations (whether they be scans, photographs, or diagrams) are 
often supplemented with accompanying text or captions, producing an intricate 
relationship between word and image. In her study of gynecological textbooks, 
Kapsalis considers the way in which text and image are often used alongside 
one another in clinical practice. Many of the images, she notes, have a complex 
relationship to what they show. For example, pathology is frequently not visible 
to the naked eye, and as such the captions are necessary in order to act as a sort 
of ‘fix or anchor’.99 Clinical representations of the body thus rely on a complex 
interplay of text, photography and schematic renderings in order to provide a 
more complete ‘picture’ since any one of these ways of representing the raw 
data alone seems to have limited epistemological value and, indeed, medical 
textbooks often now use a combination of all three, superimposed on one 
another.100  
 
Furthermore, the way that such images are used transforms them into textual 
representations. For Foucault, the focus on the pathological in the eighteenth 
century brought about an epistemic shift: to call a part or an organ diseased or 
healthy gave the body a syntax, a grammar which could be used to talk about it. 
                                                
99 Kapsalis, p. 86. 
100 For an example of this practice see Baggish & Karram, Atlas of Pelvic Anatomy and 
Gynaecological Surgery, 2nd edition, Saunders, 2006.  
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The introduction of pathology was thus a technology of representation that was 
inherently linked to the formation of the body as a legible system, in which 
parts signify and diseases are constructed.101 Disease subsequently becomes a 
system of semiotics, and the body a hermeneutics, decipherable only to the 
clinical gaze. Under the rubric of pathology, the body thus becomes a text, 
legible because it is healthy or abnormal and only in those terms. As Leder 
argues, ‘the physician is a hermeneut, reading the text of the surface body for 
what it has to say about corporeal depths.’102 Through the discourse of 
normal/abnormal – the language of pathology – the body makes itself visible 
and appears to the scrutinizing gaze of various systems: medical, desiring and 
otherwise. 
 
What is arguably peculiar about the clinical gaze is that it generally divides up a 
body that has already been converted into non-corporeal matter. Prior to 
observation by the clinical gaze, the subject will already have become part of a 
system that tends to understand the body as separate from representation. This is 
because the body will be figured as a statistical model, a subject of analysis, that 
has been re-constituted in facts and figures, and comprised of charts, graphs and 
tables.103 In ‘Drawing Things Together’ (1990), Bruno Latour has argued that 
this movement from living object to visual text about the object characterizes 
the entire scientific enterprise, and that the purpose of science is to transform 
natural objects into ‘standardized trace representations’ such as graphs, tables, 
                                                
101 Foucault, 2003, p. xxi and p. 111. For an extended discussion of the notion of the clinical 
gaze, see the chapters ‘Signs and Cases’ (pp. 107-130) and ‘Seeing and Knowing’ (pp. 131-
151). 
102 Leder, 1990, p. 51. For a discussion of medicine as a hermeneutic enterprise, see Daniel, 
Stephen L. ‘The Patient as Text: a Model of Clinical Hermeneutics’ in Theoretical Medicine, 
Vol. 7, No. 2, 1986 (pp. 195-210); Leder, Drew ‘Clinical Interpretation: the Hermeneutics of 
Medicine’ in Theoretical Medicine Vol. 11, No. 1, 1990 (pp. 9-24); and Braidotti, p. 62. On 
disease as a language, see also Turner, Bryan S. The Body and Society, Basil Blackwell, New 
York, 1984. Paula Treichler has identified what she calls ‘Turner’s Postulates’: 1) disease is a 
language 2) the body is a representation and 3) medicine is a political practice. Treichler, Paula 
‘Aids, Homophobia and Biomedical Discourse: an Epidemic of Signification’ in October, 43, 
1987 (pp. 31-70). 
103 What Foucault refers to as ‘biopolitics.’ For Foucault, what we take to mean the ‘clinical 
gaze’ is not necessarily simply synonymous with ‘vision’, but is actually a gaze that 
incorporates all manner of charts, graphs and other visual ordering mechanisms. The ‘gaze’ 
rather becomes a metaphor for the practice of ordering as it transforms bodies into legible 
devices (see Foucault, Michel The Will To Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume I, 
Hurley, R. trans., Penguin Books, 1998) 
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formulae and atlases.104 For Latour, as with Foucault105, the function of the 
scientific gaze is therefore not the natural object but the visual text produced 
about it, which does the crucial work of acting as a standardized, cooperative 
surrogate for the object/person under consideration.106  
 
The traditional goal of medical imaging is to transform the body into a 
representation without depth as schematic, textual and photographic renderings 
of the body are all brought together in one layer, brought to the surface in order 
that the body might be converted into the legible units healthy/not-healthy. The 
discovery that disease was linked to organic structures, and the subsequent 
reliance on sight to perceive sickness, precipitated a system in which the body 
became flattened out into a binary system of representation: YES/NO for 
exhibiting pathology. Of note in gastroenterology, perhaps, is that when patients 
present with symptoms but nothing abnormal is seen on endoscopy, the patient 
is labeled as having ‘functional disease’, an idiopathic diagnosis, like Irritable 
Bowel Syndrome, in which nothing is seen to explain their symptoms, but the 
symptoms are still acknowledged as real. As Foucault writes: 
 
Disease is perceived fundamentally in a space of projection 
without depth, of coincidence without development. There is 
only one plane and one moment. The form in which truth is 
originally shown is the surface in which relief is both manifested 
and abolished – the portrait: ‘he who writes the history of 
diseases must… observe attentively the clear and natural 
phenomena of diseases, however uninteresting they may seem. 
In this he must imitate the painters who when they paint a 
portrait are careful to mark the smallest signs and natural things 
that are to be found on the face of the person they are painting.’ 
                                                
104 The widespread use of anatomical atlases transforms the body in to a text, by reducing it to a 
standard. Anatomical atlases remain the dominant models by which anatomy is taught and 
include schematic, photographic, or digital representations. What counts as an anatomical atlas 
covers a huge range of objects from Vesalius’ De humani corporis fabrica libri septem (1543) 
to diagnostic dolls, to the Visible Human Project (1989 to present). 
105 It should be noted with interest, however, that Latour never references Foucault. 
106 See Latour, Bruno ‘Drawing things together’ in Representation in Scientific Practice, eds., 
Lynch and Woolgar, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, England 1990. 
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The first structure provided by classificatory medicine is the flat 
surface of perceptual simultaneity. Table and picture.107 
 
The clinical gaze thus perceives everything it needs to in a single instant, as 
there is no gradual unfolding of the subject/sickness.108 For Braidotti also, the 
transformation of the body into a text is linked to its transformation, through 
clinical representation, into ‘pure surface’. Bodily over-representation without 
embodiment, she argues, results in a physical reduction to ‘exteriority without 
depth, a moveable theatre of the self.’109 Furthermore, in Braidotti’s work – 
which, following from Foucault, is concerned with the transformation of the 
body into a textual representation that both relies on and perpetuates scopic 
epistemology – there is a sense in which these images, although superficial, 
actually begin to exceed the bodies they purport to represent in a ‘triumph of 
images’. Bodies caught in this system of representation become superseded by 
their images in clinical practice, to the point at which they do not matter so 
much as the visual text produced about them or, as Braidotti would put it, 
‘representation has the priority over that which is represented’.110 The clinical 
gaze thus transforms them into ‘objects of scopic consumption’ by making them 
more intelligible than the flesh and blood to which they refer. While 
qualitatively different in its focus on clinical representations that encompass 
non-figurative material (charts, graphs and statistics), this perhaps reiterates the 
split between the body and the image perceived by Nancy in Corpus. By 
exceeding the body, clinical representations thus reinforce the estrangement 
between self and image that is touched on in Corps Étranger. 
 
The key transformation of the body that happens with traditional medical 
imaging is therefore the move from inside to outside, or from depth to surface. 
The private, interior spaces become entangled in the logic of the exterior, social 
                                                
107 Foucault, 2003, p. 5. The quote that Foucault uses is from Sydenham, quoted by Boissier, F. 
de Sauvages, Nosolgie Methodique, Lyons 1772, Vol. 1. 
108 Alternatively, while Latour and Foucault view clinical images as a reduction or flattening 
out of representation others, such as Michael Lynch, believe that they are, in fact, multi-
layered, complex images which provide a sort of excess of meaning and interpretation: 
‘relative to the photograph, the diagram is an eidetic image and not merely a simplified image.’ 
(Quoted in Kapsalis, p. 97.)  
109 Braidotti, p. 50. 
110 Braidotti, p. 49-50. 
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body as the practices of coding and classification that have been historically 
inscribed on the surface body now come to occupy the interior spaces by 
marking them as normal or abnormal.111 The way in which the scientific gaze 
flattens out the body, to produce a representation without depth, is part of the 
drive to rationality that characterizes the masculine element of scopic practices 
more broadly.112 What this emphasizes is the notion that the opposition of 
knower and known, subject and object, is the same qualitative distinction as 
mind and body (res extensa and res cogitans). The masculine element of this 
consists precisely in the detachment, the perception of a clear and distinct 
determination of boundaries between self and world.113 The central problematic 
of Corps Étranger is thus concerned with the interconnections between vision, 
gender and scientific epistemology.  
 
Both in its formal appearance as a visual analysis (or text) about the female 
body, and its conceptual thematics of interiority, we are perhaps brought back to 
Craig’s Delicate Issue. This link might be further developed through Luce 
Irigaray’s work on techniques and technologies of looking, in particular her 
work on the speculum mirror. This is an important technology (both in the sense 
of a device and a visual language) to revisit in relation to Corps Étranger since, 
as we have already established, it not only proposes new modes of vision but 
also has been linked to the production of electronic images on a monitor, as per 
the theoretical work of Nell Tenhaaf that we saw in the previous chapter on 
video. Furthermore, Irigaray’s work is useful in considering the historical role 
of the notion of flatness, surface and depth in feminist theory. 
 
For Irigaray, the speculum is a scientific instrument that extends the capabilities 
of man’s analytic eye in order to penetrate the woman’s body – ‘to see with 
                                                
111 For a discussion of the historical role of the notion of depth in relation to the body see 
Jordanova, pp. 56-57. 
112 It is perhaps also of note that this flattening out of representation occurs not just in clinical 
and pornographic imagery but also in Laura Mulvey’s account of Hollywood cinema, since the 
heroine of the film is located outside of the narrative, converted into an icon and thus becomes 
without depth. See Mulvey, Laura ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, Screen, 16.3 
Autumn 1975 (pp. 6-18). 
113 See Fox Keller, Evelyn & Grontowski, Carol ‘The Minds Eye’ in Discovering Reality, 
Harding, S. & Hintikka, M. eds., Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983; Lloyd, Genevieve The Man of 
Reason, Methuen, London, 1986; and Bordo, Susan ‘The Cartesian Masculinisation of Thought’ 
in Signs, vol. 11, No. 3, 1986 (pp. 439-456)). 
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speculative intent’ – but only so as to confirm the truth of his own sexual 
identity.114 However, it might also function as a curved surface (resonating with 
the concave surface of the endoscopic image in Corps Étranger) to oppose the 
flat surface of Lacan’s mirror and, as such, can be an object that is re-
appropriated for a new type of looking (at women): 
  
Even if the place of origin, the original dwelling, even if not 
only the woman but the mother can be unveiled to his sight, 
what will he make of the exploration of this mine? Except usurp 
even more the right to look at everything, at the whole thing, 
thus reinforcing the erosion of his desire in the very place where 
he firmly believes he is working to reduce an illusion… To 
return to the gaze, it will be able to explore all the inner cavities. 
Although, in the case of the most secret, it will need the help of 
ancillary light and mirror. Of appropriate sun and mirrors. The 
instrumental and technical exploitation of sun and mirror will 
have shown the gaze, proved to it, that those mines contained no 
gold.115 
 
The flatness of the Lacanian mirror, whose function is to reflect the (male) 
subject is, for Irigaray, tied also to the flat surface of science, in which objective 
truth is thought to be reflected. But, she argues, any object under consideration 
is always mediated: we never look directly at it. Since Plato, we have avoided 
looking directly at things, ‘for fear of burning up the membrane at the back of 
the eye.’116 Vision has thus always entailed the platonic deferral to forms, a 
mediated, or deferred vision which only obscures and makes more blurry.117 
                                                
114 In this it is a historical artifact for looking at women: the surface of the spoon that James 
Marion Simms bent the handle of so he could peer more closely into the vaginas of the slave 
women he experimented on, and the clinical instrument which dilates the vagina, allowing the 
doctor to peer in, only to see his own eye reflected in the os. The eye of the (male) doctor is, for 
Irigaray, the penis. She writes, ‘yes, man’s eye – understood as substitute for the penis – will be 
able to prospect woman’s sexual parts, seek there new sources of profit…’ (Irigaray, Luce 
Speculum of the Other Woman, Gill, G. C. trans., Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 
1985 p. 145). 
115 Ibid., p. 145-6. 
116 Ibid., p. 147. 
117 ‘Find an economy of light in all its dazzling brilliance, without risk of combustion and death, 
marks humanity’s first steps into philosophy… But the consuming contact of light will also be 
 176 
The wall of Plato’s cave was a screen that both concealed the truth and 
projected a new truth. Techniques and technologies of looking purport to show 
the actual thing, while simultaneously disguising their own highly mediated 
relationship to it. As we have already seen in the writing of Nell Tenhaaf on 
Craig’s work, Irigaray’s model of the speculum mirror might be usefully read 
alongside these works as a new moment in moving image technology, in which 
electronic screens present a challenge to historical models for looking at 
women. In Corps Étranger, the endoscope appears to be throwing the light of 
reason onto those hidden spaces of the body, but in fact only make the body 
appear more strange, more alien, more unknowable. Like the speculum, the 
endoscope here only reveals the impossibility or failure of bodily 
representation.  
 
As the endoscope roams continuously between unknown external and internal 
structures, penetrating literal and conceptual boundaries, Hatoum overtly 
subverts traditional clinical representations by playing on notions of surface and 
depth as she presents herself as a subject that is comprised of both external and 
internal features, and as a subject that is with depth (i.e. spatial) but also 
strangely hollow (spacious). The depths of Hatoum’s body appear to be almost 
limitless, since there is always a gaping black hole in front of the camera, 
receding to unfathomable depths. Hatoum thus presents the body as a network 
of tunnels that invite exploration, so as to open up her body to the logic of 
scientific exploration.  
 
The choice of an end-viewing endoscope is perhaps here crucial, since it 
enhances the sense of tunnel vision produced by the tubular lumen, so that our 
                                                                                                                                      
avoided by attention to forms alone. Vision protects itself from the risk of blindness by using 
daylight for the exact perception of ‘beings’ and for the calculation of the relations and 
correlations ‘beings’ have with their ideal inscription in the psyche. Direct vision means looking 
directly ahead, of course, but it also means doing so through an optical apparatus that stands 
between man and light and prevents light from touching him at all… Reason – which will also be 
called natural light – is the result of systems of mirrors that ensure a steady illumination, 
admittedly, but one without heat or brilliance. The everlasting correctness of things seen clearly, 
perceived rightly, has banished not only the darkness of night but also the fires of noon. The 
episteme begins its surveying, measuring and calculating on the basis of shadows projected 
by/upon surfaces, screens, and supports… The impact, the contact, of light is – at least implicitly 
– considered to be too close to the sense and to matter to constitute the main source of profit for 
the intelligible. Light is too corruptible, too shifting and inconstant to form the basis of the 
relationship to the self and to the All.’ (Irigaray, p. 147-148). 
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gaze is always trained directly ahead in pursuit of an unseen terminus (to return 
to Irigaray: Direct vision means looking directly ahead, of course, but it also 
means doing so through an optical apparatus that stands between man and light 
and prevents light from touching him at all). We appear to hurtle feet first 
through the images down vertiginous, winding tunnels on a sort of rollercoaster 
ride through underground caverns and catacombs.118 The work scrambles ideas 
of scale, size and depth both through the use of an endoscopic camera with a 
magnification function, which distorts the surface features of skin and hair, and 
by showing interior spaces which bear no apparent relation to the actual scale of 
the individual being examined. At times, the openings are narrow and tight and 
at other times cavernous and cathedral-like, as if we could stand inside them.119 
As such, Corps Étranger seems to simulate the rhetoric of the fantastic journey, 
enacting the historical role of the passive female body as the recipient of a 
penetrating gaze, while simultaneously employing the logic of abstraction to 
undo this problematic representational history. This idea of the opening or the 
orifice is of philosophical importance for our discussion here, since, as Nancy 
has suggested, the notion of the void or hole is at the core of numerous 
epistemic practices, in that social and scientific enquiry has been founded on the 
language of penetration, tied peculiarly to female anatomy. The language he 
uses clearly resonates with the anxiety found in the work of Duchamp or 
Courbet: 
 
It’s no surprise that our thoughts, ideas and images are 
swallowed up in holes, instead of lingering within reach of their 
sides: caverns, crying mouths, hearts pierced through, inter feces 
                                                
118 For a discussion of the gendering of the rollercoaster see Lanza, Joseph ‘Female 
Rollercoaster (and Other Virtual Vortices)’ in Performing Arts Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, May 
1992 (pp. 51-63). 
119 Hatoum herself refers to this aspect of the work as a threatening void or abyss: ‘You enter a 
cylinder and you stand on the perimeter of the circular video image projected onto the floor. 
You feel like you are at the edge of an abyss that threatens to engulf you. It activates all sorts of 
fears and anxieties about the devouring womb, the vagina dentate, the castrating complex.’ 
(‘Mona Hatoum: interview with Janine Antoni). This is then echoed in a review of the work by 
Simon Grant, who writes, ‘Corps Étranger is a celebration of female sexuality which is both 
sensual and repellent… The eye travels down tubes held up like a gothic church interior, pulled 
down the passage as if spiralling in to an organic abyss before suddenly pulling back 
up.’(Abrioux, Yves and Grant, Simon ‘Mona Hatoum at the Pompidou: two responses’ in 
Untitled, September 1994 (p. 116)). 
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et urinam, skulls with staring eye holes, castrating vaginas, not 
openings, but evacuations, enucleations, collapses.120 
 
No matter how deep the endoscope goes in the pursuit of illuminating the 
mysterious black hole in front of us, the hidden depths of the body are as hollow 
and empty as the superficial clinical representations of it: The instrumental and 
technical exploitation of sun and mirror will have shown the gaze, proved to it, 
that those mines contained no gold.121  
 
By playing on the transformation of the body into a visual text, which occurs in 
clinical representation, Corps Étranger positions itself on a boundary, operating 
somewhere between medical and artistic imagery, surface and depth, and 
interior and exterior. As the endoscopic eye moves from inside to outside and 
back again, there is a flow between skin and flesh (exterior and interior) which 
makes the body appear as if it is being perpetually orificed and folded back in 
on itself. Thus the images of the body resist the flattening out of textual 
representation that typifies medical imaging since there is a continual play 
(conceptually, visually and linguistically) between surface and depth. Corps 
Étranger appears to subscribe to technologies and cartographies of the 
(female)122 body, but only in order to undo its role in knowledge production, as 
the work uses the tension between interior and exterior in order to destabilize 
the traditional privileging of sight in the conversion of hidden depths to legible 
                                                
120 Nancy, p. 75. This also puts me in mind of Victor Hugo’s exploration of sewers in Les 
Miserables: 
‘The history of mankind is reflected in the history of cloacae. The sewer ... is the resting place 
of all failure and all effort. To political economy it is a detritus, and to social philosophy, a 
residue. ... Every foulness of civilization, fallen into disuse, sinks into that ditch of truth wherein 
ends the huge social downslide, to be swallowed, but to spread ... No false appearance, no 
whitewashing, is possible.... It is more than fraternity, it is close intimacy.... A sewer is a cynic. 
It tells all.’ (Hugo, Victor Les Miserables, Denny, N. trans., Penguin Books, London, 1976 p. 
1065). 
121 As Desa Philippi writes in the exhibition catalogue, ‘il n’y à voir.’ (Philippi, Desa ‘Some 
Body’ in Mona Hatoum, Exh.Cat., Editions du Centre Pompidou, 1994 (pp. 24-35)). 
122 To this I would also add the histories of charting non-white bodies/societies. Even while 
Hatoum is keen to distance herself from racial discourse, there are key historical moments of 
overlap between seeing into women’s bodies and seeing into non-white bodies. Of particular 
relevance to this discussion would be James Marion Simms’ gynaecological experiments on 
slave women in his backyard hospital, and the exhibition of Saartje Baartman and her genitals 
after her death. For a discussion of the way in which race and gender intersect in the context of 
the clinical gaze see the chapter, ‘Mastering the Female Pelvis: Race and the Tools of 
Reproduction’ in Kapsalis (pp. 31-60).  
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surfaces. Corps Étranger thus presents a new view of a woman’s body as the 
internal spaces, which usually lie outside the domain of pornographic and 
artistic imagery, are turned inside out, causing a crisis between the boundaries 
of medical, artistic and pornographic representation. 
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1950: You are alone in the room, except for two computer terminals flickering 
in the dim light. You use the terminals to communicate with two entities in 
another room, whom you cannot see. Relying solely on their responses to your 
questions, you must decide which is the man, which the woman. Or, in another 
version, you use the responses to decide which is the human, which the 
machine. One of the entities wants to help you guess correctly. His/her/its best 
strategy may be to answer your questions truthfully. The other entity wants to 
mislead you. He/she/it will try to reproduce through the words that appear on 
your terminal the characteristics of the other entity. Your job is to pose 
questions that can distinguish verbal performance from embodied reality. If you 
cannot tell the intelligent machine from the intelligent human, your failure 
proves that machines can think… If you distinguish correctly which is the man 
and which the woman, you in effect reunite the enacted and the represented 
bodies into a single gender identity. The very existence of the test, however, 
implies that you may also make the wrong choice. Thus the test functions to 
create the possibility of a disjunction between the enacted and the represented 
bodies, regardless which choice you make. What the test “proves” is that the 
overlay between the enacted and the represented bodies is no longer a natural 
inevitability but a contingent production, mediated by a technology that has 
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become so entwined with the production of identity that it can no longer 
meaningfully be separated from the human subject.1  
 
N Katherine Hayles’ above description of Alan Turing’s important paper, 
‘Computing machinery and intelligence’ (1950), highlights the tension between 
self and image that has been running throughout this thesis. I hope to disrupt the 
claim that technology is frequently perceived as being the cause of some 
conceptual or perceptual splitting between the enacted and the represented body 
(to use Hayles’ terms), by pointing toward the way in which it is not technology 
as such, but rather the social and discursive practices that crystallise around it 
that tend to perpetuate the troublesome relationship between the body and 
technology. As Hayles has demonstrated, it is not in fact the technology but the 
test that produces this uneasy relationship. As we have already seen in relation 
to the work of Mona Hatoum, the idea of a split between the body and its 
representation, which comes out of theories of computer technology at this time, 
has impacted on retrospective discussions of other types of technologically 
mediated representation. Nowhere has this particular problem of representation 
been more evident, both in academic literature and popular culture, than in the 
use of digital technologies in image making practices. Turing’s experiment 
specifically focused on digital computers because all digital computers were 
seen to be alike in their workings: if the experiment worked for one, it would 
work for all.  
 
In discussions related to a number of computer technologies, such as 
programming, virtual reality and the Internet, the idea of code and, specifically, 
binary has been a central focus of critical attention as the common feature to all. 
This concept of the zero sum game as an all-or-nothing plane of representation, 
corresponding to electrical pulses, seemed to precipitate a crisis in theories of 
human-machine interactions around the mid-1990s, in which there was a 
supposedly disembodied interaction with an abstract plane of representation 
comprised of code.  
 
                                                
1 Hayles, N. Katherine How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature 
and Informatics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1999, p. xi.  
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For those theorists working from within predominantly visual disciplines such 
as Art History, Visual Culture or New Media studies, the interaction between 
computers and still or moving image technologies, such as film, video or 
photography, led to a widespread acceptance that representation operated in a 
realm in which the image was becoming increasingly malleable. As a series of 
1s and 0s, binary was a form of representation that made it all too easy for the 
new information-image to be cut, pasted, transformed, and generated from 
nothing.2 Kevin Robins, one of the key figures thinking through such problems, 
characterized this as a destabilizing of the relationship between the real and not 
real.3 Divorced from any basis in a material reality, digital technologies 
described a system of representation in which experience was disembodied from 
social relations and thus became a reified thing in itself. Furthermore, the 
subsequent theoretical split between a material body/self and a virtual 
image/self was conceived as similar in type to the splitting of the self as 
presented in psychosis.4  
 
But, as with Turing’s test, such claims were applied to all digital technologies, 
without fully working through the specificity of the different processes that 
occur. Indeed, to support his model, Robins made reference to a number of 
technologies, from virtual reality to digital photography to remote weapons 
systems, in order to establish an equivalence that also characterizes the primary 
anxiety associated with binary: that, as a code, there is a potential equivalence 
with other systems that rely on code, making everything infinitely replicable and 
                                                
2 A common example of this type of discourse, which draws heavily on the work of Jean 
Baudrillard, is as follows: ‘The moment foreseen by Jorge Luis Borges, in which ambitious 
cartographers have produced a map with such detail and accuracy that it would completely 
cover the very territory it depicts, has become normalized in everyday life…images produced 
not with photography – light – but digitally, with 0s and 1s. In a strange double vision, the 
hypothetical surveilled citizen could step outside her home and then view her screenal self, 
moments later on her personal computer. In the hyperreal, simulation and lived experience are 
inseparable.’ See Sommer, Lucia ‘In/Visible Body: Notes on Biotechnologies’ Vision’ in 
Domain Errors! Cyberfeminist Practices, Wilding, F., Fernandez, M. & Wright, M. M. eds., 
Autonomedia, New York 2002 (pp. 123-133) p.123; see also Johnson, Steven Interface Culture: 
How New Technology Transforms the Way We Create and Communicate, HarperCollins, San 
Francisco, 1997, in which he claims that the computer is not a representational system but a 
symbolic one that traffics in signs and symbols. 
3 Robins, Kevin ‘The Virtual Unconscious in Postphotography’ in Electronic Culture: 
Technology and Visual Representation, Timothy Druckrey ed., Aperture, New York, 1996 (pp. 
154-163) p. 155. 
4 Ibid., pp. 162-163. 
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transformable and vulnerable to practices of dislocation, destroying the 
situatedness of subjectivity so important to the work of feminist theorists such as 
Rosi Braidotti or Elizabeth Grosz. The perceived equivalences between binary 
code and genetic code has aggravated the critical discourse to a point where the 
human subject itself is now also seen to be in crisis. Reduced to code, the subject 
appears to exist within a flat plane of representation that transforms bodies into 
bodies of knowledge: as wholly knowable, readable, and transformable. As 
Donna Haraway has written: 
 
In the technical-mythic systems of molecular biology, code rules 
embodied structure and function, never the reverse. Genesis is a 
serious joke, when the body is theorized as a coded text whose 
secrets yield only to the proper reading conventions, and when 
the laboratory seems best characterized as a vast assemblage of 
technological and organic inscription devices. The central 
dogma was about a master control system for information flow 
in the codes that determine meaning in the great technological 
communications systems that organisms progressively have 
become since WWII. The body is an artificial intelligence 
system, and the relation of copy and original is reversed and 
then exploded.5 
 
This turn towards theorizing the subject as a code – which is evident both in 
technophilic fantasies of transcendence and parallel technophobic fears of the 
demise of classical humanism – is fundamentally about the desires and anxieties 
associated with access to knowledge about the body/self. As we have already 
seen in relation to Mona Hatoum’s use of medical imaging in Corps Étranger, 
                                                
5 Haraway, Donna ‘Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies: Determinations of Self in Immune 
System Discourse’ in Knowledge, Power, Practice: The Anthropology of Medicine and 
Everyday Life, Lindenbaum, S. & Lock, M. eds., University of California Press, Berkeley, LA 
and London, 1993 (pp. 364-410) p. 367. See also Waldby, Catherine ‘The Visible Human 
Project: Data into Flesh, Flesh into Data’ in Wild Science: Reading Feminism, Medicine and the 
Media, Marchessault, J. & Sawchuk, K. eds., Routledge, London and New York, 2000 (pp. 24-
38) p. 32; Thacker, Eugene ‘Open Source DNA and Bioinformatics Bodies’ in Signs of Life: 
Bioart and Beyond, Eduardo Kac ed., MIT Press, Cambridge Mass., 2006 (pp. 31-42); and 
Avise, John The Hope, Hype and Reality of Genetic Engineering, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford and New York, 2004 especially pp. 181-182.  
 184 
such rhetoric echoes the modes by which medicine also traditionally stratifies 
organs and systems in order to identify and contain any transgression 
(pathology), turning the body into a surface or text, i.e. making it readable.6 In 
contemporary art practices that utilize the techniques of genetic engineering, 
such as Eduardo Kac’s The Eighth Day (2001), the equivalence between codes 
(language, genetics, binary) is often assumed and reinforced.7 The question of 
codification then, for Haraway, is a question of searching for a common 
language in which different systems – technological, organic or textual – might 
be capable of integration with one another, and therefore no longer be 
ontologically opposed.8 As such, codification becomes primarily a technique for 
cutting across difference and instrumentalising, through homogenization, 
systems of representation. While this model can account in sophisticated ways 
for the mechanisms by which bodies and artifacts become integrated into the 
structures of capital, by making everything de- and re-tachable, as Rosi 
Braidotti would say, the way in which the discourse has been structured around 





                                                
6 Here, following from the chapter on Mona Hatoum, I would again refer back to Rosi Braidotti 
who argues that medicine has always strived for forms of representation that standardize and 
quantify the body. See Braidotti, Rosi ‘Body Images and the Pornography of Representation’ in 
Knowing the Difference, Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology, Lennon & Whitford eds., 
Routledge, London and New York, 1994. Furthermore, the idea of ‘code’ has also enabled the 
proliferation of confused bodily metaphors in relation to computers and vice-versa. Haraway 
writes, ‘The invective, invading information fragments that parasitise their host code in favour 
of their own replication and their own program commands are more than metaphorically like 
biological viruses. And, like the body’s unwelcome invaders, the software viruses are discussed 
in terms of pathology as communications terrorism, requiring therapy in the form of strategic 
security measures. There is a kind of epidemiology of virus infections of artificial intelligence 
systems, and neither the large corporate and military systems nor the personal computers have 
good immune defences. Both are extremely vulnerable to terrorism and rapid proliferation of the 
foreign code that multiplies silently and subverts normal functions. Immunity programmes to 
kill the viruses, like Data Physicians sold by Digital Despatch, are being marketed. More than 
half the buyers of Data Physician in 1985 were military. Every time I start up, my Macintosh 
shows the icon for its vaccine programme: a hypodermic needle.’ Haraway, p. 404. 
7 Eduardo Kac has written that biological processes are now ‘writerly and programmable’. See 
The Eighth Day: The Transgenic Art of Eduardo Kac, Britton, S. & Collins, D. eds., Institute for 
Studies in the Arts, Arizona State University, Tempe, 2003 p. 9. For a critique of the way in 
which these practices are often misrepresentative of the actual techniques and processes of 
biotechnology, see Stracey, Frances ‘Bio-art: the ethics behind the aesthetics’ in Nature Reviews 
Molecular Cell Biology, 20 May 2009, doi:10.1038/nrm2699. 
8 Haraway, p. 378.  
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Sean Cubitt, who published one of the first sustained discussions of the 
intersection of computer technologies with broader visual cultures in his book 
Digital Aesthetics (1998), has described the tendency towards the metaphors of 
flattening out the subject into textual representation that occurs with computer 
technologies. For Cubitt this does not occur purely as a result of the use of 
binary in the production and distribution of virtual spaces, materials and/or 
social relations, but also in programming languages more broadly, and in the 
reliance upon ASCII text to represent oneself in MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons 
or Domains): 
 
Textual representation does not allow the self to evaporate or 
dissolve into a textual world, but promotes modes of interaction 
and socialization which are conformable to the text. As 
textualised, the ego is not constrained to any identity other than 
that which persists despite the vagaries of the actual words in 
which it is embodied. Dematerialized and recoded as a set of 
coordinates on the trace of its passage, the self is reduced to the 
function of a shifter, the linguistic category of words indicating 
a context which is never the same twice, words like ‘here’ ‘now’ 
‘I’ ‘you’. The competitive edge of the MUD keeps the shifter I 
central, hiding its relational dependence under a hierarchy in 
which all the other shifters are defined by their relation to 
Number One – I don’t depend on you, you depend on me!9  
 
Although self-representations such as avatars and blog identities are becoming 
increasingly visual in MMORPG’s (Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing 
Games) rather than the purely textual MUDs, the idea that the body/self might 
                                                
9 Cubitt, Sean Digital Aesthetics, Sage Publications, London and New Delhi, 1998 p. 17. Cubitt 
also sets up an interesting relationship between computers and text in his analogy that using a 
computer is a similar experience to the bourgeois model of a ‘good read’ in that it is a lone, 
solitary pursuit. Cubit describes both the use of computers and reading as both absorbing and 
disembodying since it requires immersion into another, private world, with a subsequent loss of 
self-hood through identification with characters and narrative (ego-ideals, displaced and 
heroicised versions of the self). Cubit specifically likens the experience of using a computer to 
reading a book in opposition to common claims that the computer is like a television. He writes, 
‘because its most familiar interface is a light-emitting monitor, there is a tendency to think of 
the computer as an extension of the televisual. But metaphors of files, pages, folders refer us 
constantly to the culture of literacy in the anglo-saxon tradition.’ Cubit, p. 7.  
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be transformed into a fantasized self/image premised on masquerade through 
code seems to persist, and suggests that computer technologies have produced 
alternative spaces, objects and/or relations that operate simply as text, that is to 
say, as flat, legible and reproducible. For Cubitt, this idea rests primarily on the 
way in which modes of vision operate in relation to computer technologies, 
whether in online interactions or virtual reality environments. He writes, ‘the 
disembodied eye, textual arbiter of difference and distance, is always 
recognizable because it is alone, the objective of all rays but the resting place of 
none… focused around a tight and single nub of control: self as focal point, 
dimensionless centre of all dimension.’10 He has particularly lucidly identified 
that the combination of the familiar mouse/screen/keyboard hardware with the 
WIMP (window-icon-pointer-menu) interface of MAC OS and Windows is in 
fact a highly ‘culturally specific and an interculturally normative visual 
vocabulary.’11 Likewise, Steven Johnson has argued that the action of pointing 
and clicking on something gave the illusion of direct manipulation of an object, 
or an intimacy with it, that could rhetorically align itself with some sense of 
‘getting ones hands dirty’ and doing ‘work’.12 13  
 
The points at which the subject can be located in GUIs might therefore be found 
variously and simultaneously at the written word ‘I’, at the blinking 
cursor/insertion point at the end of every last character typed and at the I-bar or 
arrow pointer tool.14 This visual vocabulary is premised upon a point of view 
that replays the tropes of traditional visual vocabularies in which the lone user is 
positioned at the perspectival centre of a space that opens out before them 
which they directly control. As such, most computer applications, especially 
                                                
10 Ibid., p. 32. 
11 Ibid., 2. 
12 Johnson, p. 21. Although writing from a profoundly technophilic position, Howard 
Rheingold’s Tools for Thought: The History and Future of Mind-Expanding Technology, MIT 
Press, Cambridge Mass., 2000 is a key text in this field which discusses the consequences of 
such developments. 
13 Although we take the format of this hardware for granted, it might well have been developed 
otherwise. Indeed, the idea of direct manipulation that originally emerged in relation to GUIs 
(Graphic User Interface) has been pursued to the point where interface hardware might now be 
done away with altogether. For example, the XBOX Kinect is a popular example of a console 
that relies on remote sensors so that there is no interface hardware and the user only has to move 
around in order to functionally engage with the software. Robins has also discussed the 
technophilic dream of eliminating the interface altogether, producing a total symbiosis between 
technology and user. See Robins, p. 160.    
14 Cubit, p. 88. 
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games, utilize either one of two modes of vision: the orthogonal (“god”) view or 
the subjective view (as seen in first player shoot-‘em-ups).15 
 
From the mid-1990s onward, there have been several artworks that have 
attempted to re-think the possibilities of computer vision, or modes of 
inhabiting virtual spaces, which do not rely on the visual trope of a lone subject 
at the perspectival centre of virtual space. Of particular note is work by Simon 
Penney or Catherine Richards, Agnes Hegedüs’ Handsight (1993) which used a 
hand-held “eyeball” interface, or Char Davies’ Ephémère (1999) in which a user 
navigated a VR environment through their breathing rhythms. These works 
have attempted to overturn the logic of computer vision as promulgated by 
gaming technology and traditional VR environments by looking to haptic 
technologies, new modes of encounter and sensorial exploration to disturb the 
split between self and image that is perceived in the dichotomy of the real and 
the virtual. In a way, they might be conceived of as attempting to bring 
something of the formal register of works such as Carolee Schneemann’s Fuses 
(1964-1968) or Kate Craig’s Delicate Issue (1979) into the field of computer-
based practice, in that they use modes of encounter between audience, artist and 
art work that are not premised on perspectival vision or mimesis.  
 
Such modes of looking have perhaps emerged in relation to the perceived 
spatial qualities of the field of vision in which they operate, a field described 
variously as: cyberspace; dataspace; virtual reality; hyperspace; the bitmapped 
screen of pixels; the World Wide Web; the Internet.16 This emphasis on the 
                                                
15 For further discussion on the interface see also Virilio, Paul Open Sky, Rose, J. trans., Verso, 
London and New York, 1997, especially pp. 11-16, in which he describes the way in which 
current popular interface technology gives one the sensation of being highly mobile within a 
virtual space while actually being highly restrictive in that it limits the user to a few manual 
gestures only. Robins has also described the way in which interfaces construct the sense of a 
window onto a space, which we have direct, unlimited access to. See Robins, ‘Against Virtual 
Community: for a Politics of Distance’ in The Cybercultures Reader Second Edition Bell, D. & 
Kennedy, B. eds., Routledge, London and New York, 2007 (pp. 227-235) especially p. 228. 
16 Note that these terms appear to be used interchangeably in both popular and critical literature, 
rendering them largely meaningless. In and of themselves, they represent highly culturally and 
historically idealized constructions. The term ‘cyberspace’ was coined by William Gibson in his 
novel Neuromancer (1984) and has been used widely since then to refer to various ‘spaces’ 
from the Internet to DOS systems to programming. Michael Benedikt has noted the multiple, 
diaphanous and shifting definitions of the term, both metaphoric and actual, in order to conclude 
that ‘cyberspace as just described does not exist.’ Part of its appeal, therefore, is in its ‘mytho-
logic’. That is to say, that it is partly a magical or fantastical realm. See Benedikt, Michael 
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spatial qualities of cyberspace is historically important in relation to the history 
of art and modes of looking, since this is precisely what was at the heart of 
much minimalist and post-minimalist work on understanding perception and its 
relation to space and time. Scott Bukatman has already established this link, 
looking at the new models of spatiotemporality that began in artistic practice in 
the 1960s with Donald Judd, Sol LeWitt and, especially, Robert Smithson in his 
discussion of ‘spaceless space’, ‘timeless time’ and ‘scaleless scale’ in the 
important ‘Entropy and new monuments’ essay (1966). These works confronted 
the challenge of plotting the coordinates of the subject in relation to monuments 
to the dissipation of energy (entropy), which rejected mimesis and fixed models 
of time and space. Key works include Sol LeWitt’s work on plotting, such as his 
series of plotted diagrams, The Location of Six Geometric Figures (1975) and 
Bruce Nauman’s Dance or Exercise on the Perimeter of a Square (Square 
Dance) (1967-68) (figs 4.1-4.2).17  
 
That the computer is perceived as generating monocular modes of vision is 
largely seen as a result of its construction in binary: the plane of representation 
is often understood as a set of coordinates against which the movements of the 
self can always be plotted. But, as renditions of code, the spatiotemporal 
structures of these fields are characterized as valueless, directionless, 
simultaneously a macro- and a microcosm: a space that turns in upon itself as it 
leads to just more of the same.18 The self can be plotted, but in a meaningless 
information-space.19 Although this plane simulates or mimics forms of 
representation, such as the photograph, it is merely a rendition of computer 
                                                                                                                                      
‘Cyberspace: First Steps’, in Bell &Kennedy eds., (pp. 19-33) p. 20-22. On the fantastical or 
magical connotations of cyberspace, see the work of R. L. Rutsky on fetishism, gods and tribal 
affinities in cyberculture. See Rutsky, R. L. ‘Technological Fetishism and the Techno-Cultural 
Unconscious’ in High Techne: Art and Technology from the Machine Aesthetic to the 
Posthuman, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999 (pp. 129-65). 
17 On cyberspace as a spatiotemporal construct see Bukatman, Scott ‘Cyberspace’ in Bell & 
Kennedy eds., (pp. 80-105). See also Bukatman Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in 
Postmodern Science Fiction, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1993, especially 
the chapter ‘Terminal Space’ (pp. 101-182); and Tomas, David ‘The Technophilic Body: On 
Technicity in William Gibson’s Cyberculture’ in Bell & Kennedy eds. (pp. 175-189). For a 
discussion of models of spatiotemporality in this period see Smithson, Robert ‘Entropy and New 
Monuments’ in Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, Flam, J. ed., University of California 
Press, London 1996 (pp. 10-23).  
18 Bukatman 2007, p. 84. 
19 Cubitt writes, ‘The VDU is a grid, every pixel identifiable as a numerical address, and its 
status likewise encoded. This grid derives its onscreen presentations from modernist design 
practice, which itself can be traced back to Descartes invention of a neutral space defined only 
by coordinates rather than contents, and to Mercator’s redefinition of the map as a blank field of 
longitude and latitude into which the marks of coordinate space can be drawn.’ Cubit, p. 89. 
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code in culturally specified, familiar, readable forms. For many theorists, these 
forms thus implicitly relate back both to enlightenment models of vision in 
which the subject is at the perceived centre of a perspectivally rendered matrix, 
and to a form of Cartesian mapping in which digits provide co-ordinates for 
plotting the self/image. As Cubitt has noted, such visualities are determinedly 
instrumental.20    
 
But, perhaps such characterizations are fundamentally misrepresentative. The 
rhetoric around digital images has been largely dominated by theories of 
spatiotemporality that were developed in relation to a different historical period 
and technological milieu: that of Frederic Jameson and Jean Baudrillard and 
what is commonly described as a postmodern hyperspace. From the moment 
that computer technologies presented a field of vision that was conceived 
spatially – cyberspace, hyperspace, virtual space – critiques of late-capitalism 
and its operations within visual cultures seem to have largely over-determined 
the discourse around the technology. Terms from Baudrillard’s important essay 
‘Simulacra and Simulations’ (1981) are deeply embedded in the discussions 
around computer and digital technology and continue to shape it: the real, 
hyperreal, simulacral, simulation, matrices, memory banks, command models, 
reproduction, replication, signs, systems. These terms actually prefigured the 
advent of digital technologies half a decade before they appeared in the 
mainstream mass market as digital video recorders. Baudrillard perhaps 
anticipated the problem of a plane of representation that was premised on 
equivalence, since the problem with everything being a system of signs is that 
they ‘lend themselves to all systems of equivalence, all binary oppositions and 
all combinatory algebra’ in the production of a ‘perfect descriptive machine.’21 
Baudrillard thus argued that the terms ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ were no longer 
relevant because one has collapsed completely onto another, like Borges’ 
cartographers, who charted an area with so much detail that the distinction 
                                                
20 Ibid., p. 34. 
21 See Baudrillard, Jean ‘Simulacra and Simulations’ in Baudrillard: Selected Writings, Poster, 
M. ed., Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998 (pp. 166 - 184) p. 167. See also Jameson, Fredric 
Postmodernism: or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Verso, London and New York, 
1991. 
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between map and territory was obliterated in the hyperreal.22 The question is, 
then, how might we reconceptualise digital technology outside of these terms, 
given the new problems posed by ever evolving systems that interact with the 
world in very different ways, and what are the new problems of representation 
particularly in the context of the gendered body? How has the notion of the 
‘virtual’, by opposing itself to the ‘real’, shaped the discourse on what it means 
to have a body, and what is at stake in the question of disembodiment (or ‘the 
virtual body’) for the representation of women? 
  
Biotech to info-tech 
 
Since the late 1980s, the work of Nell Tenhaaf has inhabited the margin 
between the virtual and the material, focusing on the perceived links between 
info-technology and biotechnology, the culture of linguistic equivalence that has 
made such links possible and the way in which such models both constitute and 
are constituted by the tropes of gender and technology. During the 1980s and 
1990s, media representations of biological research were becoming increasingly 
genetically deterministic, resulting in what Tenhaaf has described as a ‘code 
fixation.’ This code fixation is defined by her as an ‘attention to genetics at the 
expense of environment, or the supremacy of DNA ruling the somatic matrix in 
a way that parallels how the (rational) masculine has historically ruled the 
(irrational) feminine.’23 As such, her work over the last two and a half decades 
has drawn on a variety of techniques and visual languages, incorporating 
computer technologies, medical imaging and drawing, in order to question 
technological and scientific practices and their impact on constructions of 
gender and identity. Species Life (1989) (figs. 4.3-4.4) is described by Tenhaaf 
as the work that initially re-located her practice from questioning the ethics of 
networked communications through database projects to investigating 
technological practices of embodiment. That is to say it marked a passage from 
                                                
22 Baudrillard, p. 166. Gilles Deleuze, by contrast, would claim that it is precisely the apparent 
sameness that sets up a resonance between these two orders of reality, in order to actually 
produce difference. See Deleuze, Gilles Difference and Repetition, Continuum, London, 2004. 
23 Tenhaaf, Nell ‘Production and Reproduction’ in Women, Art and Technology, Malloy, J. ed., 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2003 (pp. 362-375) p. 365. 
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info-technology to biotechnology, in order to question the idea of coding and 
binary and how it relates to cultural constructions of gender. She writes: 
 
With the introduction of biological subject matter into my work 
beginning with Species Life my objects and installations 
continued to use the computer as a way to composite images as 
well as a device for interactivity. But the focus shifted to a 
critical engagement with the burgeoning field of biotechnology, 
with a particular focus on the strong connection between 
computing and genetics that was appearing in all kinds of 
popular imagery.24  
 
In this work, rectangular light boxes show a sequence of digitally processed 
images of a man and a woman, hand in hand on a hill, looking out towards a 
sunset. Swirling beneath them are pink and blue strands of DNA, with computer 
generated but hand-printed portions of text from Nietzsche and Irigaray 
crawling up the strands of the DNA of the man and the woman, respectively. 
Counterpoising handcraft and digital images, the will to power is opposed to an 
ethics of care.  
 
Another work, Oedipal Ounce of Prevention (1993) (fig 4.5), employed similar 
visual languages as light boxes shaped like Erlenmeyer flasks showed images of 
Oedipus’ pierced ankles. These were hung beside photographs of the artist’s 
body, overlaid with images of medical instruments and protein molecules.25 
Similarly, in the installation In Vitro (The Perfect Wound) (1993) (figs. 4.6-4.7), 
Tenhaaf again used light boxes to display the 23 chromosomes that “determine” 
sexual development, superimposed over images of two glass beakers containing 
the barely perceptible figures of Mary and a wounded Jesus Christ.26  
                                                
24 Ibid., p. 365. 
25 Kim Sawchuk writes that the lightbox is ‘a technique of display that references the lit screen 
of the computer monitor without relying on the symbolism of that particular hardware, as well 
as inherently alluding to the on/off of binary.’ See Sawchuck, Kim ‘Biological, Not Determinist: 
Nell Tenhaaf’s Technological Mutations’ in Nell Tenhaaf: Fit/Unfit, ex. cat., Robert 
McLaughlin Gallery, Ontario, 2003 (pp. 9-22) p. 12. 
26 Following from Sawchuck, I have put scare quotes around the term ‘determine’ since it was 
thought that information only flowed out of DNA, and not that the environment had any 
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Such works were early attempts at exposing the way that both genetics and 
Genesis presumed that our destiny was inscribed at the moment of conception, 
and were concerned with the way in which gender has been ascribed to these 
different mythologies.  As Kim Sawchuck has noted, the message of these 
works was particularly important at that historical moment when, with the 
advances in biomedicine, biology was invoked as the cause of sex and gender 
differences. Looking at these works now, not only must we acknowledge the 
complex use of various forms of image production at an early stage of their 
development (digital processing, computer generated images, medical images 
and hand printing used in combination with one another), but also their role as a 
reminder that biology, and the representation of biology, has a long history.27 It 
is particularly useful to keep in mind the fact that these works were produced in 
the 1990s, a period that emerges as a sort of watershed in this thesis, in terms of 
the explosion of studies around technology and the body across a range of 
disciplines. So that while we might take these insights somewhat for granted 
today, such works served as an important foil to mainstream images of science 
at the time, and enable us to see the shift in more contemporary practices away 
from the heavily laboured figurative representation of the organic-technological 
hybrid. 
 
Conceptually closely linked to Corps Étranger, these early projects utilized 
medical imagery, in conjunction with drawing practices such as medical 
illustration, to think about the way in which certain forms of representation 
were perceived as having access to epistemological objectivity.  Works such as 
In Vitro (The Perfect Wound), Homunculus (1993) and Oedipal Ounce of 
Prevention, were investigations into the way in which technological vision – in 
this case biological or medical imagery – could be used to distort or degenerate 
representation, rather than produce increasingly higher resolutions or fidelity. 
This is perhaps in much the same way as both Corps Étranger and Delicate 
Issue used technology to counter-intuitively obscure representation rather than 
                                                                                                                                      
influence on its operation. This was critiqued in much of Tenhaaf’s early work and has now 
been widely re-theorised by the discipline of Epigenetics. See Sawchuck, p. 16. 
27 Sawchuck, p. 15.  
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enhance it. As we have already seen, both these works used the device of the 
close-up – a technique that is used in both medicine and pornography to 
supposedly give greater clarity by showing what the eye cannot see – in order to 
re-present such detail on the screen that any identificatory or desiring modes of 
viewing are actually disturbed rather than enhanced. In so doing, these artists 
work against the perceived logic of technological progress and, in the case of 
Hatoum and Tenhaaf, also question the way in which the medical gaze has been 
discursively and technologically formulated to analyze bodies that have been 
made coherent through charts, graphs and tables: bodies become bodies of 
knowledge. These works therefore absolutely foreground the body, the ‘somatic 
matrix’, but do so from within a highly complex technological practice, in order 
to think about the ways in which technology has historically been implicated in 
the very constitution of that body through modes of representation. Tenhaaf 
writes: 
 
My work addresses the power of a scientific theory that got 
dislodged from the somatic, from the body. In response, I’m 
trying to relocate the body scientifically in the matrix, literally in 
the protoplasm of the cell. At the same time, I am trying to insert 
into this location the subject position of the individual and how 
they actually live out the myth of genetics, as opposed to how it 
lives in them.28 
 
Tenhaaf’s projects, as Sawchuck has argued, question different forms of 
representation (whether artistic or scientific) in a highly sophisticated way that 
avoids making generalizations about either art or science’s lack of objectivity, a 
strategy that perhaps no longer seems effective in delegitimising the sense of 
science’s ultimate authority.29 To quote Tenhaaf’s own praise of the work of 
female scientists like Donna Haraway and Evelyn Fox Keller, her works seem 
to ask: what is the hidden logic behind the new folk mythology of bio/info-
technology? What is the economics of it? Why has genetics become a new, 
                                                
28 Nell Tenhaaf quoted in Tuer, Dot ‘Fit/Unfit: Nell Tenhaaf Speaks with Dot Tuer’ in Nell 
Tenhaaf: Fit/Unfit ex. cat. (pp. 51-57) p. 53. 
29 See Sawchuk, especially p. 9. 
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transcendent myth?30 These works confront these challenges by thinking about 
the role of representation in constructing these narratives. While the work of 
Eduardo Kac, for example, seems to replay the problematic topos of 
equivalence between computer coding and genetic engineering, Tenhaaf uses 
new technologies in order to ask serious questions of them and how they 
operate in relation to both theory and practice.  
 
One of her more recent works, UCBM (You Could Be Me) (1999) (figs 4.8-4.9), 
is focused on the way in which different representational practices might forge 
interesting, difficult, and provocative links between subjects and their 
understanding of their own body/self in a highly technologised world. Indeed, 
given that this work was exhibited at the Western Front, founded by Kate Craig, 
it perhaps reinforces the position of Tenhaaf’s work in the space of body 
politics and Craig’s work in the space of investigating this politics in and 
through technology.31 In this complex work, an observer enters an installation 
environment, which activates a projection, causing it to play on a screen. The 
clip shows an image of a female scientist working in a standard laboratory 
setting. She is wearing a white coat and has an impassive look. A voiceover, 
allegedly that of the scientist, plays over the top of the image. While this 
voiceover discusses different manifestations of psycho-sexuality, another 
voiceover occasionally cuts in, describing the mental processes of the scientist 
herself. After a few moments, the diagesis breaks, the scientist turns to the 
viewer and asks, ‘Now, what can I find out about you? I want to know about 
your fitness, your empathy factor, your willingness to get involved.’  The 
film/scientist then goes on to show the viewer clips of sex scenes from a 
CuSeeMe live video link, before asking ‘do you feel exposed? Are you feeling 
comfortable here? Answer yes or no please’, to which the viewer must respond 
by pressing the relevant Y or N button mounted below the film in the 
installation. The individual’s results are then tabulated and plotted in a 
comparison chart showing the results of nine other participants, and the viewer 
                                                
30 Tenhaaf quoted in Tuer, p. 53. 
31 Exhibited in the show Subject, featuring Jonathan Middleton with Randy Lee Cutler, Robert 
Helms, Daniel Jolliffe and Nell Tenhaaf, May-July 2001, Western Front, Vancouver. 
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is either praised or chastised depending on how well they have scored and 
whether they might have negatively affected overall population averages.  
 
In and of themselves the questions, and the viewer’s responses to them, perhaps 
have little meaning. What is important, rather, is the way in which the responses 
are structured according to the representations that are shown on the screen, 
such as the self-exposure on real-time webcam displays, which Tenhaaf calls 
‘the phenomenon of internet based intimacy, or pseudo-intimacy, including 
CuSeeMe video-conferencing sex exchanges.’32 The emergence of new Internet 
technology enabled Tenhaaf to further explore the issues that already concerned 
her, around the subject and representation, even if that technology did not 
function quite as imagined. For example, RealTime webcams did not yet 
operate in ‘real time’, and were badly pixilated. Even with the inherent failure 
of the technology, this work still reveals something of its effect on user 
engagement. Thus, perhaps it questions the role of technology in the 
construction of received ideas about sexuality, asking what is the relationship 
between technological forms of explicit imagery and personal sexual 
development.33 What was at stake, during this period, when badly pixilated 
‘live’ imagery on the web might have been preferable to high fidelity 
reproductions elsewhere? This part of the UCBM installation had been adapted 
from a 1997 performance called Neonudism, which integrated a ‘live’ two-way 
video feed from the net into a live performance.34 This performance placed the 
audience in a conceptual space in which they could experience a live online sex 
scene in order to assess the emotional impact of Internet display intimacy: 
 
To participate, the user first engages with a constructed audio 
and visual environment, which is based on several layers of 
surrogacy. The top layer of imagery is the point of identification 
or entry for the viewer – a digital video ‘self-portrait of the 
                                                
32 Tenhaaf, p. 372. 
33 For example see Braun-Courville, Debra K. and Rojas, Mary ‘Exposure to Sexually Explicit 
Web Sites and Adolescent Sexual Attitudes and Behaviors’ in Journal of Adolescent Health, 
Vol. 45, 2009 (pp. 156–162). 
34 I have qualified the term ‘live’ with scare quotes here both to acknowledge that, in the late 
1990s, RealTime video uplinks were not really in ‘real time’, and also to reference the existing 
problem with notions of liveness and mediated imagery, as discussed in chapter two. 
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artist’, or at least a portrait of a self-involved artistic 
temperament. This entity changes personae through both image 
and voice several times during the program. The portrait is 
merged into the next level of surrogacy, an ‘eye-candy’ program 
of self-generating artificial life imagery called Bomb that 
portrays the inner workings of the machine as having a quasi-
organic and visually pleasurable life of its own. The composite 
of these two elements – the talking head artist overlaid with 
dreamy pixel flow – interacts with the feeding in of a CuSeeMe 
image. The ‘amateur porn’ participants who are present via 
CuSeeMe are transformed into ‘art nudes’ thus pushing the 
viewer through the boundary of distinction between experience 
and art and between nudity and sexuality.35 
 
The other type of simulation that occurs in UCBM is the image of the female 
scientist herself. She is, as Tenhaaf explains, a surrogate to personify the system 
that runs the installation. This surrogate, she claims, draws comparisons with 
some of the well-known female computer personalities such as ELIZA, the 
interactive psychotherapist program developed by Joseph Weizenbaum at MIT 
in the mid 60s, or the more recent Julia, a popular online MUD persona 
programmed by Michael Maudlin at Carnegie Mellon University.36 The 
installation, therefore, primarily asks how the images of the scientist or the live 
Internet uplinks affect viewer responses? How does the structure of scientific 
representation itself affect knowledge production? And what is the role of the 
system itself in generating meaning? In this work, Tenhaaf is thus concerned 
with the problem of technologically mediated representation, notably the 
significance of the notion of ‘live’ technology (as discussed in chapter two), and 
the way in which different representations are used analogously or 
metaphorically with one another in order to explain or understand a problem.37  
 
                                                
35 Tenhaaf, p. 372. 
36 Tenhaaf, p. 371. 
37 Ibid., p. 373. 
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One of the ways in which Tenhaaf foregrounds the question of technologically 
mediated forms of representation is through the interactive device of the Y N 
touch buttons, in which the subject translates their emotional states into basic 
YES/NO responses, so that they can then be understood and analyzed by the 
system. This device, to me, resonates with several key traits in the broader 
context of our discussion. As discussed in relation to Hatoum, the work seems 
to claim that the production of knowledge within science (and Tenhaaf’s 
‘scientist’ is wonderfully non-specific) can only occur if the system is dealing 
with representations of the subject that are essentially simplistic: YES/NO for 
pathology, deviance, disease, emotional state, mental state, which in fact most 
likely require complex linguistic structures to adequately represent the subject’s 
status in these areas. If medicine understands the subject in increments of 
YES/NO this not only lends to simplicity of analysis for the system performing 
that analysis, and formally references the structure of that very system by using 
what is essentially a binary input but, by being so closely linked both 
functionally and structurally, drives its own continued practice. Although this 
appears to suggest the sort of conceptual equivalence of the body across both 
computer technologies and medicine that I earlier opposed, perhaps this work is 
rather more concerned with their mutual reliance on, and co-constitution 
through, the languages of code in order to operate, and the ways in which the 
functional activity of computer technology affects one’s relationship with it. 
Indeed, UCBM emphasizes the role of the interface in negotiating one’s 
relationship with a self/image. By interface I am referring both to hardware such 
as a screen, mouse, keyboard, or Tenhaaf’s Y/N touch buttons, as well as GUIs 
(Graphic User Interface), which are a fundamental development in the complex 
history of how computers emerged as primarily visual entities.38 
 
                                                
38 There is a well-rehearsed series of events that are widely agreed to chart the development of 
the computer in this respect. This history extends from Vannevar Bush’s theoretical Memex 
device, as outlined in his article ‘As We May Think’ (1945), through to Douglas Engelbart’s 
idea in 1968 to incorporate a graphic screen as a way of representing data (as used in RADAR), 
with a retrospective nod to the Greek poet Simonedes’ ‘memory palaces’. All of which resulted 
in computer interaction no longer being dependent on a bewildering array of codes, punch cards 
and abbreviated commands, and instead emerging with a front-end ‘user friendly’ interface. For 
an overview of these histories see Gere, Charles The Computer as an Irrational Cabinet, 
unpublished PhD thesis, Middlesex 1996; and Johnson, especially the chapter ‘Bitmapping: An 




Developed at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Centre during the 1970s, and 
subsequently popularized in the mass market by Apple (then Apple 
Mackintosh), the GUI is a user-friendly graphics-based front-end environment, 
which enables the user to run a variety of applications. Common examples of 
GUIs are Windows, Linux or MAC OS, which are now widely used in 
preference to DOS, a system which is text driven on the front end. In DOS, the 
user has to create environments for applications to run by setting variables using 
code, which GUIs can do automatically. With these, all the information is filed, 
graphically, in a 3D setting (also known as ‘nesting’), rather than textually in a 
linear fashion, as with DOS. Even while graphics programs might run on DOS, 
they are simply emulations, since underneath they are fundamentally text 
driven. While DOS relies on knowledge of coding languages, and is thus less 
‘user-friendly’, it is also a way of engaging directly with the operating system of 
the computer. GUIs, by contrast, do not require the user to run another program 
in order to start them, and as such have been used more widely, but remove the 
user from the actual material workings of the computer. GUIs are also 
multitasking, able to run several programs at once, without the user having to 
set the variables. In essence, the text systems that drive the programs run in the 
background of the GUI without the user’s knowledge.39  
 
While the development of GUIs contributed enormously to the rise of the 
personal computer, it perhaps also crystallised the sense of the computer as a 
‘black box’: an engineering term to describe an object whose internal workings 
are not known but which nonetheless works, and which can therefore only ever 
be viewed solely in terms of its input and output, as with Tenhaaf’s Y/N touch 
buttons.40 Most users are unable to engage with the actual workings of the 
technology in order to generate new relations between the subject and the 
computer and so, on a mass scale, the relationship tends towards the 
                                                
39 An interesting analogy with medical imaging technology might be established, which perhaps 
starts to expose some problems with the way in which computer technology re/presents itself to 
the user. As I have already discussed in relation to MRI in the previous chapter, there is a 
tension between graphical and numeric representation in that MRI images, like GUIs, are a way 
of visually representing numeric data sets.  
40 On the model of the computer as a ‘black box’ see Gere, p. 22. 
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instrumental: knowledge of how it works has been superceded by knowledge 
that it works. In fact, just as Drew Leder demonstrated in relation to the somatic 
body, the problem of (not) knowing the technological body only seems to 
appear when something is not working. When the computer breaks down, we 
become aware that we never really understood it: the reason for the breakdown, 
and its possible resolution, will most likely be beyond the technical capabilities 
of the average user. The role of the GUI, therefore, perhaps serves a conflicted 
purpose in the history of computer development since it has both enabled more 
people access to the technology while simultaneously obscuring the processes, 
deepening the rift between those who understand them and those who don’t.    
 
As several theorists including have noted, one of the results of this is a 
deepening gender divide in the way in which technology is used: women use the 
technology that men have developed and programmed. Although work has been 
done by Sadie Plant to reintegrate women back into the history of technology by 
looking to the telephonists, operators, typists, secretaries and calculators, as well 
as figures such as Grace Murray Hopper and Ada Lovelace, these are largely 
examples that suggest an alignment of women with an instrumental model of 
both technology and subjectivity.41 Instead, Sherry Turkle, Rosi Braidotti and 
Faith Wilding tread a more careful line between technophilia and technophobia 
in this respect.42 For these writers, it is not simply enough that women have had 
a history of using technology, but that we must also acknowledge that that 
history itself might well be a reflection or repetition of historical forms of 
oppression which needs to be unpicked and understood. As Braidotti writes: 
 
Western culture reiterates its habit of organizing things 
hierarchically at times of the greatest technological advance. 
And so it is that as technology progresses, and gives women the 
                                                
41 See Plant, Sadie Zeros and Ones: Digital Women and the New Technoculture, Doubleday, 
New York, 1997 and Plant ‘On the Matrix: Cyberfeminist Simulations’ in Bell & Kennedy eds., 
(pp. 340-351) especially p. 345. 
42 See Wilding, Faith & SubRosa group ‘Where is Feminism in Cyberfeminism?’ in NeMe, 
available online at http://www.neme.org/392/cyberfeminism; Braidotti, Rosi ‘Cyberfeminism 
with a difference’ available online at http://www.let.uu.nl/womens_studies/rosi/cyberfem.htm; 
Turkle, Sherry The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit, MIT Press, Cambridge MA., 
1984; and Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet, MIT Press, Cambridge 
MA., 1995. 
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means by which to negotiate new and complex forms of 
subjectivity, the gap between men and women in computer 
literacy and participation in programming and design continues 
to widen.43 
 
That different forms of technology might be characterized either as rational, 
functional and controlled (masculine) or as out of control, wild, unknowable 
(feminine), has been well observed in the literature coming out of science and 
technology studies, film studies and gender studies.44 However, outside of 
popular representations of computer technology, there needs to be a closely 
woven link between women and computers, which demonstrates their ability to 
develop and access technology in a sophisticated way. Braidotti therefore calls 
on cyberfeminists, Tenhaaf amongst them, to reconfigure their relationship to 
technology by rejecting the instrumentality implied by the GUI and WIMP 
systems – and instead work beneath the level of the interface, whose functional 
role is to represent itself to the user and the user to themselves, in order to 
challenge the way in which they abstract the user from the material workings of 
the computer itself.45  
 
Tenhaaf’s most recent project, Lo-Fi (2005-2010) (figs 4.10-4.11), addresses 
the way in which commercial computer products have engendered a crisis of 
representation. It does so by exploring the use of alternative interface hardware 
and employing modes of representation that potentially operate beyond a 
discourse of the ‘real’ and the ‘virtual’, replacing the question of the body with 
the question of embodiment. The sculpture Push/Pull (2009), developed as part 
of the broader Lo-Fi project, is an interactive artificial life (A-life) artwork in 
which clusters of LEDs are used to represent encounters between computer-
generated and live subjects, interacting with one another through sound and 
                                                
43 See Braidotti. 
44 For example see Jordanova, Ludmilla Sexual Visions: Images of Gender in Science and 
Medicine between the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London 
1989; and Wild Science: Reading Feminism, Medicine and the Media, Marchessault, J. & 
Sawchuk, K. eds., Routledge, London and New York, 2000; Fox Keller, Evelyn Reflections on 
Gender and Science, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985; Huyssen, Andreas 
‘The Vamp and The Machine: Technology and Sexuality in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis’ in New 
German Critique, No. 24/25, Autumn 1981 – Winter 1982 (pp. 221-237). 
45 Although Braidotti mentions the work of Tenhaaf, it is not a sustained discussion. 
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movement. In this work, a spectator enters a room with the sculpture at its 
centre. As the spectator moves around the sculpture, her presence in the room 
seems to cause the pattern of LEDs on the sculpture to constantly change, as if 
in response. Tweeting and beeping sounds emanate. These changes occur 
because an overhead camera in the room senses the position of individuals 
around the sculpture and these sensors produce information which is fed to 
software that controls the ‘on’ or ‘off’ positions of the LEDs. The resulting 
pattern of the LEDs that the spectator sees displayed on the sculpture and the 
sounds that it makes is formed by the encounter between the information 
produced by the live subjects and the autonomous, but responsive, ‘artificial 
agents’: computer-generated subjects that are formally indistinguishable from 
the LED representation of any organism in the sculpture’s environment. 
 
As a sort of input/oupt device, the sculpture is much like a computer except in 
its appearance. The traditional monitor or screen has essentially been replaced 
by a grid of fibreoptic cables, connected to the LEDs, which stand in as 
functional alternatives to a grid of pixels. Importantly, given that the LEDs can 
only be in either an ‘on’ or ‘off’ position, they represent a sort of binary matrix 
equivalent to 1s and 0s, but here it is represented as a material entity rather than 
an abstract plane of numerical values. The support or ground for this matrix of 
fibreoptic cables with flashing LEDs at their tips is an undulating brash mesh 
‘screen’ that presents a formal challenge to the flat surface of the traditional 
computer monitor, referencing the artist’s interest in haptic technologies (fig 
4.12).46  This mesh is a clear re-investment in the materiality of the technology, 
since it is almost as if the viscera of the technological body are being exposed, 
rejecting the notion that the computer interface generally serves to hide the 
workings of the computer, as discussed earlier. By opening it up, and making it 
material, this sculpture undoes that logic and attempts to make the technological 
body and its ‘internal’ workings more open. Peculiarly, however, when we are 
shown inside the machine, the internal ‘organs’ are revealed to be fibreoptic 
cables, the very device that is usually used to see inside the human body, as per 
Corps Étranger. 
                                                
46 For example see Tenhaaf, Nell ‘Art Embodies A-Life: The Vida Competition’ in Leonardo 
Vol. 41 No. 1, 2008 (pp. 6-15). 
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In a sub-variation of this project, the human-representative subjects must work 
collaboratively to herd the artificial agent into a nesting area, through movement 
and sound (fig 4.13).47 By altering the interface hardware, and subsequently 
choosing to represent all subjects as LED clusters, both the sculpture Push/Pull 
and the broader Lo-Fi project offers an alternative to the constraints of GUIs 
and computer-generated imagery in order to explore new visual economies. 
Indeed, all subjects are represented in the same visual register; foregrounding 
the question of how new technology might produce new subjectivities through 
the act of representation itself. In so doing, the use of LEDs perhaps seems to 
reject the tendency to describe the subject in terms such as ‘real’ or ‘virtual’, a 
debate that is motivated by those computer-based practices that repeat 
conventions of figural representation since they foreground formal differences. 
In other words, Lo-Fi appears to sidestep certain problems, which are perhaps 
unwittingly demonstrated by other practices, by operating outside of a visual 
economy that establishes a tension between the real and the virtual, since it no 
longer implies that there is a normative bodily standard, real or imagined, upon 
which an avatar or bodily simulation might have been modeled. Importantly, the 
use of LEDS specifically overturns anthropomorphism in the representation of 
virtual subjectivity, which is often employed to elicit certain behaviours or 
relationships with the ‘real’ subject, and which assumes that, as Tenhaaf notes, 
everyone’s anthropomorphic gesture is equal and that the set of relations among 
human and virtual entities is the same for all users.48 The virtual representation 
can then no longer be measured either in its similarity or difference to that 
standard and, as such, severs a problematic link between subjectivity and bodily 
identity. As Braidotti has stated, ‘women need to repossess subjectivity by 
reducing their confinement to the body’.49 
 
Indeed, the problem of bodily representation is absolutely the critical question 
in relation to emergent computer-based practices such as digital photography 
                                                
47 For a description of the work in the artists’ own words see Baljko, Melanie and Tenhaaf, Nell 
‘The Aesthetics of Emergence: Co-Constructed Interactions’ in ACM Trans. Computer-Human 
Interactions, Vol. 15, No. 3, Article 11, 2008 (pp. 11:1-11:27). 
48 Baljko & Tenhaaf, p. 11:13. 
49 Braidotti, Cyberfeminism with a difference. 
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and Internet Art. For the last two decades, most projects have focused precisely 
on the question of virtual identities, and attempted to reconfigure the way in 
which the (usually human) subject might be represented, either through hyper-
realistic simulation or exaggerated difference. An early example of internet-
based artistic practice that has been widely discussed in the literature is 
BodiesINC (1995). Developed at UCLA by Victoria Vesna, who worked with 
Schneemann on Vesper’s Stampede to My Holy Mouth (1992) (which will be 
returned to in the conclusion to this thesis) BodiesINC uses VRML to enable 
users at home to build a graphic representation of a virtual self or avatar. The 
welcome statement reads, 
 
Welcome to BodiesINC. The building elements at your disposal 
are ASCII text, simple geometric forms, TEXTures and low-
resolution sound. Bodies built become your personal property, 
operating in and circulating through public space, free to be 
downloaded into your private hard drive/communication system 
at any time. The MOO/WOO functions as an institution through 
which your body gets shaped in the process of identity 
construction that occurs in, and mutually implicates, both the 
symbolic and material realms.50 
 
This work was innovative in its very early use of graphics applications at a time 
when most online identities were constructed only in text-based MUDs, as well 
as in using the Internet to network these bodies in a ‘public space.’51 But its 
most radical feature was that it allowed bodies to be constructed using 
combinations of body parts and textures that attempted to move beyond 
traditional categories of race and gender, thus avoiding the clichés and 
stereotyped representations associated with most avatars. It did so by enabling 
                                                
50 See http://www.bodiesinc.ucla.edu/welcome.html 
Note that it is also of interest that Victoria Vesna uses the term ‘symbolic’ rather than ‘virtual’ 
here, as this echoes Johnson’s model of computer space as symbolic rather than 
representational. 
51 For discussions of the Internet as public sphere see Bell, David ‘Webs as Pegs’ (pp. 254-263); 
Bakardjieva, Maria ‘Virtual Togetherness: an Everyday-Life Perspective’ (pp. 236-253); 
Robins, Kevin ‘Against Virtual Community: for a Politics of Distance’ (pp. 227-235); Willson, 
Michele ‘Community in the Abstract: a Political and Ethical Dilemma?’ (pp. 213-226); Holden, 
Todd Joseph Miles & Tsuruki, Takako ‘Deai-Kei’ (pp. 144-158). All in Bell & Kennedy eds.  
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any body part to be constructed from one of the following textures, black 
rubber, blue plastic, bronze, chocolate, clay, cloudy, concrete, glass, lava, 
pumice, water and wood (fig 4.14). Each of these parts in turn was associated 
with a particular characteristic, e.g. lava is ‘hot and dry; light that is trapped in 
matter; “perpetual fire”; team leader sense’; while water is ‘cold and wet; 
dissolution, evaporation; strong relationship with gravity and heat; conceptual 
element.’52 
 
While these textures have been shown to unwittingly repeat some tropes 
associated with corporate stereotypes that rely on racial markers of identity, on 
the whole this project is widely conceived in a framework that suggests that the 
politics of identity construction are intimately bound up in the processes of self-
representation.53 Given the technological capabilities for graphic representations 
in the mid-1990s, Bodies INC seemed to offer alternative modes of identity 
construction in the then-emerging sphere of the Internet. However, I would 
suggest that, like many subsequent projects which suggested that new 
technology could enable the subject to align itself with its interior body-image, 
Bodies INC was limited in its capacity for alternative representations by 
formally referring back to the human body so closely in its choice of torso, 
head, two arms, and two legs (an anterior-posterior morphology). As such, 
perhaps a project such as Bodies INC inevitably actually became historically 
incorporated into a visual trajectory that includes popular or mass culture 
representations of the online subject: a body that wears its markers of difference 
so overtly that it only ever draws comparisons with an implied ‘real’ body on 
the other side of the screen. An example of how avatars now commonly exhibit, 
and indeed flaunt, the formal markers of difference (racial, cultural or sexual), 
albeit with improved graphics capabilities, can be seen in the options available 
for building screen selves in MMORPG’s. For example, XX Deudigren, an 
avatar I built for the MMORPG EVE Online, the second largest online gaming 
environment after World of Warcraft, seemed to appeal to non-specific ethnic or 
                                                
52 http://www.bodiesinc.ucla.edu/frames1.html 
53 See Nakamura, Lisa ‘Race In/For Cyberspace: Identity Tourism and Racial Passing on the 
Internet” in Bell & Kennedy eds. (pp. 712–720); Gonzalez, Jennifer ‘The Appended Subject: 
Race and Identity as Digital Assemblage’ in The Feminism and Visual Culture Reader, Jones, A 
ed., Routledge, London and New York, 2003 (pp.534–544); Balsamo, Anne ‘The Virtual Body 
in Cyberspace’ in Bell & Kennedy eds., (pp. 489–503).  
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racial typologies, and yet was absolutely underwritten by them. Skin/eye colour, 
hairstyle, clothing, bone structure, poise and naming all invoked recognizable 
types from both the gaming world and everyday life (fig 4.15). The forward 
projecting cheekbones, lower nose bridge and shallow brow clearly reference a 
generic Asian facial type that is difficult to avoid making, in spite of the wide 
array of options for custom generating your desired face. As such, the avatars 
tend to resemble the sort of computer generated ‘face of the future’ type images 
periodically seen in the likes of TIME Magazine. Far from being ‘generic’ and 
non-specific, these images frequently re-play fears around miscegenation and 
the increasing populations of developing countries.54    
 
By contrast, Tenhaaf’s project Lo-Fi actually rejects the figural altogether and 
turns toward a form of abstraction – what she calls lo-fi embodiment – in order 
to subvert and escape the clichés of computer generated representations, and 
question the relationship between the body and technological subjectivity.55 
Unlike a project such as Bodies INC, it does this by representing subjects (both 
organic and computer-generated) in the highly abstracted form of LEDs in 
either an off or on state. Tenhaaf writes, 
 
Such low-fidelity embodiments stand in stark contrast to high-
fidelity ones, such as humanoid-like, digitally rendered 
characters, and are preferable to use because they circumvent the 
clichés and expectations attached to humanoid characters, 
avatars, or (even worse) cartoons.56  
 
This low-fidelity aesthetic perhaps also resonates with the work of Schneemann, 
Craig and Hatoum, who, as I have previously described, all overturn and 
challenge the vocabularies of realism and realistic representation in their 
                                                
54 On this, see also the work of Sandra Kemp, curator of the 2004 Future Face exhibition at The 
Science Museum, London. This was a critical examination of the concept of the ‘future face’ 
and digital composites that are becoming increasingly prevalent.  
55 On Tenhaaf and Baljko’s work on abstract forms of representation see Tenhaaf & Baljko 
‘Different Experiences, Different Types of Emergence: A-life Sculpture Designers, Interactant, 
Observer’ in Proceedings of AAAI Fall 2006 Symposium on Interaction and Emergent 
Phenomenon in Societies of Agents, 2006 (pp. 104–110).  
56 Baljko & Tenhaaf, 2008 p. 11:14. 
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challenge to the masculinist drives of certain types of vision, most notably 
scientific and technological. From the use of extreme close up shots in order to 
make vision appear to obscure itself, to the practice of damage and 
deconstruction of the imaging technology to add depth and complexity to the 
image, to the visual language of de-skilled modes of representation, which play 
on woman’s perceived inability to access technology in a sophisticated way, the 
concept of lo-fi actually inhabits and permeates all these possible challenges to 
representation, finally confronting and upending the continual (hard-) ‘drive’ for 
increasing sophistication in technology once and for all.57 If the computer is a 
primarily visual tool, Lo-Fi is perhaps a radical challenge to histories of 
representation and computer imaging that rely on video technologies and 
“hyperreal” CGI representations that repeat the image of the body, in order to 
replace it with a model of embodiment.  
 
In her influential 1996 essay ‘Cyberfeminism with a difference’, Braidotti 
described the process of using new technology to reflect on ways in which the 
female subject had previously been constituted through technologies of vision, 
and the emergence of potential new strategies of representation for women 
artists. As well as Braidotti, the work of other important feminist scholars such 
as Hayles and Elizabeth Grosz have argued that it is no longer satisfactory to 
speak of ‘the body’, but that instead we should be looking towards a model of 
‘embodiment’. That is to say, a form of subjectivity that allows one to inhabit 
multiple embodied positions as situated subjects. To go some way to offer a 
definition of Grosz’s suggestion that there is no body as such, only bodies58, we 
might do well to look to Hayles, who writes, 
 
Embodiment differs from the concept of the body in that the 
body is always normative relative to some set of criteria. To 
explore how the body is constructed within renaissance medical 
discourse, for example, is to investigate the normative 
                                                
57 The term ‘drive’ perhaps seems to be particularly appropriate in the context of historical 
fantasies of technological progress, as it resonates with Filippo Tommaso Marinetti’s interest in 
the car crash as the symbol of technological progress. See ‘The Futurist Manifesto’ (1919). 
Tenhaaf’s work actually stops this drive by confronting technological progress with itself. 
58 See Grosz, Elizabeth Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994, p. 19. 
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assumptions used to constitute a particular kind of social and 
discursive concept… Technologies turn embodiment into the 
body by creating a normalized construct arranged over many 
data points to give an idealized version of the body in question. 
In contrast to the body, embodiment is contextual, enmeshed 
with the specifics of time, place, physiology and culture, which 
together compose enactment.59    
 
To think of embodiment in contrast to the body is useful in that it begins to 
shake off terms like ‘the virtual’ and ‘the real’, and the problematic oppositions 
structured within them. Instead, embodiment can encompass subject positions 
that are no longer bounded by categories of race, gender and species. Indeed, 
the term resonates in an important historical way with the three boundary 
dissolutions that Haraway associated with the cyborg nearly 30 years ago: that 
between human and animal, between organism and machine, and between the 
physical and the non-physical.60 As such, the term ‘virtual embodiment’ is to be 
rejected since the single term ‘embodiment’ can account for this type of subject 
position. In fact, ‘embodiment’ can actually account for this subject position in 
a far more sophisticated way since the prefix ‘virtual’ gives the allusion that all 
material ties have been severed which, as I will demonstrate, is somewhat 
misrepresentative. Instead, embodiment argues that the material world is always 
in operation even, and most especially, in the realm of digital technology and 
information transfer. As described earlier in my chapter on video-based 
practices, one of Hayles’ most important contributions was to demonstrate that 
flows of data cannot be separated from the material substrate through which 
they flow. The tenacious grip of terms such as ‘real’ or ‘virtual’ on this 
discourse has perhaps clouded the important observations by Hayles and has 
resulted in a perceived detachment from the material world that Kevin Robins 
characterized as psychotic in nature, and Sadie Plant as hysterical.61 What I 
                                                
59 Hayles, p. 196. 
60 Haraway, Donna ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the 
Late Twentieth Century’ in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, 
Routledge, London and New York, 1991 (pp.149-181) especially pp. 151-153. 
61 By no longer being anchored in the ‘real’ the neural nets, links and hyperlinks of associations 
between spaces and objects in digital planes of representation become too free. For Plant, this is 
one of the characteristics of hysteria. Drawing on the work of Freud, she writes that hysteria is a 
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hope to argue for, by contrast, is a reinvestment in the material (embodiment) in 
relation to computer technologies so as to disrupt the exclusion of women that is 
implied by characterizations of information technology as transcendent, in 
opposition to the immanence of the female body, and revisit the ways in which 
the body/self has historically negotiated the numeric planes of binary 
representation. 
 
Tenhaaf’s Lo-Fi project seems to point toward this notion of embodiment 
through the use of light clusters as a representational strategy, since it generates 
a subjectivity that is not only unbounded by the categories described above, and 
which produces (A-Life) subjectivities through representation, but one that is 
also perpetually shifting in relation to its environment and other subjects.62 
Tenhaaf describes the actions of both the artifact and the human user as 
‘context-dependent’ or, a ‘coupling to the environment’, resulting in a form of 
participatory action that can therefore be best described as ‘emergent’, since it 
deals with the continual dynamic interplay between a self and Other.63 In this, 
the model of embodiment that is being promoted is aligned with a type of 
multiplicity, both in the way in which an interactant can act as a single agent or 
as a population, and also in the potential for performing heterogeneous subject 
positions: the LED representation is a prosthesis to self.64  
 
Lo-fi embodiment is not synonymous with the body and, in this sculpture, 
rejects any attempt at realistic simulation of the human form, instead working 
with a mode of representation that is essentially an extended metaphor on the 
medium itself. By describing the subject through LEDs in states of on/off, lo-fi 
embodiment is essentially a binary representation of the subject. By taking 
binary seriously as a representational strategy, lo-fi embodiment paradoxically 
                                                                                                                                      
‘lack of inhibition and control in its associations’ between ideas which are dangerously ‘cut off 
from associative connection with the other ideas, but can be associated among themselves.’ See 
Plant, 2000 p. 345. 
62 By being detached from figural representation, there is a sense in which Tenhaaf’s agents are 
free to constantly take on new positions in the assigned tasks, rather than being bounded by role. 
In this the work resonates with the distinction that Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari make 
between the games of Chess and Go. See Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Felix Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus, Continuum, London, 2004 p. 389. 
63 Baljko & Tenhaaf, 2008 p. 11:5 and p.11:10. 
64 Ibid., p.11:14. 
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re-defines it outside of a dualistic framework (of human/not-human, real/virtual) 
and proposes a mode of encounter between technologically mediated subjects 
that is embodied and material. Although Tenhaaf’s work might initially seem to 
be problematic in its inability to represent difference, the very use of binary 
actually points to a highly gendered form of representation which draws on a 
long history of women and computer technology, thus re-inserting the feminine 
into a field traditionally characterized as masculine, without resorting to an 
over-determined reinvestment in the corporeal. 
 
States of superimposition 
 
In the 1840s Ada Lovelace developed the Analytical Engine with Charles 
Babbage, by taking inspiration from the Jacquard loom, which had been 
developed some 40 years earlier. The loom worked on the basis of punched 
paper programs, designed as a code for the highly complex patterns of textiles 
such as damask, brocade and matelasse to be produced on a mass scale. The 
loom is controlled by cards with punched holes, each row of which corresponds 
to one row of the design. Multiple rows of holes are punched on each card and 
the many cards that compose the design of the textile are strung together in 
order. Although the Analytical Engine could not be built because the machines 
for making the component parts of the device would not be sophisticated 
enough to do so for another 100 years, the design formed the basis for the 
earliest computers, and systems of punch cards as computer programs were still 
in use well into the 1970s.65 
 
In her essay, ‘On the Matrix: Cyberfeminist Simulations’ (1997), Plant has 
reimagined the origin of computer technology not only as an invention by an 
individual woman, Lovelace, but ultimately also as an invention by women 
because of its relationship to weaving and the Jacquard loom. She writes: 
 
If weaving has played such a crucial role in the history of 
computing, it is also the key to one of the most extraordinary 
                                                
65 As well as the work of Sadie Plant see also Essinger, James Jacquard's Web: How a Hand-
Loom Led to the Birth of the Information Age, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004. 
 210 
sites of woman-machine interface that short-circuits their 
prescribed relationship and persists regardless of what man 
effects and defines as the history of technology… In his new 
introductory lectures on psychoanalysis, weaving and plaiting 
are the ‘only contributions to the history of discoveries and 
inventions’ that Freud is willing to ascribe to women. He tells a 
story in which weaving emerges as a simulation of what he 
describes as a natural process, the matting of pubic hairs across 
the hole, the zero, the nothing to be seen…it is because of 
women’s shame at the absence which lies where the root of their 
being should be that they cover up the disgusting wound, 
concealing the wandering womb of hysteria, veiling the matrix 
once and for all. This is a move which dissociates weaving from 
the history of science and technology, removing to a female 
zone both the woven and the networks and fine connective 
meshes of the computer culture into which it feeds.66 
 
As a proto-binary system, the history of the punch cards of Jacquard looms not 
only offers a way of folding the feminine back into a field traditionally 
perceived as both male and masculine, but also suggests a way in which the 
concept of binary itself might be refigured not as a flattening out of the plane of 
representation but rather a process of transformation that weaves in depth and 
complexity. The punch cards, a system of hole/not hole, provide an interesting 
point of encounter between the design for the textile and the cloth that might be 
considered analogous to the point of encounter between the body/self and the 
self/image in binary planes of representation, or indeed the LEDs of Tenhaaf's 
fibreoptic grid. What is important in both these cases is that these planes of 
representation (the screen, the grid, the design and the cloth) are all intimately 
linked, constantly encounter one another and generate a transformation that is 
process-based rather than object-based. The punch card, like code, occupies an 
interstitial site between the subject and the field of representation, which allows 
for continued encounter between the two. Tenhaaf’s subjects continually shift 
                                                
66 Plant, 2000 p. 346. 
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and renegotiate their position in relation to one another, and are determinedly 
not fixed. Indeed, this notion of reciprocity or mutual encounter that underpins 
binary perhaps forges a conceptual network with the earlier discussion of 
feedback in relation to video art practices. As with VHS, computer technologies 
including, and perhaps especially, Web 2.0 operate on a principle of user-
generated content that resonates with the historical emergence of interactivity in 
art practice.67 Crucially, this notion of reciprocity, in which a subject undergoes 
continual transformation through its encounter with another plane of 
representation is, for Plant, at the heart of a theorization of weaving. She writes: 
 
Most technology is characterized as having an instrumental 
relationship to man, but weaving is outside this narrative: there 
is continuity between the weaver, the weaving and the woven 
which gives them a connectivity which eludes all orthodox 
conceptions of technology. And although Freud is willing to 
give women the credit for its ‘invention’, his account also 
implies that there is no point of origin but instead a process of 
simulation by which weaving replicates or weaves itself. It is not 
a thing but a process.68 
 
In emphasizing the critical practice of process-based encounters, Plant touches 
on a challenge to object-centered practices that might be constructed as 
masculine.69 Furthermore, Plant reconfigures computer technologies as 
fundamentally feminine by establishing an equivalence between the womb and 
the matrix (indeed, the etymology of the term matrix shows a relationship to 
both mother and matter, again reinstating the concept of materiality as an object 
of consideration in relation to computer technologies70) and, using the work of 
                                                
67 Tenhaaf has investigated this turn towards a concept of interactivity in art practices, emerging 
in the 1970s, as read through the work of Margaret Morse and Lev Manovich. See Baljko & 
Tenhaaf, 2008 pp. 11:7-11:8. 
68 Plant, 2000 p. 346. 
69 Most notably in relation to models of vision: theorized as a detached, critical eye rather than 
an embodied mode of encounter. For a discussion of these debates in the context of 
technological modes of vision in art see my earlier chapter on the work of Carolee Schneemann. 
70 In Latin the word for ‘womb’ is matrix or mater, so invoking a sense of both the mother and 
the material. In Greek the word for ‘womb’ is hystera, from which we derive the term 
‘hysteria’. The matrix is therefore configured as hysterical, i.e. non-rational.  
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Luce Irigaray in her book This Sex Which is Not One (1977), she also sets up an 
equivalence between the vagina and the 0 (zero) of binary: 
 
For if ‘she’ says something, it is not, it is already no longer, 
identical with what she means. What she says is never identical 
with anything, moreover; rather, it is contiguous. It touches 
(upon). And when it strays too far from that proximity, she stops 
and starts over at ‘zero’: her body-sex.71 
 
If the vagina is the lack, then this nothing, or 0 that represents the entrance to 
the matrix/womb might be positioned against the phallus/1.72 This is the claim 
that Plant originally makes for binary, ‘they [1 and 0] made a lovely couple 
when it came to sex. Man and woman: one and zero looked just right, made for 
each other: 1, the definite, upright line; and 0, the diagram of nothing at all: 
penis and vagina, thing and hole.’73 Indeed, it is precisely this logic of 
black/white, male/female, which has structured western epistemology, and 
which important theories of technology and technologies of thought have 
attempted to expose, or even overturn during the last three decades.74 If 0 is the 
woman, she is indefinable, much like a computer: a general-purpose machine 
whose ontology is always theorized as relational, instrumental, as Other to the 
subject.75 Perhaps even a black box since, as Plant writes, ‘digitization sets zero 
(vagina) free to stand for nothing and make everything work.’76 This clearly is 
an ontology of simulation, a being that poses as something, and which can only 
                                                
71 Irigaray, Luce This Sex Which is Not One, Porter, C. trans., Cornell University Press, 1985 p. 
21. 
72 In Neuromancer, Gibson describes cyberspace/the matrix as ‘the nonspace’, ‘a 
vastness…where the faces where shredded and blown away down hurricane corridors.’ See 
Gibson, William Neuromancer, Grafton, London 1986 p. 45. 
73 Plant, 1997 p. 34. 
74 For example, Haraway’s ‘Cyborg Manifesto’. 
75 On the concept of the computer as a general purpose machine, see Plant, 2000 p. 345. She 
writes, ‘unlike previous machines which tend to have some single purpose, the computer 
functions as a general purpose system which can, in effect do anything… Like Irigaray’s 
woman, it can turn its invisible, non-existent self to anything: it runs any program, and simulates 
all operations, even those of its own functioning.’ See also Gere pp. 9-12, especially p. 12, 
where he writes, ‘the only possible definition of what a computer is, is a place where computing 
takes place. Computing itself can best be defined as a process where data is entered into a 
device, whereupon the device can store it, manipulate it, store or output the result of the 
manipulation. Anything that does this is a computer.’ The computer is hard to define precisely 
because it mimics so many different things, the TV, typewriters, spreadsheets and so on.  
76 Plant, 2000 p. 347.  
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ever be understood in relation to something else rather than a thing in its own 
right. 
 
But I’m not sure that the analogy between vagina and ‘0’ holds true, nor that 
Plant’s reading of binary sufficiently overturns the paradigm. Computers might 
operate using a binary system of representation, but to theorize 0 and 1 as 
equivalent to male and female raises more questions than it answers. Zero/0, as 
both a numeric value and a written digit, have a history that is clearly tied both 
to the feminine and to non-western mathematical systems, apparently perfectly 
opposing it to the rational system of western mathematics expressed in the 
concept of 1.77 But perhaps the analogies have become scrambled somewhere 
along the line. Wasn’t the hole in the punch card of the Jacquard loom the ‘on’ 
mode, the ‘thing’ rather than the ‘no-thing’? The punched hole that formally 
references 0 was in fact an early representation of the binary 1. That 0 became 
the opposition to 1 in binary is a result not of the history of 0 as a number (zero) 
that, like computers and women, is hard to define; a number that is neither 
positive nor negative, that in itself is not really a number but only a plan for a 
number. Rather, 0 was adopted as a counterpoint to 1 in binary because it best 
represented the gaps between the punched holes in the Jacquard loom. And it 
did this because 0 also had an earlier, alternative history: it began not as a 
number, but as a way of separating digits in early mathematical systems that 
were positional and required physical spacing for clarity, generating difference 
between decimal columns. It thus served an entirely different function 
altogether, and one that is non-numeric. A clear example is that the figure 1 
holds a different value when it is followed by a string of zeros (e.g. 1, 100, 
1000). It does this not because of the numeric value of 0, but because of the way 
in which it moves the 1 into a different decimal column. In binary, therefore, 
perhaps we should not read 0 as no-thing, as the numeric value zero, and as a 
lack, but rather as a material figure that spaces out and separates the ones across 
a field of representation: 0 acts on a number to escalate the scale of that number. 
 
                                                
77 For an overview of the history of zero see Kaplan, Robert The Nothing That Is: A Natural 
History of Zero, Penguin Press, London and New York, 1999. 
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Although Plant suggests that by producing an equivalence between ‘zero’ and 
woman (and here I use the written numeric value in opposition to my material 
understanding of the figure ‘0’/‘oh’) you expose a system in which woman is 
indefinable and without a unified ontology, she asserts that this fluidity of 
identity is actually no longer a matter of ‘deprivation and disadvantage’ but 
rather ‘a positive advantage in a feminized future for which identity is nothing 
more than a liability.’78 Ultimately, therefore, theorists like Plant have 
reconfigured the matrix as fundamentally feminine, even if that model of the 
feminine is still leaky, soft and malleable: 
  
Cyberspace is out of man’s control: virtual reality destroys his 
identity, digitization is mapping his soul and, at the peak of his 
triumph, the culmination of his machinic erections, man 
confronts the system he built for his own protection and finds it 
is female and dangerous.79 
 
Refiguring such technologies in the context of notions of identity, fluidity and 
femininity, as a means to upturn the rigidity and rationality of binary structures, 
has been a useful line of thought originating with Haraway and taking many 
incarnations along the way. However, by looking closely at how the technology 
actually works we might come to see that perhaps 1 and 0 cannot be so readily 
positioned within the broader understanding of binaries in the structure of 
Western epistemology, and that doing so perpetuates a discourse that is self-
limiting.80 1 and 0 perhaps do not have equivalence in male/female, east/west, 
and day/night. Of course this is not to say that technologies aren’t gendered in 
complex ways, and computer technologies in particular have certainly been both 
theorized as masculine and dominated by an overwhelmingly male user-ship. 
But, by looking at the 1s and 0s as textual/material rather than as numeric 
values, we see that not only do they serve a somewhat different purpose, but 
also that they cannot be so readily opposed to one another. 
                                                
78 Plant, 2000 p. 345.  
79 Ibid., p. 349. 
80 For an overview of the way in which Haraway’s important article has been taken up by 
scholars in the secondary literature see Sofoulis, Zoe ‘Cyberquake: Haraway’s Manifesto’ in 
Bell & Kennedy eds. (pp. 365-385). 
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Like the punched cards of the Jacquard loom, the 1s and 0s fill a field or plane 
of representation. As with Tenhaaf’s low-fidelity forms of embodiment, it 
would therefore be a mistake to think that such a system is a reduction or 
flattening out of representation to two basic digits, since what is important in 
binary is not the digits themselves but the places where they occur. This is 
because binary is not just a string of digits but a field of representation, a plane 
or space that has to be filled with pattern (punched holes or 1’s). Every 1 is not 
equivalent to every other 1, but contains different meaning depending on where 
in the sequence it occurs.81 The origin of binary systems in the punched card of 
the Jacquard loom is extremely useful here in elucidating this concept: should 
every punched hole in the card be equivalent, it would be translated directly as 
an equivalent mark on the resultant cloth that is woven from the pattern. Instead 
the pattern of fabric, such as jacquard and damask, are complex, dense, and with 
long repeats and, in the case of matelasse, has substantial physical depth. The 
fabric is not merely a mirror of the pattern of punched holes, but it does bear a 
relationship to it. The punched holes actually describe a process of 
transformation that the design undergoes as it shifts its material being. Because 
of its formal reliance on code (in that one LED=one subject/cluster of subjects) 
Lo-Fi is unusual amongst computer-based art practices in that it actually 
foregrounds the function of binary and presents it as a field that is inherently 
spatial and with depth. By contrast, many practices invest virtual representation 
with a graphically produced illusion of depth or realism, which only further 
severs the links between the real and the virtual and reifies the planes of 
representation into two opposing structures. Lo-Fi, conversely, is interested in 
the points of encounter in-between. 
 
As well as considering whether 0 and 1 are suitable representations for the 
states ‘yes/no’ or ‘on/off’ (corresponding to electrical pulses rather than holes 
punched in card), a final challenge I would like to mount to the overwhelming 
scholarship on the hegemony of binary and its ties to the systems of patriarchy 
                                                
81 Similarly, the functioning of the Analytical Engine, which relied on a series of spokes running 
down the length of a cylinder, was premised upon pattern and spatiality, since it was the 
position of the cylinder within a potential full cycle of rotation that transferred information. 
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and western epistemology concerns refiguring all the 1s and 0s as a pattern or 
rhythm whose spaces in between contain moments of anticipation and 
potentiality, much like the blinking cursor at the end of every last typed 
character, waiting to inhabit the next space. 
 
As discussed in the chapter on video, quantum mechanics has allowed us to 
think about various phenomena in which multiple ontologies can occur 
simultaneously. The example of wave/particle duality is one such state of 
superimposition. These states are framed by anticipation and potentiality, and 
thus describe a model for inhabiting multiple, shifting subject positions: a form 
of embodiment that, as we have already seen, stands in opposition to the body 
and is a situated subjectivity. In Digital Aesthetics, Cubitt discussed Freud’s 
case study of ‘A child is being beaten’ in relation to the model of a subject 
simultaneously inhabiting the cursor, the I-bar/arrow pointer and the word ‘I’ on 
a computer screen, which I described earlier. In this case, ‘a child is being 
beaten’ was the description of an erotic fantasy given to Freud by several 
patients. Freud drew from analysis of this fantasy another, more primitive one: 
‘the father beats the child’. In relation to this latter statement the added 
information was that the child that the father was beating was not the patient, 
but another child, while the patient was looking on. But of course, in this 
fantasy, the patient was the one being beaten and the one doing the beating, as 
well as the onlooker: the case described a state of superimposition. For Cubitt, 
this is precisely the experience of fantasy that is generated by computers in their 
various fields of representation, such as VR environments or online networks. 
He writes,  
 
The specificity of fantasy is that it allows you to inhabit multiple 
subject positions…like dataspace, fantasy allows, encourages, a 
kind of masquerade in the position of the Other, an identification 
with otherness in which the centering ego is lost and forgotten in 
the play of alterities.82 
 
                                                
82 Cubitt, p. 85. 
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While Cubitt constructs this model of ‘dataspace’ as a place in which 
identification with the Other is seen as a positive form of play with subjectivity 
– although it is not clear whether for Cubitt this can only ever be a simulated 
identification or some kind of ‘authentic experience’, thus raising questions 
about why an individual might choose to participate in such an activity – the 
concept of entertaining fantasies of inhabiting the Other, known as ‘passing’, 
has also been criticized for its investment in replaying stereotypes of the 
erotic/exotic.83 What is of interest to me here, therefore, is not the question of 
(virtual) identity tourism, in which one might inhabit other bodies, but the way 
in which the very structure of binary itself might be seen to produce an ontology 
of embodiment premised upon potentiality and multiplicity.  
 
Jean Francois Lyotard’s reading of Freud’s case seems to me to set up an 
interesting way of thinking through this in relation to the concept of beating/a 
beat. This beat generates a rhythm of on/off on/off on/off, structured like binary, 
which represents, as Rosalind Krauss describes it, the alternating ‘charge and 
discharge of pleasure, the oscillating presence and absence of contact.’84 This, 
for Lyotard, is the plane of representation, or a ‘matrix’, which fields the 
fantasy. Lyotard’s use of the term ‘matrix’ here is very interesting since the 
term clearly resonates with popular representations of computer technology, and 
the imagined vastness and incomprehensibility of dataspace, as represented in 
films such as The Matrix (1999). Lyotard argued that the matrix is an invisible 
order, which lies below the ‘seen’ order of the image, and which belongs to the 
unconscious. The matrix, for Lyotard, is the operation of primary processes, 
whose products are then projected onto the visible surface, so we can see its 
workings, even if we cannot see the matrix. As such, the matrix is here 
theorized much like the ‘black box’: its workings can only be inferred from the 
superficial representation of the fact that it’s working. Like dataspace, as 
discussed previously, Lyotard’s matrix is also considered to be spatial, even if 
                                                
83 See Gonzalez, Nakamura, & Sardar, Ziauddin ‘ALT.CIVILIZATIONS.FAQ: Cyberspace as 
the Darker Side of the West’ in Bell & Kennedy eds., (pp. 732–752). 
84 Krauss, Rosalind ‘The Im/Pulse to See’ in Vision and Visuality, Foster, H. ed., Dia Art 
Foundation Discussions in Contemporary Culture No. 2, Bay Press, Seattle, 1988 (pp. 51-78) p. 
66. 
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that spatiality does not correspond to the coordinates of external space. Lyotard 
remarks,  
 
Places are not partes extra partes; the intervals required for 
example in the perceptual order for things of the external world 
to be recognizable and for them not to pile up on one another – 
depth, in short – or in terms of phenomenological transcendence, 
negation – here, these intervals are abandoned.85 
 
It is onto this matrix that we can map the fantasy of a blow that might also be a 
caress: a form of contact that is both painful and pleasurable (a form of 
superimposition).86 The matrix of on/off on/off represents the rhythmic 
oppositions between contact and absence of contact, the beating, a ‘beat’, in 
which you are simultaneously the one being beaten and the one who is beating. 
What is important here is that, for Lyotard, this is not merely a recurrent pulse 
in which ‘off’ will always follow ‘on’. Rather, the recurrent rhythm suggests the 
potential for a rupture that is not followed by the onset of another contact: there 
is always a constant threat of interruption, an interstice between the ‘on’ and the 
‘off’, a space of potentiality and anticipation. In Lo-Fi, this represents itself as 
an emergent ontology that is formulated precisely in relation to the participatory 
(inter)actions between human and computer agents: the actions are unfixed and 
undetermined, inhabiting unexpected and heterogeneous positions. 
 
It is these gaps between the states on/off, gaps which are themselves not spatial, 
or which do not exist on the field of representation but somehow beyond it, that 
might invest computer binary with a theory of superimposition that provides a 
radical challenge to the theorization of binary as fixed and theoretically lacking 
in depth and complexity. By lifting computer binary out of the context of the 
binaries of western epistemology, we might hope to explode the perceived 
                                                
85 Lyotard, quoted in Krauss, p. 64. 
86 For a discussion of the way in which touch has been conceptualized around a simultaneous 
stroking and striking, see Derrida, Jacques On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, Irizarry, C. trans., 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2005. This concept is discussed in Chapter 1, in 
relation to the work of Carolee Schneemann. 
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rigidity of the block of code.87 Instead, under these new terms, we might re-
imagine the use of binary outside of the structure of binaries such as 
real/virtual, and instead reinvest it with a materiality. As such we might also 
position binary as an interstitial point of encounter between subjects (whether 
technological or organic) and thus acknowledge that the epistemological power 
of the system itself relies on the interstitial gaps between the 1s and 0s: the 
moments of potentiality and anticipation inherent in an embodied subjectivity, 
no longer tied to the body. 
                                                
87 Here I use the term ‘block’ to echo Lyotard’s theory that the elements of a matrix ‘do not 
form a system but a block.’ Lyotard, quoted in Krauss, p. 64. 
 220 











To close the discussion with a case study of Nell Tenhaaf is fortuitous, since it 
takes us all the way back to the beginning, back to Carolee Schneemann. 
Between them is a point of connection, Victoria Vesna, whose collaborative 
work with these artists speaks to the continuing relevance of Schneemann’s 
early work in moving image technology and the conceptual ties between 
projects such as Fuses (1964-1968) and contemporary computer-based practice. 
As new technologies emerge, and others fade into obsolescence, imagined 
patterns of teleological progress (plotted X against Y) should be replaced by 
wormholes and quantum leaps, in which relations of technology are plotted in 
four dimensions. That this thesis serendipitously stumbled across works that 
continue to speak to one another formally, conceptually or politically across 
different historical, cultural or technological milieus should sufficiently 
evidence this approach. 
 
Victoria Vesna who, like Tenhaaf, also holds an established academic post as a 
theorist in electronic media practices, has not only dialogued with Tenhaaf in 
numerous panels, conferences and printed media, but has also worked closely 
with Schneemann on the more recent video work Vesper’s Stampede to My 
Holy Mouth (1992). Like Fuses, this work interrogates the chain of co-
signification in which the (female) human and the animal body have historically 
become bound up, weaving together many of the themes from throughout the 
rest of this thesis: technologically mediated animal encounters; the relationship 
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between video and domesticity; and the role of abstraction in overturning the 
epistemo-logic of certain types of technological looking. 
 
In this short video, Schneemann and Vesna are shot in a domestic setting, 
talking frankly to one another in a manner that recalls the confessional mode of 
deploying the camera in important early feminist video works, such as Julie 
Gustafson’s The Politics of Intimacy (1972).  They are seen reading and 
chatting together, discussing the ways in which the female and the feline have 
historically become interwoven, looking at female genital (pussy) mutilation, 
destruction of goddess sites during the war in Lebanon and cat/clitoral 
condemnation during witchcraft trials. They discuss the connections between 
the cat and the vagina, postulating whether resultant phobias might stem from 
ideas of fur, claws and domesticity (of both cats and women).  
 
The importance of conducting and documenting this research was, for 
Schneemann, intensified by her relationship with a new kitten, Vesper, after 
Cluny died in 1988. Schneemann believed that Cluny was reborn in Vesper, and 
the physical relationship that she had shared with him (see Infinity Kisses 1981-
1988) continued with the new young cat. This relationship is explicitly 
foregrounded in the second half of the video, when it shifts into a more poetic 
and technologically experimental mode of representation. As Schneemann and 
Vesna discuss the research, sounds of a cat cleaning itself begin to overlay the 
images. We can hear it licking, purring and grunting: the sounds themselves 
connoting wetness and the oral. During a story about the lynching of 
Schneemann’s grandmother’s cats by neighbourhood children, the cat noises 
intensify and the film suddenly breaks. No longer a scene of two women 
discussing their research, Schneemann is now seen lying on her bed kissing 
Vesper and letting him lick her nipples, while a voice over reads the essay-
poem, ‘Vesper’s stampede to my holy mouth’, about the erotic affections of the 
kitten. The screen splits in two and is doubled; becoming a mirror image of 
itself, so that left to right we see the image and its negative, its reverse. This 
reversal is further compounded by the use of solarization techniques on the 
VHS images so that the light areas appear dark, and vice-versa. As the process 
of solarization bleaches out any detail, the reverse images on either side of the 
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split-screen move around, creating an abstract, optical effect that looks like a 
continuous stream of Rorschach tests. The voice over tells us that the intimacy 
that we are witnessing on screen ‘sounds the phallocentric bells of bestiality, 
obscenity and perversion’.  
 
While the associations of the feminine and the feline (and the cat’s ties to 
domesticity, the almost exclusive remit of the feminine) have already been 
discussed in chapter one, it remains important to stress that an interest in 
crossing the borders between the human and the animal has been historically 
presented both as a feminine and a female pursuit. Notions of an animal(istic) 
Other have historically been conflated with the Other of post-colonial and 
feminist theory, i.e. the monster.1 Hybrid bodies have been traditionally 
deployed in folk tales and horror stories to symbolically communicate a moral 
order, for example in animal-groom tales like Hans My Hedgehog, The Frog 
Prince or Beauty and the Beast or metamorphosis tales including Peau d’Ane, 
Bearskin and La Gatta Cenerentola. As Marina Warner has noted, what is of 
particular interest about these tales is not only that they largely assumed a female 
audience, who expected to be given away by their fathers to men who would 
‘probably strike them as monsters’, but also that the tales themselves were 
mostly written by women.2 For example, Le Cabinet de Fees (The Fairy 
Library), is a series of 41 volumes comprising hundreds of tales from the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Over half of these were written by 
women, unusual during a period in which women might otherwise have been 
                                                
1 For wide-ranging discussions of the historical construction of the feminine or the non-Western 
as ‘animal’ see: Adams, Carol J. The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical 
Theory, 1990; in Fleta, the common law of England, 1290, makes numerous reference to Jewish 
people and their innate association with animals in the eyes of the law; Davies, pp. 1046-1047; 
Curtis, L. P. Apes and Angels: The Irishman in Victorian Caricature, 1997; Palencia-Roth, M. 
Enemies of God: Monsters and the Theology of Conquest, 1996; Mullan, B. & Marvin, G. Zoo 
Culture, 1999; Pagden, A. The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of 
Comparative Ethnology, 1982; Ritvo, H. The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures 
in the Victorian Age, 1987; Salisbury, J. E. The Beast Within: Animals in the Middle Ages, 
1994; Salisbury, J. E. ‘Human Beasts and Bestial Humans in the Middle Ages’ 1997; 
Schiebinger, L. Nature’s Body: Gender in the Making of Modern Science, 1993; Thomas, K. 
Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility, 1983; Colins, Patricia Hill 
Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment, 1990; 
Braidotti, Rosi ‘Signs of Wonder and Traces of Doubt: on Teratology and Embodied 
Differences’, in Between Monsters, Goddesses and Cyborgs: Feminist Confrontations with 
Science, Medicine and Cyberspace, Braidotti, R. & Lykke, N. eds., Zed books, London and 
New Jersey, 1996. 
2 Warner, Marina From The Beast to The Blonde, Vintage, London, 1995, p. xii and pp. 267-
286. 
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marginalised from many forms of cultural production, and Marie-Catherine, 
Baronne d’Aulnoy, has a volume all to herself. Warner has traced this genealogy 
of female authors interested in animal-groom and metamorphosis tales right up 
to Ruth Rose, the screen-writer of King Kong (1933), and Linda Woolverton, the 
screen-writer of Disney’s Beauty and the Beast (1991). Perhaps what we might 
learn from such a bewildering, cacophonous collection is that hybridity, or 
monstrousness, has historically been considered the means by which women 
might escape the oppressive logic of modern dualisms.3 However, it is also a 
label that has been applied to certain bodies, as part of that very same oppressive 
structure, in order to invoke themes of fear, anxiety and the unnatural.  
 
Vesna’s work is, perhaps, a continuation of this rather strange lineage in which 
female and animal bodies encounter one another, critically and textually. Her 
current project Hox Zodiac (2009-present) is a visual exploration of the role of 
the homeobox gene in morphogenesis. This gene is important because it is found 
in both human and non-human animals and, furthermore, because it is 
responsible for anatomical development – defining body regions, determining 
number of arms, legs, noses and so on – it speaks to a questioning of traditional 
body morphologies that we saw in Tenhaaf’s exploration of lo-fi embodiment, 
and Schneemann’s, Craig’s and Hatoum’s use of abstraction. This gene, 
paradoxically, thus both points toward what is similar between human and non-
human animals, and is the site at which morphological differences between them 
are developed. Crucially, we are told, the homeobox gene could have a 
significant impact in the field of technologically mediated organ and limb 
regeneration. 
 
Hox Zodiac, and its formal and conceptual ties to the other projects in this study, 
thus highlights one of the central claims of this thesis: that there is a conflict 
                                                
3 For a selection of debates relating to the ‘monster’ see Creed, Barbara ‘The Monstrous 
Feminine’, 1993; Cohen, Jeffrey Jerome ‘Monster Culture (Seven Theses)’ in Monster Theory: 
Reading Culture, Cohen, J. J ed., University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London, 1996 
(pp. 3-25); Haraway, 1985; Huet, Marie-Helene Monstrous Imagination, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1993; Stephen Pender, ‘No Monsters at 
the Resurrection’ in Cohen, J. J. ed., (pp. 143-167); Between Monsters, Goddesses and Cyborgs: 
Feminist Confrontations with Science, Medicine and Cyberspace, Braidotti, R. & Lykke, N. 
eds., Zed books, London and New Jersey, 1996. 
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between the body and its representation, which technology has historically both 
engendered and attempted to resolve. To conceive of a split between the body 
and its representation underwrites other problematic divisions such as the real 
and the virtual, technology and the body, and nature and culture. In the works of 
Schneemann, Craig, Hatoum and Tenhaaf, moving image technologies are thus 
deployed in such a way that the body becomes consciously abstracted from its 
representation, both acknowledging the means by which technology has 
historically affected such a splitting as well as pointing towards a place from 
which it might be reimagined.  
 
Indeed, it is precisely the question of a ‘split’ that this thesis hopes to do away 
with once and for all. Following the lead of Donna Haraway’s theory of 
‘naturecultures’, or Karen Barad’s ‘intra-action’, I propose that the subject never 
exists anterior to technology, but that both are always involved in processes and 
cycles of mutual co-constitution. The political problems of representation 
inherent in those imaging technologies that have traditionally staked a claim to 
an objective point of view are here overturned as the technology itself becomes 
complicit in the formation of the subject that it seeks to represent, not distinct 
from it.  
 
While this argument is now very familiar to the field of gender and science and 
technology studies, what is novel here is that the works included in this thesis all 
point toward the potentiality of abstraction in technologically mediated 
representations of the body, in order to shift the question away from theories of 
‘the body and technology’ toward ‘embodiment’. In so doing, the initial terms of 
the investigation need no longer imply that the body is distinct from technology, 
nor that terms such as nature and culture can be taken for granted. Through 
abstraction, or rather lo-fi embodiment, the very terms of the relationship are 
thus entirely reconfigured, as the technology is used in novel enterprises that 
undo the concern with mimesis and objectivity in representation. 
 
Much of the work done in relation to feminism and technology has been about 
the problem of mimesis, since it feeds into theories of vision that are founded on 
a sort of rational perspectivalism, an over-privileged mode of representation 
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compared to touch, smell or sound. Furthermore, it has been an important site of 
critical enquiry given that mimesis presupposes a model of technology in which 
the (human) subject is not only recorded and analysed through ever increasing 
fidelity of re-production (subsequently objectifying it), but it also makes the 
technology itself into an object. In the instrumental mode required by mimesis, 
technology only ever has a ‘role’ to play in relation to the subject, and is never 
conceived as an active participant, or subject with agency, in these processes. 
Thus, I would argue, mimesis produces a double objectification of both the 
subject of representation and the technology.  
 
The question of mimesis is haunted by anthropomorphism, in terms of our 
relation both to technology and to animals (i.e. non-humans more broadly). For 
example, the recent work of Lucy Suchman has tackled the problem of 
anthropomorphism in robotics, looking at the ways in which these projects are 
often judged on the degree to which they have either succeeded or failed to be 
human-like. Importantly for Suchman, this emphasis on the anthropomorphic 
has an impact not just on theories of the non-human subject, but also on those of 
the human itself.4 She writes: 
 
A recurring theme of Haraway is the historical prevalence of 
mimesis or mirroring as a guiding trope for figuring human-
nonhuman encounters: a form of relation that privileges vision, 
and looks to find in the Other a differently embodied 
reproduction of the Self.5 
 
Challenging mimesis through abstraction or, more accurately lo-fi embodiment, 
thus plays a crucial role in subject formation and in undoing the oppositional 
divide between the body and technology and between the real and the virtual 
(presupposed by the question of mimesis, as discussed in chapter four of this 
thesis). Because of the emphasis on a critical encounter with images, art history 
                                                
4 See Suchman, Lucy ‘Subject Objects’ in Feminist Theory, Vol. 12, No. 2, August 2011, 
Special Issue: Nonhuman Feminisms (pp. 119-145). 
5 Suchman, p. 121. 
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might conceivably be a site from which new theories of embodiment could be 
developed.  
 
As such, the role of artistic practice is thus conceived as absolutely fundamental 
in shifting the terms of this particular discussion. By challenging 
anthropomorphism and destabilizing the figurative through abstraction, these 
works demonstrate both the way in which artistic practice has previously been 
the site of the formation of ideas around the subject (premised on bodily 
identity), and its potential role for generating new theories.6 Works that engage 
technology in the mode of lo-fi potentially redirect discussions of technology 
away from mimesis, which is premised on vision. Although they are imaging 
technologies (film, video, medical imaging and computer-based work) they 
might, paradoxically, thus be seen to challenge vision itself. Furthermore, lo-fi 
representation is an important mode to consider for a theory of technology more 
generally since it overturns the assumption that technology only ever tries to 
reproduce the subject with greater and greater likeness (high fidelity). By 
rejecting the concept of the screen as a mirror, we might overturn the paradigm 
of repetition that has informed so much of art history for the last four decades. 
 
With regards to this thesis, the work of art history has demonstrated that it is 
potentially able to initiate an original analysis of technologies, such as 
endoscopy, which moves from the visual to the political. Concerned as it is with 
vision and visualities, art history might address the blind spot in the literature in 
dealing with certain types of image production. Specifically, what is original 
here is the engagement with medical imaging and computer technology. As well 
as undertaking a unique analysis of endoscopy and binary (and here it is original 
not just within art history but also within science and technology studies) this 
                                                
6 Of note is that even in the realm of abstraction – and especially in relation to abstract 
expressionism – the body was seen as always present, and always figured in the work itself. 
Abstraction in painting was historically theorised as anthropomorphic, and the encounter itself 
was seen as anthropomorphic. ‘Any art that originates with a will to ‘expression’ is not abstract, 
but representational. Space is represented. Critics who interpret space see the history of art as a 
reduction of three dimensional illusionistic space to ‘the same order of space as our bodies’… 
Here Greenberg equates ‘space’ with ‘our bodies’ and interprets this reduction as abstract. This 
anthropomorphizing of space is aesthetically a ‘pathetic fallacy’ and is in no way abstract.’ 
Clement Greenberg, ‘Abstract, Representational and So Forth’, 1961, cit. Robert Smithson, 
‘Quasi-Infinitudes and the Waning of Space’ (1966) in Robert Smithson: the Collected Writings, 
Flam, J. ed., University of California Press, London 1996 (pp. 34–37) p. 35. 
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thesis has also drawn on contemporary theories of the subject and 
technologically mediated representation to enable a critical re-examination of 
film- and video-based works whose analysis has perhaps become somewhat 
over-determined. Not only does this project therefore aim to open up pathways 
for new readings of medical imaging and binary technology beyond the thesis, 
but also to revisit important early works in feminist film practice, for example 
reading Schneemann’s Fuses through current literature in animal studies to 
generate a new way of conceiving of the film screen in the tactile realm of the 
pet. Similarly, Craig’s videotape Delicate Issue intersects with Schneemann’s 
project as an example of an early feminist work that deployed new technology at 
the historical moment when it entered the mainstream public sphere.  
 
Through these diverse practices, I hope to have brought to light categories of 
image production that are under-represented in art history, from medical imaging 
to online gaming to the home sex tape, evaluating their significance in wider 
visual cultures and artistic practice. By looking at the inter-connections between 
these different practices, this project has begun to draw formal and theoretical 
links between technologies in order to highlight the points at which the 
representation of the female body continues to pose a serious question to artists 
and theorists. In this I am particularly thinking of the relationship between 
video- and internet-based practices in relation to the figure of the amateur. 
Although the overlapping possibilities and problematics of representation in 
these two fields are hinted at in chapter four, they could be more fully developed 
in an art-historical context, particularly given that internet-based practice is 
currently under-represented in the literature. 
 
As well as enabling new research to be conducted in relation to well-established 
practices, by mobilizing a serious consideration of gender and science and 
technology studies through the notion of lo-fi embodiment, I hope to re-position 
art history at the forefront of the literature in this field, and strengthen existing 
interdisciplinary work between the two.7 As I suggested in the introduction: as 
                                                
7 Faith Wilding and the SubRosa Group, Rosi Braidotti, Sadie Plant, Christine Ross, Kate 
Mondloch and Julie Wosk all have an existing interest in the role of the visual arts in relation to 
gender and science. 
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much as the sciences, and especially medical sciences, are finding a new 
position of prominence amongst art historians, I hope that this exchange might 
come to be bidirectional. By ‘re-position’ I am referring to the lack of attention 
to these questions post-2000 in an art-historical context; a real problem when 
dealing with an ever-changing technological culture. Instead, the 1990s emerges 
as somewhat of a pivotal moment in the formation of ideas around the body, 
gender and technology, in terms of both practical and theoretical output. 
However, this is not to suggest that this line of enquiry is no longer relevant, but 
that art history must now acknowledge that the terms of the debate have 
changed somewhat. For example, as discussed in chapter 4, the frame of 
reference for approaching computer-technology can no longer be structured 
around the real/virtual opposition.  
 
While a vast amount of literature was published during the 1990s and beyond on 
a few important works (that of Orlan and Stelarc, for example) neither practice 
nor theory seems to have kept pace with developments in technology in terms of 
models of subjectivity and sexuality. The critical tools of psychoanalysis, 
feminism and Marxist theory are no longer being seriously deployed in relation 
to new technologies in art. Here, for example, I am thinking of the work of 
Parveen Adams on Orlan.8 Likewise, the important contribution that Sherry 
Turkle made to the field of psychoanalysis and computer technology could be 
extended and continued.9 No practice since the work of Orlan and Stelarc seems 
to have generated such critical interest and, subsequently, theorizations of 
technology in art now often seem outdated and polarized (extreme technophilia 
vs technophobia).10  
 
                                                
8 See Adams, Parveen ‘Operation Orlan’ in The Emptiness of the Image: Psychoanalysis and 
Sexual Difference, Routledge, London, 1996 (pp. 141-159). 
9 See Turkle, Sherry The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit, MIT Press, Cambridge 
MA., 1984; Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet, MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA., 1995; and Turkle ‘Artificial Intelligence and Psychoanalysis: A New Alliance’  
in Daedalus, Vol. 117, No. 1, Special issue: Artificial Intelligence, Winter 1988 (pp. 241-268). 
10 That certain tools of analysis are no longer being consistently used is perhaps reflected in the 
transition between the Cybercultures Reader first and second editions (2000 and 2007 
respectively), which shows the relative deceleration of new critical work in these areas, post-
2000. 
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By looking beyond the practices that are now commonly associated with ‘art and 
technology’ projects, which have become somewhat staid, uncritical and 
overdetermined, this thesis hopes to reinvest art history with that earlier 
momentum to re-think how art has engaged imaging technology in an unlikely 
series of encounters both prior to that moment in the 1990s, during it, and after. 
Much of the current work on technology and the body is in the area known as 
‘SciArt’, dominated by a handful of institutions that have developed a self-
limiting discourse around themselves, as outlined in the introduction. By 
contrast, therefore, this thesis invests in a wider range of discursive practices, 
acknowledging a formal diversity not exclusively focused on lab-based 
(‘wetware’) practices, surgical interventions and neuro-scientific techniques of 
analysis. 
 
And yet, I absolutely understand all the works included in this study as engaged 
with biotechnology. In this I understand the term through its two constituent 
parts: bios, and its associations with a Foucauldian notion of biopolitics, which 
is to say a politicized body, and techne in the Heideggerian sense, which 
opposes a traditional instrumental ontology of technology. Thus, biotechnology 
is here conceived as mounting a significant challenge to the orthodox definition, 
premised on the application of science and technology to the utilization or 
improvement of living organisms for industrial and agricultural production.11 
Outside of its instrumentalisation in the systems of economic production, I 
understand biotechnology as both political and poetic: a process of interaction 
(or, following from Karen Barad, ‘intra-action’) in which technology is always 
an acting, political subject in its physical and metaphorical encounters with other 
subjects (whether human or non-human).12  
 
What is important to my understanding of biotechnology is that it enables us to 
draw together a wide range of practices that speak to one another across different 
historical periods, technological milieu and formal or conceptual differences. It 
also extends critical analysis of technology beyond lab-based practice, in order 
                                                
11 See OED on biotechnology 
12 See Barad, Karen Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
Matter and Meaning, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2007. 
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to demonstrate how these issues feed in to visual cultures more broadly, and the 
bidirectional impact this has with art. As the works in this thesis have 
demonstrated, the field of technology in art is wider than the current literature 
might otherwise have us believe, and these practices now merit serious 
consideration in this context. 
 
But, what is absolutely urgent to address is that the discourse around SciArt has 
also neglected considerations of gender and sexuality and the politics of 
technologically mediated representation and analysis. One of the primary aims 
of this project has therefore been to look at the role of various imaging 
technologies in the construction of subjectivity and sexuality in different visual 
cultures. Particularly, the similarities and differences in representation between 
art, medicine and pornography have emerged as a central axis around which our 
discussion has rotated. In this, the initial work in the early chapters on practices 
that identified as feminist lead the way for re-situating later projects amongst 
these concerns. For example, taking the work of Schneemann, Craig and 
Hatoum as a series of case studies, this thesis has considered the points at which 
pornography might differ from (or be similar to) other categories of explicit 
representation such as home sex tapes, erotic films and gynaecological imagery, 
examining the gendering of these forms of vision, and linking these findings to 
models of gendering in computer technology. 
 
This has, however, highlighted several key areas in which my analysis of gender 
and sexuality is limited. Importantly, this study has only considered the work of 
women artists, focused primarily on heterosexualities, and drawn on theories 
from women working in the fields of Feminism and Science and Technology 
studies. Where is the male body? The queer body? The transsexual body? Is it 
even still useful to conceive of this project as ‘feminist’? In so doing, it might jar 
against the petitions in chapter one that I make to animal subjectivities and 
sexualities, and the claims of both chapter four and this conclusion to the 
importance of embodiment as a way for thinking beyond the categories of 
gender and sexuality. And yet, the specific issue of the female body and its 
representation clearly runs throughout.  
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While conducting the research for this project, no initial restrictions were made 
on which artists would be discussed, based on race, sex, sexuality, class or 
species (either concerning the body of the artist themselves or the way in which 
these categories might be foregrounded in the content or structure of the work). 
It was not intended to be a study of women artists and, in fact, the body of the 
artist has been somewhat sidelined here except where it relates to questions that 
emerge from the strategy of self-representation. The only criteria in choosing the 
visual and textual practices for discussion concerned the way in which moving 
image technology might challenge conventions of representation in relation to 
gender and sexuality, through both the formal and structural properties of the 
technology. Perhaps, as a gendered body myself, this set of criteria automatically 
– but unwittingly – excluded certain practices. This conclusion therefore might 
usefully serve as a site for questioning my own blind spots and limitations. Are 
male or trans artists simply not working with technology in this way and, if so, 
why not? Would looking at non-heterosexual pornography trouble my 
discussion of forms of explicit representation? Can we even take this category of 
‘explicit representation’ for granted as a single entity? Maybe. Yes. Probably 
not.   
 
Looking back, the overall tone is not quite as ‘post-’ as I might have initially 
conceived it, and essentialism has reared its head at times. But this is how the 
research came to unfold, perhaps reflecting the fact that, at least in part, this is 
due to the advances made in such theories that are deeply indebted to the early 
work of feminism (as outlined in the introduction). Socially and historically, 
women have encountered technology both in its most instrumental mode (as 
telephonists, typists and operators) but also in its most poetic (as artists and 
inventors). Thus, finding my way to embodiment through the female body 
perhaps recognises the especially rich and dynamic relationship that women 
have had to technology, marking, as it does, their supposed transition from 
nature to culture. Furthermore, the fact that we might even imagine the 
possibility of speaking or writing beyond the categories of gender at all is 
largely thanks to the work of women theorists (Haraway, N Katherine Hayles, 
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Judith Butler)13 and transsexual theorists (Judith Halberstam, Sandy Stone)14, 
and this important history needs to be acknowledged.  
 
My interest in, and sympathy for, the project of embodiment clearly comes up 
against the problem of difference here. In this, my work performs a sort of vocal 
relay of other projects that draw similar conclusions: the terms are now set by 
which we might speak beyond the bounds of gender and sexuality, and yet we 
are rarely able ever fully to do so. The specificities of bodies are always 
configured not just in the representation, not just in the technology, but also in 
the discourse itself. And this, of course, is because there is still much work to be 
done.  
 
                                                
13 The works of Haraway and Hayles have been extensively referenced throughout this thesis. 
However, for the relevant works of Judith Butler see Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity, Routledge, London and New York, 1990; Butler, Bodies That Matter: 
On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’, Routledge, London and New York, 1993; and Butler, 
Undoing Gender, Routledge, London and New York, 2004. 
14 See Stone, Sandy/Allucquère Rosanne The War of Desire and Technology at the Close of the 
Mechanical Age, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1996; Stone, ‘The Empire Strikes Back: A 
Posttranssexual Manifesto’ (1987) available at http://www.sterneck.net/gender/stone-
posttranssexuel/index.php; Stone, ‘Will the Real Body Please Stand Up: Boundary Stories 
About Virtual Cultures’ in The Cybercultures Reader (first edition) Bell & Kennedy eds., 
Routledge, London and New York, 2000 (pp. 504-528); Halberstam, Judith Female Masculinity, 
Duke University Press, Durham, 1998; Posthuman Bodies, Halberstam, J. & Livingston, I. eds., 
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